Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Dissertations

Graduate College

8-2004

The United States Supreme Court and American Individualism
Gary C. Roberts
Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations
Part of the American Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Roberts, Gary C., "The United States Supreme Court and American Individualism" (2004). Dissertations.
1275.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/1275

This Dissertation-Open Access is brought to you for free
and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM

by
Gary C. Roberts

A DisseiMios
Submitted to the
Faculty o f The Graduate College
in partial fiilfillment o f the
rcqjiifemeats for the
Degree of Doctor o f Philosophy
Department o f Political Seieace

Western Michigaa University
KalatBaaM), MicWgaa
August 2004

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

^ciT-ei
THE UNITED STATES SUPREK4E COURT AND AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM

Gary C. Roterts, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2004

The United States Supreme Court occupies an unusual, oftentimes paradoxical
position within Ainerican democracy. On one hand, it is an institution that seemingly
lacks democratic legitimacy, and on the other, it is an Institution that dutifully gives
meaning to the nation’s donocratic values. The uniqueness and possibly the grandeur of
the American Supreme Court is that it has historically been able to successfully combine
these two apparently contradictory aspects in such a manner as to expand upon the
nation’s traditional sense o f individualism—^the whole notion of an individual’s In
alienable right to life, liberty, and property.
Using legal case analysis, the hypothesis o f this research endeavor is that the
United States Supreme Court has seemingly perpetuated, in some o f its more ftindamental constitutional decisions, an underlying predisposition toward those nomiative
ideals that pertain primarily to classical democratic liberalism—^that is, toward those
normative Ideals that f^rtain specifically to the value o f individualism. It has done so
through carefiil case selection, which has, in several instances, involved the liberties and
protections guaranteed to flie individual against the government by the Bill o f Rights and
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
White countless studies have been coaductai on the U.S. Supreme Court, most of
them have either sought to determine a proper role for the Court within American
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democracy, or have sought to find ways o f explaining the Court’s power. 'This research
endeavor has been altogethw different Its objective has been to determine how the U.S.
Supreme Court has used its unique institutional setting, as the final arbiter o f constitu
tional law^, to preserve and perpetuate the founding principles o f classical liberalism (i.e.,
life, liberty, and properly) within American political culture and society. As such, individiiaiism has been its end; the Bill o f Rights has been its means.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court occupies an unusual, oftentimes paradoxical
position within American democracy. On one hand, it is an institution that seemingly
lacks democratic legitimacy, and on the other, it is an institution that diitifiilly gives
meaning to the nation’s democratic values. The uniqueness and possibly the grandeur of
the American Supreme Court is that it has historically been able to successfiilly combine
these two apparently contradictory aspects in such a manner as to expand upon the
nation’s traditional sense o f individualism—the whole notion o f an individual’s in
alienable right to life, liberty, and property. The questions to ask about this parados are:
How has the Supreme Court accomplished this feat? In essence, what types of cases (i.e.,
issue areas and/or constitutional provisions) has it used to promote American individ
ualism? Moreover, why has the Supreme Court seemingly felt compelled to pursue such
an agenda? In other words, why has iJie Court assumed a substantial portion o f the
responsibility for ensuring that individualism remains an important part o f American
culture? Finally, what makes the Supreme Court institutionally suited to undertake such a
task? What is it about the Supreme Court’s particular institational setting that allows It to
be a pivotal player in protecting and expanding upon American individualism?
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Statement o f the Problem
If one begins with the supposition, as most scholars o f judicial politics do, that the
United States Supreme Court’s primaiy objectree under the Constitution is to act in the
capacity as a counter-majoritariaii institution, as a protector of minority rights, then it is
only fair to hypothesize from this premise that the United States Supreme Court will
endeavor to accept as legitimate any means it perceives to be significant to further en
hancing the rights o f the iadivMiial (Semonclie, 2000, p. 1). This Implies that the United
States Supreme Court should accept as constitutional any means that it perceives to be of
value in underscoring the democratic rights o f the individual. We might think o f this
process as a ‘^weighing process,” whereby the Court balances the rights of the whole, or
the majority, against the rights o f the individual person or entity, as in property (Van
Geel, 1991, pp. I2-14). As John Semonche writes:
Americans are united within a civic culture that is [both] strong and durable. These ties
that bind are primarily legal, political, and spiritual; they nurture and promote the inter
ests of the kidividuai; and they are mstitutioBaiired within the American constitutional
system. The Supreme Court of the United States, which is at the apex o f the coimtiy’s
legal system, plays a central role in explicating, reinforcing, and expanding the range of
these ties (p. 1).

Hence, if true, we should be able to demonstrate, through case analysis, that the Supreme
Court has historically viewed American economic, political, and social dem ocr^y in
individual terms. In other words, it has perceived the rights o f the individual as far more
important to Ainerlcan democracy than the rights o f the whole. In this respect, such an
analysis could very well lend credence to the notion that the United States Supreme Court
has been an .hnportant contributor to American individualism.
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Theoretical Problem

In order to properly anderstaad Americas mdividiiaKsni, whether it be ia its
current form or historically, one needs to become familiar with its origins or roots. Only
aftenvards can he or she triily come to appreciate the iorige¥ity it has sustained in
American culture. The theoretical foiindation o f Americaii individualisin can be traced to
the early tenets of classical liberalisin or, more aptly put, classical democratic liberalism.
Such economic, political, m d social thinkers as John Locke, Adam Smith, and John
Stuart Mill have all. In one respect or another, contributed immensely to this early
pMiosophical notion. Their writings have provided an ideological foundation upon which
American individualism has been built and fostered. This

occurre4 in large part,

through the scholarly promotion o f individual liberty—^that is, an individuafs right to
pursue whatever he or she wishes, so long as it does not inflict any degree o f harm on
another individual, without any undue restraint on the part o f the state. We see this as
most evident in classical liberalism’s pursuit o f individual freedom (i.e., self-determina
tion) within the economic, political, and social spheres o f life.
Economically, classical liberalism places a great deal o f emphasis upon such
concepts as “peraonai consumption,” “entrepreneurship,” “maricet,” '‘private investment,”
and “private property,” among others (i.e., capitalism). What do all o f these id e ^ have in
coiHmon? Quite simply put: Indivldiialisiii. They all boil down to the individual using his
or her own talent and initiative in such a manner as to freely engage in the market pro
cess. John Locke writes that each individual should

free in his or her own “life, liberty,

and property,” with particular emphasis being placed upon “property” (Macpherson,
1980, p. 9). The mdividual, accordingly, should be freely able to make “private” that
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4
which he or she “mixes with Ms or her labor”—^that no one, particularly governinent,
should be able to take his or her properly' without some form o f coaseat (pp. 19, 73).
Adam S,niith fiirtiier undersc-oies this belief by statiag that “amoag m m , the most dis
similar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective
■talents” (Smilli, 1991, pp. 22-23).
Politically, classical liberalism also places a great deal o f emphasis on the rights
o f the individuai within the political process. John Stuart Mill writes, for instance, ^that
[the individual] is the only safe guardian o f his [or her] own rights and Interests—that
[such] rights are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is him
self [or herself] able . . . to stand up for them” (Mill, 1991, p. 65). Hence, ’‘1:he ideally
best form o f goverament,” accorfing to Mill, “is that in which the sovereignly, or the
supreme controliing power, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every
citizen not only having a voice in the exercise o f that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at
least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government” (p. 64). In much the
same fashion, John Locke stipulafcs that by man’s own consent does he relinquish his
natural liberty, his natural power, to form a civil govemment—-a government solely be
stowed with the duly to protect his “life, liberty, and property” (MacpheKon, 1980, pp. 9,
52).
And finally, classical liijeralism places particular emphasis on the rights o f the
individual (i.e., his or her own sense o f self-determination) within the community at
large, within the social sphere. John Stuart Mill writes that “the only part of the conduct
o f any one, for wMch he for she] is amenable to society, is that which concerns others; in
tie part which merely concerns Mmself [or herself], his [or her] independence is, of right,
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absolute” (Collini, 1993, p. 13). What does sucti a statement entail? Well, in part, unless
the individual is harmfully in.friagiRg upon the rights o f others, he or she should be freely
able to do whatever he or she wishes to do. For Mill, such liberty incladed the indi
vidual’s right to express Ms or her own opinion, to pursue his or her own tastes, and to
associate with his or her own respected colleagues (pp. 15-16). If society should play a
role in any one of these aspects, then it should only be one of persuasion—^oot com
pulsion (p. 13). Above ail, the individual should be protected “against flie tendency o f
society to impose its own ideas and practices as rules o f conduct on those who dissent
from them” (p. 8).

Research Problem

O f course, one might ask: Where exactly does the United States Supreme Court fit
into all o f this early philosophical discussion? More specifically, what do the Court’s
decisions have to do with classical liberalism? At first glance, not much, given that
classical liberalism is philosophically concerned with questions o f ‘hvhat ought to be,”
and that the Supreme Court is empirically concerned with questions o f ‘%hat is”; how
ever, after care&I analysis, one can begin to observe a close parallei between liie tenets o f
classical liberalism and many of the fundamental constitutional decisions handed down
by the Supreme Court. What makes such a relationship even more pertinent is the fact
that, in some cases, it remains trae regardless o f the Court’s particular ideological per
suasion. This implies that while such noted judicial scholars as Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey
Segal are certainly correct in asserting that personal values and attitudes do play a large
role in each jastice’s decision making process, the adherence o f the Court as a whole to
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such principles as indMdaal autonomy and individual rights remains even stronger, and
if not stronger, then at least a central concern (Segal & Spaeth, 1993, pp. 64-73). Hence,
while the primaiy emphasis o f the attitodlHai model is with each justice’s own peKoiial
values and attitudes at the individual level, the primary emphasis of this mode! is with the
whole Court’s values and attitudes at the aggregate level.
From this, we might then hypothesize that many o f the Supreme Court’s justices
are invariably conscious, in some capacity or another, of the nation’s founding principles
in their decision making process—^again, regardless o f their own personal predispositions.
the casual observer might disagree, asserting that such a statement is nothing more
than mere ideology camouflaged as an empirical truth, the fact remains that we are not
talking about the role o f the govemiiieiit, per se. Instead, we are specifically alluding to
the role of the mdividual within the nation’s economic, political, and social strato
sphere—his or her own personal autonomy within these realms. Moreover, even if
ideology is the correct caption, we are not talking about an attitudinal arrangement o f the
Segal-Spaeth variety, (i.e., where a justice’s personal preferences can be found along a
liberal to conservative spectram; pp. 64-73). No, the argument being made here is that the
individual is nearly always, keeping in mind that there are clearly exceptions to any rule,
considered in a one-dimensional fashion (Van Geel, 1991, pp. 12-14).* The individual’s

*
To undmcore tliis statemrait, T, R. Van Geei provides a nice discussioa o f how tbe Supreme
Court uses the Coiistilution’s protection of individua! rights as a “restraint” on the jx>wer of other entities,
such as government, to not interfere with those rights (Van Geel, 1991, pp. 12-14). Such rights, Van Geel
notes, are treated, in many cases, “as if they were absolute” (p. 13). Accordingly, he identifies six steps that
the Court uses to define such a relationship. These inclDde: (1) Does the Constitution recognize the claimed
right?; (2) Is the right availaWe in the circuiBstaaces o f this case?: (3) Did the govCTnmenfs policy or prac
tice infringe apoi the right?; (4) Wbat Jastification does the govenatient offer for the adoption o f its policy
and how important are the istereste the govemment seeks to promote?; (5) How important is the Individoal
right at stake ia the case?; and (6) %4iat strategy of justification, tests, precedent, and other materials,
should be used in crafting the opinion? (p. 14)
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personal rights are considered as paramount to ail others, whether they be the state or
some other entity (pp. 12-14).
In the end, though, it should be noted that if Mmtog^y d < ^ come into play, then it
is only with respect to the Court’s— its justices’—own preference toward certain areas o f
concern—^meaning, that there may be particular issues that seeiaiiigly dominate mucli o f
the Court’s time as reflected In Its caseload. For instance, it is widely accepted that the
Fuller Court (1888-1909) spent much o f Its time with “liberly o f contract” cases, while
the Warren Court (1953-1969) spent much o f its time with civil rights and civil liberties
cases. Two very different Courts, with two very different ideological agendas. Still, the
pursuit o f individual autonomy and mdividual rights remained consistent, only in dif
ferent areas o f coacem. For the Fuller Court, individual autonomy within the economic
sphere was far more compelling than the state’s right to impose regulations—^regulations
that in its view would Inhibit an Individiiaf s personal fieedom to engage in “contracts,”
of whatever sort. For the Warren Court, however, individual autonomy within the social
sphere, say within criminal rights, was far more compelling than the state’s right to
prosecute without a proper accord given to due process o f law.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis o f this research endeavor is that the United States Supreme Court
has seeiBHigly perpetuated, in some o f its more fhndamental coestitutional decisions, m
underlying predisposition toward those normative ideals that pertain primarily to classical
democratic liijeralism—that is, toward lliose normative ideals that pertain specifically to
the value of individualisin.
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Definition, o f Temis

A concept is the building block o f a language; it is a “‘shoiAaiMi’ description of
the empirical world” (Nachinias & Naclimias, 2000, p. 24). We might think o f a concept
in terms of te primaiy functions: (1) .as a tool for communication; (2) as a tool for
organization; (3) as a tool for generalization; and (4) as a tool for theoiy construction (pp.
24-26). However, a concept is truly naeaiiiagiess without definition. Indeed, “if [the]
concept [is] to serve [its] functions,” then it must “be clear, precise, and agreed upon” (p.
26). That is why it is necessaiy to spend some time identifying and defining those Con
cepts that are most relevant to the current research endeavor:
1. Classical liberalism is defined as a normative pMiosophical ideology which
places particular interest on the right o f the Individual to pursue his or her own chosen
agenda without any undue restraint on the part o f the state. In essence, the individual, so
long as he or she does not seek to harm other individuals, should be f r « to do whatever
he or she desires with his or her own life, litert}*', and property. Classical libwalism is
very much rooted in the writings o f John Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John
Stuart M ill While each one o f these philosophical writers approaches classical liberalism
from a different perspective, the final product is still very much the same—an individ
ual’s rights, Ms or her o w e happiness and development, are “nearly always” paramoiint to
those offlie state.
2. Constitutional decision is defined as a decision, a case, in which the Supreme
Court has decided on some issue related to the United States Constitution. Most consti
tutional decisions have involved the Bill of Rights as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, for purposes here, though, such decisions will tend to focus on property
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rights, freedom issues, and due process. These particular t>'pes o f decisions are selected
for analysis because they are Issue conceras that are readily observable across the
Sapreme CourTs history, and because they are also cases in which we are most likely to
find, the individualist tendencies reflected in the principles o f classical liberalism.
3.

Democracy is defined, in the modern sense, as a representative po.litIcal process

whereby such standards as “effective participation,” “voting equality,” “enlightened
undestaading,” “control o f the agenda,” and “inclusion o f .adalts” are p^amount to its
overall legitimacy (Dahl, 199§, pp. 37-38). Democracy, how-ever, like so many other
similar concepts, such as “representation,” can be, and has been, defined in a number o f
diverse ways. Many of us are probably familiar with its early application in such Greek
city-states as Athens, where democracy itself was direct, as in the people’s right to par
ticipate ifi policy discussion and formation but, at the same time, very restricted and
limited to upper-class Athaiian males. Most o f us are proi»Wy also familiar %'itli its later
application in the Roman republic. These early versions o f democracy, nonetheless, were
not, in any sense o f the term, what the fouading fathers had in mind when they set out to
create the American system o f government. O f course, they similarly foresaw a very
limited scheme o f democracy— &democracy where flie right to participate was limited to
white propertied males—but their democracy also included other facets such as “repre
sentation,” a “bill o f rights,” an “electoral college,” “checks-and-baiances,” “separatioiiof-powers,” and “federalism.” The American system o f govemment would be a democ
racy in only a very li.inited sense o f the teim. The people would have a right to participate
in goveraineiit through their representatives; they would have a right to vote for these
representatives if they were white, male, and propertied; and their rights would be
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protected tlirongh a very complex, decentralized form o f goYernment. While, today,
thanks to the expansion of the francMss, Americaa democracy is miich ditTerent ix>m
what the founding fathers inltiaily created, many o f its central tenets are still present We
still ha¥e a right to participate in gO¥emineiit through our rspresentotives; we still have a
right to vote for th e « represeoMlves; and oar ifidividiial rights are stlil protected by a hill
o f rights as m'eli as a complex network o f govemnieatal checks-and-balances.
4.

Due process o f law is defined as “a course o f legal proceedings according to

those rules and principles which have been established in our system o f jurisprudence for
the enforcement and protection o f private [individual] rights” (Black, 1979, p. 449). In
other words, due process of law
implies the right of the person affected fiiei-eby to be present before the tribunal which
pronoiinces jodgnent ufxtn the questicsn of life, libery, or propert}', in its most comprehaisive sense; to be lieafd, by festimoHy or otherwise, arid to have the r i ^ t of OTBtrovert,
by proof, every material fact which bears on Pie question of right in the matter invol ved
(p. 449).

Originally, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal
govenunent; however, after the adoption o f the Fourteenth Amendment at the end o f the
Civil War, it also became applicable to the states as well.^ In fact, the due process clause
o f the Fourteenth Amendfnent has become a tool by which the Supreme Court has selec
tively “nationalized,” or incorporated, most o f the Bill o f Rights onto the states (O’Brien,
1991, pp. 272-336). Today, such constitutional provisions as the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amsndmefif s protection
against self-incrimitiatlon, and the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel are ju ^ as binding
on state governments as they once were, and still are, on the federal government.^ Other

^
Barron vs. The M{^'or m d City ComncM o f Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
^
M^aifvs. Co&r«fo. 33§ U.S. 25 (1949); Maiioy vs. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 {1964); and Gideon w.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as Fourth z4mendtnenf s sxclusionaiy niie, the Fifth
Americinient’s protection against doable jeopardy, the Sixth AmendmeisFs right to a
speedy trial, and the Eighlh AsiendHieiit’s ban against crael and unusaal paaishments, are
also applicable/ And, o f course, we cannot forget the various freedoms o f the First
Amendment—freedom of speech, press, and religion, as well as freedom o f as^m bly and
association/
5.

Equal protection o f the law Is defined as a “guarantee . . . that no person or

class o f persons shall be denied the same protection o f the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances in their lives, liberty, property, and in their
pursuit o f happiness” (Black, 1979, p. 481). While each individual citizen has been
guaranteed the equal protection o f the law under the Fourteenth Ameedment, such pro
tection was not historically forthcoming where citizens were viewed as “separate but
equal.”^ Certainly, one does not have to search too far in history to find that the equal
protection clause o f Ihe Fourteenth Amendment has only recently, as within the past few
decades, provided relief to countless “categories” of citizens/ Today, the equal protec
tion clause has been made applicable by the U.S. Supreme Court to such areas as racial
discrimination and state action, racial discriminatioii in education, affirmative action and
reverse discrimination, gender-based discrimination, indigent-based discrimination, as

Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); .Bemton vs. Maryimmd, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); K hpfer vs.
North Cam lim , 386 U.S. 2i3 (1967); and Rob'msos vs. Catifornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
^
Fiske vs. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Nesv iw. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Hamilton vs.
Regents o f the University o f California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Everson vs. Board o f Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); De Jonge vs. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
aad NAACP vs. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
j
P kssy vs. Fergason, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'
The tom “categories” is used in place of such cfiverse adjectives as color, gender, race, and so on.
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well as alien-based discrimination (O’Brien, 1991, pp. 1246-1496).*
6. Equality is defined in two ways, isoth o f which, Lawrence Herson notes, have
historically been 'troablesome” (Herson, 1984, p. 20). ’H ie first, equality o f opportunitj',
stipulates that “each person shall be free to make what he or she is able of his or her life
without undue governfnent interference or assistance” (p. 21).^ This form o f o|uaIity was
most prevalent prior to the New Deal of the 1930s, when rugged mdividiialisin was
appreciated as a preemiiient virtue o f American culture. It is more o f a laissez-faire
approach to life, where each individual is responsible for '“pulling up his or her own
bootstraps” and getting to work. As such, equality o f opportunity “places the burden o f
success or failure on the individual” (p. 21). The second, equality o f outcome, stipulates
that “govemmefit shall take respmsibllity for making certain that each person receives
something that approaches an equal share o f life’s rewards” (p. 21). This form of equality
is largely a post-World War II phenofaenon and is predominantly synonymoas with such
govemment programs as job retraining, unemployment insurance, and welfare. As a
whole, equality o f outcome “suggests that responsibility for a person’s success or failure
shall be shared by both the individual and society” (p. 21).
7, Freedom o f religion Is defined as the “freedom from dictation, constraint, or
control in matters affecting the conscience, religious beliefs, and the practice o f religion;
[It is the] freedom to entertain and express any or no system o f religious opinioas, and to
engage in or refrain from any form o f religious observance or public or private religious

Sheliey vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Brown vs. Board o f Education o f TopeM, Kmsas, 347
U.S. 4S3 (1954); Regents o f the Umiversity o f Cdifornia vs. BaUe, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); C ityofR kkm ond
vs. J. A Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Reed vs. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Griffin vs. lilm ois, 351 U.S. 12
(J956); and Graham vs. Richardson, 403 U.S. 532 (1971).
®
It should be noted, though, that even equality o f oppoitunity assumes that government will provide
an equal playing field—^that contracts, for instaince, w ll be enforced irregardless of who is involved.
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worship, not inconsistent with the peace and good order of society and the general
welfare"’ (Black, 1979, p, 828). As so stipulated by the First Amencinient o f the U.S.
Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishraent o f religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Simple in phraseology, but veiy complex in appli
cation. Indeed, as with m m y other cases, the Supreme Couit has hM to periodically
grapple with providing a succinct interpretation to the religion clause, as in what exactly
constitutes the “establishment o f a religion” as well as what exactly constitutes the “fe e
exercise thereof’ (O’Brien, 1991, pp. 635-636)? Throughout, the Court has basically
relied, at various times, on three distinct approaches to these questions; (1) the “strict
separation” approach; (2) the “strict neutrality” approach; and (3) the “accommodationist” approach (p. 643)}^ As the words themselves seemingly imply, the “strict
separation” approach Requires state neutrality and a secular purpose for legislation”; the
“strict neutrality” approach “requires not merely a secular purpose for legislation but bars
ail laws that either aid or hinder religion; and the “accoiTunodationist” approach, “while
maintaining that laws raust have a secular purpose, allows

govemmental accofnmo-

dation of religion in ways that fiirther religious freedom without endorsing a particular
religion” (pp. 643-644). During the post-World War II era, all three approaches have
periodically been influential with the Court at different times. The Vinson Court (19461953), for instance, m^as strongly influencal by the “sfrict separation” approach, the
Warren Court (1953-1969) by the “strict neutrality” approach, and the Burger Court
(1969-19S6) by the “accommodationist” approach (pp. 643-654). The crarent Retmquist

Everson w. Beard o f IMuca$i/m o f Ewing Tawmhip, 330 U.S. I (1947); Abmgian School District
vs. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); aad Widmarvs. V ixem , 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Court (1986-Present) has shown a tendency to favor the “accommodationisf’ approach.
8.

Freedom o f speech is defined as the “freoiom . . . to express opinions and facts

by word or mouth, uncontrolled by a censorship or restrictions o f goveriineiif’ (Black,
1979, p. 828). Under the auspices of the First AmendmsEt, fi-eedoiii o f speech has tra
ditionally been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in such a maimer that “the
government may not restrict protected expression because o f its content, message, view
point or topic unless the goverament establishes a compelling regulatoiy interest”
(Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p. 47). This, however, has not meant that freedom of speech
is an absolute freedom. The Court has also historically set aside categories—largely, on a
case-by-case basis—^that it has felt may ver>' well fall outside the venues o f the First
Amendmeiit Such categories have included “obscene speech,” “fighting words,” “of
fensive speech,” “threats,” “speech posing a clear and present danger,” and certain cate
gories o f “commercial speech” (pp. 4 6 - 6 4 ) . Recent trends in the Supreme Court’s
inteipretation of the First Amendment, though, have made such categories largely in
effective as dete’fninants o f constitutionality (pp. 64-67). The reason is that the Court has
come to the realization that most cases involving speech are not clear-cut instances of
constitutionality and anconstitutionality, as in the case o f one category being protected
and the other not (pp. 64-67). As such, today, the Court also places a great deal of
emphasis on the overall “social value” in the speech to the “marketplace o f ideas,” thus
creating different degrees of importance to speech within each category (pp. 66-67).*^

"
M ik vs. United States^ 345 U.S. 476 (1957); Ckapiimfy’ vs. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
Cohen vs. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); M^atis vs. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Sckenckvs. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); and Virginia State Board o f Pharmacy vs. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Bethel School District vs. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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9. Ideology is defined as “a set o f beliefs, values, and goals” that an individual
holds in his or her own life (Gans. 1.988, p. 1). Given that an ideology confines itself
principally to values, it is .normative .in character.*'^ This means, mors specifically, that it
can be neither true nor false. An individual, for instance, may believe that the economy
would operate much more eflectively and efficiently if only the state would stop regu
lating aspects of it. This is an op.inioa, a set of beliefs about how one perceives the proper
role o f government within the economic sphere. Another individual may just as well
disagree by believing that the economy needs state regulation. Two very different per
spectives; two very different ideologies.
10. Individualism Is defined as “the pureuit o f personal freedom and o f personal
control over the social and natural environment” (Gans, 1988, p. 1). Another way o f de
fining individualism is to perceive it as a “mode o f life in which the individual pursues
his [or her] own ends and follows his [or her] own ideas” (Herson, 1984, pp. 45-46).
While individualism may be centra! to classical liberalism in theory, it is a reality to the
Americaii way o f life. Indeed, the American system o f government is designed to pro
mote and protect the rights of the individual. This is most evident in the individual
guaraotees o f freedom provided in the Constitution’s first ten amendments—the Bill o f
.Rights.
11. Judicial review is defined as the Supreme Court’s “authority to review the
constitutionality o f legislative and executive acts”—^both at the federal and state level
(Fisher, 1990, A-21). While the power o f judicial review is nowhere explicitly stated

It should be ooted, tkoBgh, in a soniewhat guarded maaner, liiat values can be empirica! as well,
given that we can observe how these values actually play oat ia the rrai world. .For instance, we can iead%
observe what impact a free market can have on society. We can see its effects.
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within Article III o f the U.S. CoastitHtion, evidence does exist, prior to Marhury vs.
Madlsoii, which would suggest that some o f the founding feliiers expected that judicial
review would be aa iinplied power of the U.S. Supreme Court (pp. 43-46).*^ Alexander
Hamilton, for instance, discusses the Court’s power of judicial review—its necessity as
v/eli as its limitations—at length in Federalist Mo. 7S (p. 45). Not anti! Chief Justice John
Marshall’s opinion In Marbury vs. Madison, though, did the Supreme Court’s power of
judicial review become a lasting centeipiece to the Court’s institutional role within
America’s complex system of checks-and-balances, separation-of-powers, and federal
ism. In that case, Marshall states: “It is emphatically the province and duty o f the judicial
department to say what the law is” (pp. 65), Accordingly, “if, then, the courts are to
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act o f the legis
lature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they
both apply” (p. 65), Whether or not the Supreme Court was explicitly intended by the
founding fathers to have such a power o f judicial review, the fact remains that it does
have the power and that it has routinely exercised it.
12.

Liberty is defined as the “freedom from all restraints except such as are justly

imposed by the law” (Black, 1979, p. §27). We might think o f liberty as possessing two
rather distinct perspectives: “ [the] freedom to pursue one’s own purposes, and [the] free
dom from interference with that pursuit” (Herson, I9S4, p. 20).*^ However, it is important
to note that an indivlduaFs liberty' is not absolute. Even the most diehard classical liberal
would agree that liberty must be constrained within the parameters o f what is right and

Matbmyvs. Madism, 5 U.S. 137 (18Q3).
Anoflier way o f looking at this perspective is in terms of negative vs. positive liberty.
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what is ju s t “The only freedom which deserves the name,” according to John Stuart Mill,
“Is that o f pursuing oar own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive odiers o f theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (CoHini, 1993, p. 16).
Accordingly, “each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental
and spiritual” (p. 16),
13. Liberty or freedom o f contract is defined as “the ability at will, to make or
abstain from making, a binding obligation enforced by the sanctions at the law; [it is| the
right to contract about one’s affairs, including the right to make contracts of employ
ment” (Black, 1979, p. 828). Liberty of contract became synoaymoiis with economic
substantive due process at the end o f the 19**^ century and at the beginning o f the 20*
century. The U.S. Supreme Court, following the principle that it not only was obligated to
protect the procedural aspects o f the Constitution but also the substantive values o f it as
well, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause prohibited the govern
ment’s regulation of business enterprise (Biskupic & Witt, 1997, p. 296). In espousing
the doctrine o f a liberty o f contract. Justice Rufus Peckbam writes:
The Tibertj'’ mentioned in |tfae Fosirteenth] AmeiMlment means not only the right o f die
citizen to be free . . . in the enjoyment of all his [or her| faculties; P>ut also] to be free to
use them in all iawfol ways; to live and rvork where he [or she] will; to earn his [or her]
livelihood by any lawfW calling; to fwrsue any liveiibcsod of avocation; aad for tfiat pur
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper. , . (O'Brien, 1991, pp. 231-232).

14. Natural law or inalienable rights is defined as “a universal system o f rules and
principles to guide hiiman conduct” (Fisher, 1990, p. A-21). Natural law Is most often
characterized in classical liberalism as an individual’s inalienable rights—his or her
rights to life, liberty, and property. Thomas Hobbes, an early forerunner to classical

Aiigeyer vs. Lmismms, 165 U.S. 57i (1897).
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liberalism, writes; “The Law of Nature is a precept or general role, found out by reason,
by which [an indwldual] is forbidden to do that which is destructive o f his [or her] life or
taksth away the means o f preserving the same, aad to omit that by which he [or she]
thinketb it may be best preserved” (Curley, 1994, p. 79). While it is true that natural law
is a fiindamental premise to such political philosophies as classical liberalism, the fact
remains that the very issue of natural law often elicits controversy (Fisher, 1990, pp. 5455).*'^ Why? Well, in large part, natoral law is a normative suppositioii, in that it can
neither ise proven as true nor false. An individual can state that he or she has an inaiienaWe right to property, but this is the person’s own belief or opinion. While such a
statement is obviously supported by classical liberalism, it is still not a fact. Classical
liberalism, too, is a normrfve philosophy.
15.

Original intent is defined as a judicial method of interpretation whereby the

wishes of the original authors o f the U.S. Constitution, subsequent Amendments, such as
the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordinary statutes, are given prim a facie weight as a
guide to the interpretation and definition o f law. The doctrine of original Intent asserts,
for instance, that if the Supreme Court wishes to define “commerce,” as it is outlined in
Article I, Section 8, o f the U.S. Constitution, thai it should defer to the original definition
of the founding fattiers, as stipulate4 say, within the Federalist Papers, Convention notes,
or personal diaries. The original intent o f the founding fathers should be adhered to as
much as possible. Why? Well, in the words o f Edmund Burke: “In history a great volume
is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past
errors and infiimlties o f mankind” (Pocock, 1987, p. 124). More pertinent to the present

Rochin vs. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and Griswoldm Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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argiimsnt, however, is the ifihereat belief that the doctrine of original intent, as espoused
by those such as Robert Bork or Edmund Meese, prevents the Supreme Court, a noeelected institation, from engaging in policy making—a power believed to be properly
reserved only to the elected Institutions of government. The coanterciaim to the doctrine
o f original Intent is the view that fli© U.S. Con^itiition Is a “living doeument” and should,
thus, be adapted to the time in which it is interpreted. The “living document” approach
emanates from Ihe Constitution’s apparent lack o f specificity—^its overall generalitj^
Such individuals as Justice Oliver W. Holmes and Justice William Brennan, among
others, have historically supported the “living document” interpret^ion.
16. Political culture or political creed is defined “as a widely shared set of values
concerning goverament and politics, a widely shared set o f understandings as to what
government ought to do, and a widely shared set o f ideas concerning the purposes of
public policy” (Herson, 1984, pp. 13-14). Lawrence Herson notes that while America’s
political culture is vastly complex, it still can be narrowed down to what he categorizes as
a “cuitiiral inventory” (p. 20). Americans, he stipulates, have a strong desire for “liberty,”
a keen sense o f “equality,” a drive for “achievement,” a respect for “justice,” an ad
miration fc»r the “rule o f law,” an appreciation o f “private property,” an affection for
“localism,” and a love of “democracy” (pp. 20-24). Each one o f these principles has
historically, in one shape or another, composed America’s political culture. Most all o f
them, o f course, were founding principles of American government.
17. Property Is defined as ^That which is peculiar or proper to any person” (Black,
1979, p. 1095). It entails a sense o f “ownership—the unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing, [whereby the individual has] the right to dispose o f a thing in every legal way, to
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possess it, to ase it, and to exclude [anyone] else from interfering with it” (p. 1095). Con
sidered as a central tenet o f classical liberalism, the ¥ery concept o f “property” itself has
aodergone tremendoiis changes over the years. In its earliest fona, properly merely
signified what many, such as John Locke, belie¥ed to be one of its distinguisMog features-~-the fact that it becomes property, in the sense that it is pri¥ate, once an indi¥idiial
mixes his or her labor with it (Macplierson, 1980, pp. 19). Such a view meant that the
“individual possessed property in Piis or her] person as well as in p is or her]
goods— [that] the act of labor [itself invested part o f [Ms or her] personality in an object”
(Fisher, 1990, p. 465). James Madison fiirther under^ored this perspective in Federalist
No, 10 when he stated that it is “the diversity in the faculties o f [individuals], from which
the rights o f prof^rty originate” (p. 465). Hence, we can see that the very concept o f
property, at least during the founding era, represented more than the mere physical pos
session o f an object; it djviously encompassed something more, sometHRg rather
“broad” in nature (p. 465). Louis Fisher writes: “People had property in their opinions, in
the free communicatiofi o f ideas, in religious beliefs, and the free use o f faculties and
‘free choice o f the objects on which to employ them”’ (p. 465). While the U.S. Supreme
Court would feinporarily restrict the meaning of property' ia later yearn to what it felt the
doctrine o f laissez-faire ecoeomics espouse4 it is true that, today, property “has come to
represent a ‘bundle o f rights’” (p. 465).
IS.

Right to privacy is defined as an individual’s “right to be let alone,” in his or

her pereon, place, or things (O’Brien, 1991, p. 1146). While the right to privacy is no
where explicitly provided for in the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court, nonetheless,
has ruled that its “penumbras” can be found within the Bill o f Rights, especially within
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the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, aa,d Nisth Aniendmefits, as weii as in the Fourteenth
Amendment (p. 1148).** The right to pri¥acy has most often been equated with an
individuafs “reproductive feedom” and “personal autonomy” (pp. 1150-1245).*’
19. Siibstantive due process is defined as a procedural method whereby “the
Constitution not only demands the government follow fair procedures but also protects
certain substantive values” (e.g., economic and properly rights) (Biskupic- .aad Witt, 1997,
pp. 296-297). The U.S. Supreme Court has periodically incorporated substantive due pro
cess to, for lack o f a better word, Kad values into the Constitution that may not be
explicitly stated within it but that the Court feels are implied by the substance of it (the
Constitution) as a whole. The Supreme Court extensively used substantive due process as
a means to prevent the government’s regulation o f business enterprise during the late 19***
century and early part of the 2§* century. The Court’s rationale was simple: freedom o f
contract (pp. 296). The government could not regulate business enterprise because such
regulation violated an implied “liberty of contract” between employers and employees (p.
296).^® While the Supreme Court eventually did retreat from its use of substantive due
process within the business arena, it wouI4 in later years, find another use for it. This
time, though, it would use substantive doe process to incorporate a “right to privacy” into
the Constitution (p. 297).^*

Griswold vs. Comectiait, 391 U.S. 145 (1965).
R&e vs. Wmk, 4i0 U.S. 113 (1973) aad Moore vs. Citf o f East Clevelmtd, 431 U.S. 494 {1977).
SImghterkoMse Cases, 16 U.S. 36 (1873); Mmtn vs. lUinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1S77); Mugler m.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Chicago, Mibmukee and St. Paul Railroad- Co. vs. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890); Allgeyer vs. Louisiam, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Locknerws.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); m d Adkim vs. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Grisu’oM vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Limitations of Study

As with any research endeavor, while the objective will always remain consistent,
to provide as accurate and insightful o f conclusions as possible, there are always going to
be limitations in the overall accuracy and applicability o f the research itself. In this
respect, the researcher acknowledges the existence of the following limitations to this
study:
1. Even though the primary objective, in this case, is to determine whether or not
the United States Supreme Court has had a tendency to underscore many o f its consti
tutional decisions with several o f the more pertinent tenets o f classical liberalism, it can
never be positively ascertained as to whether or not such a connection was conscientfously made by the Supreme Coiiit itself. Indeed, it could well be the case that such
a coimection is nothing more than mere coincidence. The researcher thus can never be
100 percent confident that when the Court hands down a decision, it based that decision
solely on classical liberalism. There may, o f course, be indications o f such an intention,
but the researcher can never know with absolute certainty that the Court itself made such
a connection. The only hope is to find enough pieces o f evidence to make such a con
nection probabilistic.
2. Moreover, even though another objective, in this case, is to determine the role
that the United States Supreme Court has played in fostering Americas individualism,
again, for the same rcasoss stipulated above, it can never be positively a^ertained as to
whether or not this was in fact a consclously-made intention on the part o f the Supreme
Court itself. Clearly, it could be nothing more than a coincidental side-effect o f the
Court’s overall decision making In particular areas o f constitutional law. The aim, again.
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is to make such a connection probable, based upon the amount o f evidence presented
within each case.
3.

Finally, white the primary' aim of this analysis is directed toward the United

States Supreme Court itself—^its hypothesized role ia perpetuating classical liberalism-—-the Intention is not to lay sole credit for such an endeavor at the footsteps o f the
“Marble Temple” (O’Brien, 2000, pp. 104-164). Indeed, it Is folly acknowledged that the
Court is only one institution among many others, including the President, Congress, the
federal bureaucracy, political parties, as well as a whole host o f state and local institoticKis. No, the objective here is to simply look at the Supreme Court’s particular role ia
this endeavor, while acknowledging that other institiitions may have played a part too.

Review of the Literature

The availability o f literature on the Supreme Court’s role in promoting or
fostering American individualism, as a particular “ideological agenda,” is minimal at
best. This by no means implies that there is no literature on the subject—only that the
existing literature tends to be rather issue- or case-oriented. For instance, there is ample
literatiirs available on the Court’s role in such issue areas ^ property rights, freedom o f
ideas, and due process. However, there Is little, if any, literature available on how these
particular issue areas have enhanced American Individualism—on how they have nur
tured and promoted the basic liberal democratic principles upon which the United States
was originally founded. To undertake such aa endeavor, it Is important to keep in mind
that the literature itself does not necessarily have to be scientifically based, with
independent, dependent, and control variables, s© long .as it remains logical, with weil-
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supported premises and conclusions. The literature can be philosophical as well as
historical in character.
The best place to begin such an endea¥or Is to briefly examine what has been
accomplished, thus far, with respect to determining what influence classical democratic
liberalism may lia¥e had on fiie American foanding fathers. Iti other words, what e¥idence exists which would allow us to conclude that the founding fathers were not only
aware o f classical liberalism—its principles, that is—^but were deliberate in Iheir attempts
to make it a founding tenet of American gO¥enMnent. There are any number o f sources
tiiat we might turn to for answers, including: (1) the Declaration o f Independence; (2) the
Federalist papers; and (3) the debates in the federal con¥entioe of 1787 (Paul & Dickman, 1989, pp. 23-2S). All o f these worics provide a first-hand glimpse into the “true”
intent of many o f the founding fathers. We know, for instance, from the Declaration of
Independence, that Thomas Jefferson must have been a receptive studait o f classical
liberalism. After all, he writes “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienaMe Rights, that among Aese are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit o f Happiness [property]” (Witt, 1990, p. 933). Moreover, we also know, from the
Federalist papera, Aat Alexander Hamilton, Jianes Madison, and John Jay were clear
proponents of a liinited republican government, since they all, in one shape or another,
advocated a fonB o f govemment that was tightly hinged to such ausiiiaiy precautions as
checks-and-balaaces, federalism, and separation-of-powers. And finally, we know, from
the debates in the federal convention of 1787, that while many o f the other founding
fathers did not necessarily expound a d ear philosophical ideal o f their own, they at least
did share in the belief that the individual’s liberty should be safeguarded against any un
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necessary encroachment on the part of the gO¥emment (Paul & Dickman, 1989, pp. 2735). As Ellen Fraakel Paul and Howard DiGfcmaii write: “The delegates to tie Con¥ention
were undefiiaMy conceraed with the preservation o f rights” (p, 30).
It is not enough to merely determlHe that classical liberalism was an important
consideration to the founding fathers in their attempts to create a new govemment We
must also deterniine if there is evidence which woaM suggest that their “attempts” were
lasting In nature. In other words, has classical liberalism had a lasting impact on
American culture and society? There is much in the way o f evidence to suggest that It has
survived. If only partially. Indeed, Lawrence Herson writes that “for more than three
centuries w'e have maintained a comrnon culture whose political dimensions have been
sustained with considerable tenacity” (Herson, 19M, p. 295). Such key values as liberty,
equality, achievement, justice, precedent, rule o f law, private property, localism, and
democracy—all, in many respects, cental to classical liberalism—-mean as much today to
Americans as they did nearly three-hundred years ago (pp. 20-24). They are now part of
what Guanar Myrdal calls the America political creed, “a profession o f ideals so central
to American thought that they [forever] infomi and haunt our political life” (Myrdal,
1942, p. 4). As Alexis de Tocqaeville once wrote, in Ms observations o f the United
States, during the l§30s: “ [While] liberty is generally bom In stormy weather . . . , it is
only when it is old does one see the blessings it has brought” (Lawrence & Mayer, 20fW,
Vol. I, p. 240). The fact that classical iibsrallsoi has survived innumerable “difficulties
amid civil discords” attests to the accuracy o f this statement (p. 240). Classical iiberalism—ihe whole notion, that is, o f mdividiial rights and liberties— is still *Very' much
alive” within the United States (Shapiro, 1986, p. 273).
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Finally, having detennined that classical liberaiisiB still lives and breathes in
Americ-an culture aad society, we must now turn our attention toward that entity which
has enabled it to successfiilly do so. Since the hypothesis of this research endeavor seeks
to determine what role, if any, the United States Supreme Court has played in this regard,
it might behoove as to focus our primary attention on it. In essence, m%at literature exists
which might lend credence to the notion that the Supreme Court has been an active par
ticipant in promoting and nurturing classical liberalism? The best place to begin such an
endeavor is to simply examins what basic duties the Supreme Court is responsible for
performing within American government and society. We know, for instance, that the
Court Is expected to resolve all “cases and controversies” that may arise under the United
States Constitution (U.S. Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 2). We also know that the Court is
responsible for providing definition to the Constitution through Interpretation and for pro
tecting its integrity through judicial review (Ball, 1987, pp. 15-17). Nowhwe, though, is
the Supreme Court more effective than in its duty as a counter-majoritarian institution, as
a proponent o f those individual rights and liberties that are explicitly spelled out in the
Bill o f Rights as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, Joan Biskupic and Elder
Witt write: “The Bill of Rights promises individuals protection against the strong hand of
governeieiit, psut] it is the Supreine Court . . . that has made this guarantee a practical,
living reality (Biskupic & Witt, 1997, p. vii). John Semonche fiirther underscores this
statement by adding that “from the [very] beginning, the Court carved out for itself a
special role: It would be the briuich that clothed itself in the Constitution and interpreted
that document to liirdier the aims o f the Preamble—the most important o f which has been
to secure ‘the Blessings o f liberty to ourselves and our Posterit)?’” (Semonche, 2000, p.
405).
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Methodology

The partlciilar metliodology that is titilized in this research endeavor is speci
fically geared toward a more qualitative, historical-type of approach. While most iBodem
studies ia poMticai science seek to explain political phenomena using quaatitative means,
the current undertaking does not really lend itself to such a method. Instead, It is more
philosophical in character. The aim is to logically determine through selective case anal
ysis (i.e, landmark decisions) what role, if any, the United States Supreme Court has
played with respect to promoting American individualism. The premises, o f course, are
the principles o f classical literalism themselves, and the conclusions are the Court’s
decisions—^their impact, that is, on promoting these principles in American culture and
society. It is a forni o f inductive or probabilistic reasoning, whereby “generalizations
express . . . a tendency for events to take place,” as in X tends to influence Y (Nachmias
& Nachmias, 2000, pp. 8-9). Tlie only drawback in using inductive logic is that we can
never be wholly confident as to the overall certainty o f our conclusions; we can only be
confident that they are probably correct (p. 9). O f course, our confidence can be signif
icantly enhanced with the use o f sound logical reasoning that is also firmly based upon
established historical tendencies. In essence, does the selected case include the values at
the heart of classical liberalism? Does it, in some mannsr, reflect principles that are prone
to encourage and promote individualism? What is the Supreme Court’s rationale for its
decision? Does the final majority decision, in other words, nurture individualist ten
dencies? And, what has been the cultural and societal impact o f the decision? Has it had
the efftet of fiirther encouraging individualism?
The research subject, if one had to label it, is the case itself. Indeed, this is how
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the Supreme Court expresses its views—its opinions on particular issue areas—before the
public. The specific cases that are selected for this analysis are arrayed into three primary
issue areas: (1) iife (i.e., searches and seizures); (2) liberty (i.e., freedom o f religion); and
(3) p ro b ity (i.e., liberty of contract). These particular cases are selected, in large part,
because they are issue concerns that are readily observable across the Stipieine Court’s
history, and because they are also cases in which we are roost likely to find the indi
vidualist tendencies reflected in the principies o f classical iiberalism. In addition, the
specific cases that are selected for this analysis are only those with majority opinions.
Indeed, this will be how each Court is defined, as the predominant viewpoint that is held
by a majority o f its sitting justices at any given time, or in any given decision. This casts
aside the enormous probiem that could potentially be had by dealing with individual
justices, with individual concurring or dissenting opinions. This also alleviates the prob
lem o f dealing with justices who step aside or leave the Court, for whatever reason, or
with justices w'ho join to or dissent from opinions that are, in some sense, atypical for
them. Finally, since the primaiy objective in this research endeavor is to determine what
role, if any, the Supreme Court has played in promoting American Individualism, it is
really necessaiy to examine the entire case history o f the Court itself. Obviously, certain
issues are more relevant to specific Courts, but in order to attain a fuller understanding of
the historical evolution o f individualism within American culture and society, we need to
examine its profession through different Court eras. This will enable as to determine
how it may have teen helped or hindered by the Supreme Court at various junctions in
American history.
The case analysis required for this research endeavor will be rather difficult as
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well as extensive. Indeed, it would be very unlikely to find cases where the Supreme
Coart has openly acknowledged that, it was following the foanding principles o f classical
litseralism in its dec.isioii. Thus, it will be necessaiy to develop atemative means by
which one can determine whether or not the values and ideas o f classical liberalism are
refiected in the Court’s final decision. The key is to maintain as much objectivily as is
possible in their eventual application. The measures that seem most promising for this
task include: (I) cases that involve issues surrounding life, liberty, and property; (2) cases
that involve the federal government on one side o f the issue and some other person or
entity' on the other; (3) cases fliat explicitly discuss, in some detail, the founding prin
ciples o f American government as some form o f justification for the current decision; (4)
cases that explicitly discuss some aspect o f individaalism with particular reference to its
virtues in American society; (5) cases that place a stronger burden o f proof on the gov
ernment, such as the need for goveniment to demoasti^e a “compeliing liite re sfa n d (6)
cases that promise a strong individualist tendency in their overall societal impact. It
should be noted, however, that not all o f these measures are simuteneously required to
make a sound appraisal o f the Supreme Court’s decision and its relationship to some of
the more central tenets o f classical liberaiism. A combination o f two or more measures
should be sufficient for the task. As discussed early on, such cases are likely to center
around substantive due process issues, personal freedoms, and criminal rights and pro
cedures.

ConciusioH '

The likelihood of finding that the United States Supreme Court has played a
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significant role in promoting American indi¥idualisni is high. We know that classical
liberalism was ¥er>' iaflaential with the founding fathers, that it became a founding prin
ciple o f American govemmenl, and that it has perpetuated itself, in one shape or another,
throughout American cultural history. ladividualism, one might say, Is alive and well in
the United States! The question o f course is how has the Supreme Court helped to nurture
its long-term survival? What role has it played In this historical process? Countless
studies have tseen conducted on the Supreme Court. Most o f them have sought to deter
mine a proper role for the Court within American democracy, given its seemingly un
democratic stature. Others have sought to find ways o f explaining the Court’s power, on
how its power is used, and on how it can potentially be curtailed or influenced, if need be.
This research endeavor is altogether different; its objective is to determine how the
Supreme Court has used its unique institutional setting, as the final arbiter o f consti
tutional law', to perf^tuate the founding principles o f classical liberalism within Americaii
culture and society. An examination into the Court’s interpretation of property rights,
freedom issues, and due process of law should provide us with an answer.
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CHAPTER II
FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF AMEMCAN INDIVIDUALISM

IntrodiictioE

One o f the most iinpoitaat attributes o f any research endeavor is to provide some
historical basis or foundation as to what a particular concept or idea is and how it can be
best described and explained. In this case, what historical evidence exists which would
lead support to the proposition that classical liberalisiB was prcseat at the founding o f the
American nation-state? In what way, if any, did classical liberalism influence America’s
war and eventual independence from Great Britain? What impact did classical liberalism
have on the founding fathers? How did classical liberalism influence American consti
tutional design? And in what manner has classical liberalism perpetuated itself through
out American history? These are questions that are absolutely essential to understanding
just how important classical liberalism has been to American economic, political, and
social thought—both then and now. More importantly, these are questions that are pivotal
to uedefstanding just how important classical liberalism has been to promoting and
perpetuating Americaii individuaHsm. In Ihe historical inquiry that follows, the develop
ment o f classical liberalism and its eventual impact upon America will be explored.
Throughout, a general examination wdli be conducted as to what classical liberaiisiH, how
classical liberalism came about, what exactly classical liberalism is, and how classical
liberalisHi found its way into American culture. The historical inqaiiy will end with an
31
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analysis into ths origin and purpose o f fte institution o f American government that is
hypothesized to have t e n largely responsible for fosteiiag classical liberalism as part o f
Ainerlca’s founding creed—the United States Saprcnie Court. This will ‘mevitabiy set the
stage for subsequent analysis into the role that the Court has played in promoting and
perpetuating American indi«diiaiism.

Precursors o f Classical Liberalism

Chapter One contained a general discussion o f classical liberalism, therefore
fiirther detailed examination is needed to develop a more comprctiensive definition.
Questions such as where did it come from, how did it originate, and who, in particular,
has been responsible for developing and perpetuating it need to be thoughtfiiliy explored
and analyzed. Classical liberalism is indeed a composition o f many beliefs and values
and, as such, “should be seen not in fixed and abstract terms, but as a specific historical
movement o f ideas” (Arblaster, 1987, p. 11). In this sense, as Anthony Arblaster writes:
[Classical] liberalism requires an historical rather than a purely conceptual and inherently
static type o f analysis” (p. 11). Classical liberalism is not just the product o f any one
particular era or century; its roots go miich deeper than that. Classical liberalism, much
like any ideology, is dependent upon historical occurrence. Events whelJia- by will or
circumstance leave evidence of their own existence through time. Much of this evidence
takes the form o f an idea, a belief or a value. In much the same fashion as Justice Oliver
W. Holmes’ “mailcetpiace o f ideas,” some of these beliefs or values, these ideas, have a
way of surviving and leaving significant impression, while others have no audience
(White, 1993, p. 413).
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The objective of this chapter is to search for those events that help bring forth
such ideas and then to search for those events Ihat sahance and perpetuate them through
time. In other words, what causes a certain idea to develop, and what enaWra that idea to
stand the test o f time? Some caution, though, in undertaking such a task is necessarily
warranted. Indeed, “it would obviously be absurd to try to attach to precise a date to the
beginning o f anything so general as an ideology or moveraent of ideas. There are few, if
any, absolute discontinaities in humaii history, and [those] in pursuit o f origins aad roots
usually find themselves pushing further and further back into the past” (Arblaster, 1987,
p. 95). Even so, there are points in time whereby certain ideas have become more readily
apparent than others. With respect to classical liberalism, in particular, such points in
time seemingly revolve around the Renaissance, the Reformalioii, the Age o f Enlighten
ment, and the advent o f capitalism (pp. 95-98). It is during this timeffame of about 500
years that iadividualism, probably the central most important idea of classical liberalism,
develops into an accepted manner o f understanding and appreciating human behavior (pp.

95-98)?^

The Renaissance

The Renaissance dates from the 14*^ and 15^** centuries to sach individuals as
Leon Battista Alberti and Giovanni Picodella Mirandola (Perry, et a i, 1985, pp. 277-

Of course, it woiild be iacorrect to assume that iBdividoalism is only a product of the Renaissaoce;
it is not (Peny, et al., 1985, pp. 95-98). Signs of individualism have existed even earlier (pp. 95-98). For
insiance, Thucydides places much o f the blame on the cause of the Peloponnesian War in Ae hands of indiyiduaiism (p. 61). “Love of power,” he writes, “operating through greed and through jKrsonal ambition,
was the cause . . (p. 61). Even Socrates stresses some sense of individualism in his belief that man’s
mdividua! moral character could be refonaed and made better throng the active purauit o f reason {pp. 1174). Even so, it is reaiiy not aatii the RejaissaniK that man’s own sense of being becomes paramount—that
his own tiumaniiy beromes central to his veiy existence.
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281). The Renaissance is significant to the ad¥ent o f classical liberalism because it .marks
what many historians, including Jacob Burckhardt, believe to be the begtaning of
“modem individualism” (Bkni, et a!., 1966, p. 65)."^ It is daring the Renaissance, for
instance, that man is first really recognized as a gifted and creative being in his own
individual right {p.,65). Prior to the Renaissance, man’s existence was really only as a
part of a larger community or “corporate body,” such as that o f Ms own class (p, 65).
The Renaissance, however, begins the process o f changing this by transposing man from
a secularly-oriented being, seemingly recognized as only one among many, Into more of
a spiritualistic

of

individualistic one, recognized as a unique being set apart from the

many (p. 65). As Leon Battista Alberti writes in 1434: “If anyone wishes to investigate
carefully what it is that exalts and increases . . . honor and felicity, he will clearly see that
men are themselves the source o f their own fortune and misfortune” (p. 70). The Renais
sance, with its emphasis upon Individuality, places man at the center o f the anivefse and
makes him master o f his own destiny (pp. 70-71). For the first time, man’s own innate
ability or talent and not just a preordained (i.e., privileged) position within society,
becomes essential to his own existence—^his own “destiny and greatness” (pp. 70-71). In
alluding to how God might perceive o f man, Giovanni Picodella Mirandola asserts: “We
have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, so that, more
freely and more honorably the rnolder and maker o f yourself, you may feshioii yourself in
whatever form you shall prefer . ,

(p. 70). In this sense, it is by man’s own personal

accomplishments, his own individual wherewithal, for which he should be judged and
potentially admired (p. 71). Creativity, or one’s own “talent, imagination, intelligence,

It is also considered to be the beginning of the .modem era (Blum, et a!., 1966, p. 65).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
self-reliance, and ambffioii,” is the key to individiial success (pp. 70-71),

The Refonnatioit

The Reformation can be traced to the 16* century and, in particular, the works of
Desiderious Erasmas and Martin Luther (Perry, et al., 1985, pp. 285-312). At issue
during the Reformation was whether or not the Catholic Church was the only true
coimection between man and God; was the Church a necessary intermediaiy between
Christendom and Heaven? Clearly, at least for Erasmus and Luther, it was not. Erasmus,
for instance, firmly believed that God was accessible through the Bible to all people,
irregardless o f their economic, political, or social standing (p. 286). Indeed, as Anthony
Arblaster writes: “Erasmus stood for a kind of anti-theoIogical Cfiristlaiiily' which, in
terms o f Church |»licy, pointed clearly In the direction o f an easy-going tolerance of
doctrinal differences” (Arblaster, 1987, pp. 113-114). Martin Luther similarly believed
that it was one’s ov/n personal relationship with God, one’s own religiosity, that really
mattered—^aot whether there was regular church activity (e.g., fasting) (Peny, et aL,
1985, p. 301). “I wish to be free,” he writes, “ . . . not to become the slave of any
authority . . . , for I shall proclaim with confidence what I believe to be true” (Bronowski
& Mazlish, 1975, pp. 85-86). In this sense, Martin Luther believed that man was folly
capable. In his own individual right, to know and iiaderstand God—that the relationship
between man and God should only be mediated by means o f the Bible and not the clergy
(Peny, et a l, 1985, p, 3§i). Such beliefs, as propounded by both Erasmus and Luther,
would later have tremendous impact on the development o f classical liberalism. Their
belief that man

folly capable of uaderstandiag God on his own and without the
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intervention o f the Catholic Church was truly revolutionary' for its

The Age o f Enlightengieiit

The Age o f EnligMentnent, or Age of Reason as it is sometimes known, dates
back to around the 17*^ and 18* centuries and such individuals as Rene Descartes, a
rationalist, and Thomas Hobbes, as empiricist (Arblaster, 1987, p. 127; Peny, et a i,
1985, p, 399)?^ While rationalism and empiricism are different from each other, the
former dealing with reason and the latter with observation, they do share the similarity of
placing “stress on the experience o f the individual as the basis o f knowledge . .
(Arblaster, 1987, p. 127). Rene Descartes, for instance, believed that every man can be a
philosopher ia his own right—that every man can find true knowledge, through the use o f
reason (p. 128). He wrote: “The power o f judging rightly, and o f separating what is true
from what is false is equal by nature in all men . . . [that] r ^ o n itself,. . . inasmuch as it
alone makes us men, and marks us off from the te ast s, . . . is found whole and entire in
each maa” (p. 128). Descartes’ emphasis upon the individual as a rational being is further
underscored when one turns to the empiricist, Thomas H obtes (pp. 132-137). Hobi?es
depicted man as driven entirely by “appetites” and “aversions” (Curley, 1994, pp. 27-35).
On the one hand, man is drivesi toward that which is desirable and pleasurable and, on the
other, he is driven away from that which is offensive and unpleasant (pp. 28-35). It is

Evffli so, some caution is warranted, for it would be stretching the ti’otb to say that either o f these
men was an individualfst in the traest classical liberal sense o f the term. Maitiu Luther’s assertion, “the
only liberty for vrMch [serfs] should <»re is spiritual liberty, [and that] the only rights [serfs] can legiti
mately demand are those that pertain to [their] spiritual life,” does not necessarily e.xiilt with classical
liberal ideals (Bronowski & MaMish, 1975, pp. 88-89).
Thomas Hobbes is also oo,ssidered the “fatha*” o f ctesical lifeeralism basause o f his emphasis on
social contract tiieoiy and aim because of iiis belief fliat man is innately rational.
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man’s own self-interest that matters. Within Hobbes’ state o f nature, for instance, where
there is no gO¥eming body other than the ¥arious laws o f nature, each and e¥ery man is
driYcn by “ ‘competition,’ ‘diffidence,’ and ‘glory’” (p. 76). Man’s desire for more and
mors leads him into a perpetual state o f war with his felloFr man (pp. 76-78). Hobbes
asserted that wiiiiii such a state, man has ao more p ic tu re ; he only has “a great deal o f
grief’ (p. 75). When man comes to the realization that his life mdthin the state o f nature
will only be one that Is “solitary, poor, nasty, biutish, and short,” he will endeavor out of
self-interest to leave his hoirible state o f existence (pp. 76-77). It is in this regard that
both Descartes and Hobbes look to man’s self-interest as key to his own individuai
wherewithal. Whether it be the individuars pursuit o f knowledge, his desire for pleasure,
or Ms aversion to pain, man is keen enough to know what is in his own self-interest

Laissez-Faire Economics

Laissez-faire economics can be dated to the 18* and 19* centuries and such indi
viduals as John Locks and Adam Smith (Peny-', et a i, 1985, pp. 506-510). Laissez-faire
economics is rightly associated with Adam Smith. He is after all considered to be the
“father” o f free-market enterprise. Still, there is more to laissez-faire economics than just
the market system; there is also the notion o f private property, another key precept of
classical liberaiism. John Locke defines private property as that which man “hath mixed
his labor with, and joined to it something fliat is Ms own” (Macplierson, 1980, p. 19).
This is man’s own labor, his wherewithal, and Ms creativity. For Locke, private property
belongs to only the “industrious and [the] rational” {p. 21). “Nothing was made by God,”
accordingly, “for man to spoil or destroy” (p. 21). Man must endeavor to use Ms
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property—to be prodiietlve with it. Private property, in this sense, is really nothing more
than an extension, o f man’s own labor, his own being. If man’s creatiYity, his private
property, is combined to a free-market enterprise, the invisible hand, then a system o f
piHX competition has been put to together that is driven predominantly by man’s own
self-interest, his desire to accumulate more and more private property (pp. 28-29).^® The
result is very simple; it is the promotion and perpetuation of individualism through
economic self-determifiation. As Adam Smith writes: “Every mao endeavors to supply by
his own industry . . . . When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when his coat is
worn out, he clothes him self. . . ; and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs [it],
. . .” (Smith, 1991, p. 221). As such, “every individual is continually exerting himself to
find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can coininaiid. It is
his own advantage . . . which he has in view” (p. 349). In this regard, man’s pursuit of
individual self-interest is clearly at home with capitalism. Indeed, it is man’s self-interest
that drives the market system—^that ensures that society is yielded the goods that it wants
at the prices it is willing to pay (Heilbroner, 1999, pp. 54-57).

Principles o f Classical Liberalism

A lthou^ the philosophical pieciiKors to classical liberalisni are too expansive to
cover exhaustively, what should be apparent at this point anyway is that man’s own
individuality has clearly been an evolutionaiy product o f several historical events. Each
event, beginning in large part with the Renaissance, has gradually added to the notion that

It should be m tsd fliat since John Lodte was very mucis against the “spoilage” o f fropeity, ac
cumulation ha-e is represented In tenns of money. Money in this sense is something that is “lasting . . that
men might keep without spoiling” (Macpherson, 1989, pp. 28-29).
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man should be admired and respected for Ms owm unique individuality. While man is still
very much recognized as a social creature with social needs, there Is a nauchs wider
appreciation and acceptance o f man Ixcaiise o f Ms own individuai merits and talents and
not just those that have been laid down by a potentially confonnist-oriented society.
Indeed, as Anthony ArWaster writes: “Coafoiiiiity p s| always suspect [It| suggests . . .
that people are merely following convefition or fashion or the crowd, rather than acting
out their own independent and spontaneous incliHations” (AAiaster, 1984, p. 46). What is
needed now, though, is to fit this newfound appreciation for individuality witMn the
larger context o f classical Miseralisin. To do that, a more thorough understanding of
“classical liberalism” is warranted. There are, o f course, several angles or dimensions to
classical libefaJism; however, only those diinaisions that are directly relevant will be
explored. Among these are: (1) an individual’s right to life; (2) an individual’s right to
liberty; and (3) an individual’s right to properly. All three o f these rights, in one shape or
another, are essential to any understanding o f classical liberalism and are imperative to
the promotion and preservation o f individuallsiii.

Right to Life

What is an individuafs “right to life” in the classical liberal sense o f the term, and
why is it importaat to classical liberal thought? According to Lawrence Herson, an
individual’s right to life “cofinofes s system o f justice that is free o f arbitrary action and
pays proper attention to legal procedure” (Herson, 1984, pp. 46-47). ’While classical
liberals pffcelve governineat as essential, primaiily to protect man from man, they do not
rejoice in having it. To such classical liberals as John Locke, governnieiit is a necessary
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evil Govemmerit is created by man’s own coHsent for the sole purpose of protecting his
kalienabie rights (Mac-pherson, 1980, p. 52). Once govemnient moves beyond this realm
and begins to act arbitrarily or without regard to man’s rights, mas has the right to
withdraw his consent and to create a m w govemment (pp. 107-124). Government, at
least from Locke’s perspective, is boimd by man’s own consent (pp. 63-64). Man leaves
the unceitainty and the insecurity o f the state of nature for the comforts and conveniences
o f political society (pp. 65-67). Rule o f law in that society is supreme.^’^ Not only is man
bound by the law, so too is government. In fact, rule o f law is man’s protection against
arbitrary goverainent (Arblaster, 1987, pp. 72-73). As Anthony Arblaster states; “The
state and its institutions must operate within limits which are either laid down in an
explicit, written constitation, or take the f« m o f a rather more vaguely conceived body o f
‘ftmdamentaf laws and customs” (p. 72). “Part o f the meaning o f the rule of law,” he
continues, “ps| a HiiniiBuin o f consistency and impartiality” (p. 73). Time and again,
Locke reiterates Ms position that government cannot be arbitrary “for nobody can transfer
to another more power than he has in himself; and nobody has an absolute arbilxaiy
power over himself or over any other” (Macpherson, 1980, p. 70). Rule of law, the con
sistency in the law, is key to classical liberalism and is just as important to It as are man’s
other malienaMe rights—-Ms rights to liberty and property. One might stipulate, as
Arblaster does, that without rale o f law, liberty and property would be nothing more than
ideals (Arblaster, 1987, p. 71), The uncertainty and insecurity that man witnesses in the
state o f nature would be no differeiit in political society. However, with the rule of law,

Rttle o f law and due process o f law are used here inteRJiangeably. Both connote a systms o f p o cedures whereby both the government and the iodividua! are boand by the same laws.
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man is ^ f e and secure in knowing that he is protected against the potential arbitrariness
of both Ms fellow man and gOYemment alike. It is the sanctity o f the law that man hopes
for when he consents to leave the state o f nature to form a political society; it is the
sanctity of the law that he is counting on to protect and preserve his inalienable rights
once he is in political society (Macpherson, 1980, p. 66).

Right to Liberty

What about an individual’s “right 1x>liberty”? How is it defined in classical liberal
terms, and why is it essential to classical liberal thought? According to Thomas Hobbes,
“the right of nature is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself
. . . . By liberty is understood . . . tfie absence o f external impediments” (Curley, 1994, p.
79). In ctesical liberal terms, liberty can be thought o f in much the same fashion as
fieedom. However, neillier one should be tiiought o f in absolute teims. Classical liberals
typically do not think o f liberty or freedom in the sense o f allowing man to do whatever
he wills; there are o f course restrictions (Arblaster, 1987, p. 56). Most notable is the
restrlctiori on man’s ability to take his own life or that o f another (Curley, 1994, p. 79).
Thus, according to Hobbes, man’s first duty is to seek peace, and his second dotj' is to
preserve his own life {p. 80). Liberty, in this sense, might be perceived io a “negative”
fashion (A rbla^r, 1987, p. 56). Man is free from whatever it is that may hinder or inter
fere with Ms own personal liberty. For classical liberals, such as John Locke, such
Mndraaces or interferences are likely to come from government Accordingly, “whenever
the [govemmentl endeavors to take away, and destroy the property o f the people, or to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, [it] put[sj [itselfj into a state o f war with
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the people” (Macpherson, 1980, p. 111). It is gO¥emment’s duty, in this regard, to protect
man’s inalienable rights and not to infringe upon them.
Classical liberalism, through the likes o f Hobbes, Locke, and others, places a
great deal of emphasis upon man’s existence within the state of nature. Hobbes depicts
man’s life within the state o f nature as something akin to a “free for all”—a “war o f all
against all” (Curley, 1994, p. 76), All that really guides the state o f nature are the various
iaw's o f nature (e.g., to seek peace and to follow it) (pp. 79-80). Locke follows Hobbes
very closely although he sees man’s life within the state o f nature as one that is less
horrific and uncertain. Locke’s stMe o f nature is one more akin to “reciprocal equality”
whereby each man acts as his own enforcer o f the laws (Macpherson, 1980, pp. 8-9).
This, though, is a problem for Locke. While the laws o f nature are paramount, Locke still
believes that “civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences o f the state
of nature” (p. 12). He writes: “Thoiigh this be a state o f liberty, . . . It is not a state o f
license” (p. 9). Man must still abide by the laws and o f nature, and “God hath certainly
appointed govemineiit” to help man with friis endeavor (p, 12). Govemiiimf s fcndamental purpose, for bofli Hobbes and Locke, is to protect man’s natural rights, his in
alienable rights.^® Government is not to infringe upon these rights; It Is merely to protect
and uphold them. In this sense, man creates govemment out o f necessity—^to protect man
from his fellow m ai, to preserve his own life, libertj', and property.

It should be noted that more so for Hobbes, government’s fiindamentai puipose is to provide se
curity. Man gives up most of his rights, except the right of sdf-defense, when he leaves the state of nature.
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Right to Property

Finally, what is an indi¥Miiai’s “right to prope-rty*’ in the classical liberal sense o f
the term, and why is it significant to classical liberal thought? While the whole notion of
pix>pert>' is certainly nothing oniqae to man, in that properly has existed since the be
ginning o f time, it is classical liberalism that truly brings property to the forefront of
early-modem economic, political, and social thought. Private prof^rty, in this sense, is
absolutely pivotal to classical liberalism. It is pivotal in the sense that property is viewed
by such classical liberals as an inalienable right—a natural right, a God-given right
(Macpherson, 1980, pp. l§-3§). Moreover, as Lawrence Hereon writes: “M v ^ e property
is [also] inextricably bound to the value of achievement, [or the ability] to do one’s best”
(Herson, 1984, pp. 21-23). Private property, in this sense, is closely aligned to the notion
o f prosperity—^that the individual can take his private property and make something pro
ductive out o f it. Private property is, according to Locke, that which “man tills, plants,
improves, cultivates, m d can use the product o f ’ Macpherson, 1980, p. 21). Private
property is that which man can “industrious[ly] and rationalpy]” utilize for the “advan
tage o f PiisJ life . . (pp. 20-21). Further, Benjamin Barber argues that a great deal o f the
importance placed on private property by classical liberals arises out o f what he terms as
“original righf’ (Barber, 1984, p. 74).^^ Accordingly, “mas is as he owns and is because
he owns” (p. 75). As such, “from self-ownership, issues . . . the right to room or space for
the owned self . . . the right to the power that belongs to the owned self; and . . . the right
to the product of self and labor as it is mixed with the otherwise commonly held bounty'

An “origiaai rig if ’ t&at is supported by longev% and tradition. Private property belongs to mm,
in this respect, bojause “it was pjis] fathers, and Ms father’s before him” pSatber, 19S4, pp. 73-74).
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o f nature” (p. 75). Pri¥ate property, in this sense, is a virtue because it is an extension of
man?® Property originates with God and is given to mankind in coimnon. Man’s Miereiit
desire for ‘‘self-preservation, piis| need to consume, and finally [his] labor, are what cre
ate piis individualj right to [siicfi| property” (Arbiaster, 1987, p. 163). As Locke stated:
“Though the earth . . . be commoii to all men, yet every man has a propert)' in his own
person; tiiis no body has any right to but himself’ (Macpherson, 1980, p. 19).

Revolutionary America and Classical Liberalism

Having identified the various beliefs and values o f classical liberalism, the objec
tive now is to determine in what manner it may have influenced the founding and
eventual creation o f the American nation-state. Indeed, there is little doubt that there have
been m y number o f inteilectuM Influences that could pjtentially be linked to earfy
American economic, political, and social thought. Indeed, Bernard Batlyn suggests:
“[The] study of the sources o f [early American] thought . . . reveals, at first glance, a
massive, seemingly random eclecticism” (Bailyn, 1992, p. 23). The key to this statement,
though, is the phrase “at first glance” (p. 23), It is true that the founding fathers did have
a large array of “political theoiy at their disposal” (McDonald, 1985, p. 7). However,
only a select portion o f this theory was really taken seriously enough to be perceived as
useliil to early American thought. This select portion includes the various attributes o f
Roman republicanism, English antiqult>% and classical liberalism. While the founding
fathers certainly looked to Roman republicanism as an historical basis for the creation o f
repre,sentative government and to English legal custom as a model for constitutionalism,

And also a source of political power.
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it is to classical liberalism that they turned for justification o f America’s independence
and for the recognition of man’s individual rights. It is in this sense that Herson says,
“[John] Locke was takes to heart” (Herson, 1984, p. 35).
Classical liberal principles become rather commonplace in much of the literature
iiBiaediately leading up to, daring, and following the American Revolution. According to
Bailyn, “in pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cite Locke os natural rights
and on the social govemnientai contract. . (Bailyn, 1992, p. 27). This Is not to imply
that John Locke was by any means the only influence upon Americans during this time.
Others, such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Coke, and Blackstone were just as influential.
However, as Bailyn contends, “except for Locke’s, their influence . .. was neither clearly
domiflant nor wholly detenninative” (p. 30). As a result, it is John Locke’s writings that
seemingly set the tone for much of this period in American histoiyc His writings not only
proclaimed principles that were acceptable to revofatioaary Americans, such as an indi
vidual’s right to life, liberty, and property, but his writings also provided ample justi
fication for America’s eventual call for independence from Great Britain. Both o f these
perspectives are embodied in two of the most revolutionary American documents o f this
timeframe: Common Sem e and the Declaration o f Independence.

Common Seme

Probably no other document during the Revolutionary period aroused American
resentment against the British anymore than did Common Sem e, written by Thomas
Paine in 1776. Englisli by birth, Thomas Paine, like so many other colonial Americans o f
his time, had become incensed at what he perceived to be the “violent abuse o f power” on
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the part o f the British governnieiit against the American people (Kramnick, 1986, pp. 63,
71). Accordingly, “the laying a coantry desolate with fire and sword, declaring war
against the nataral rights of ail maaldnd, mid extiipatiag die defender thereof from the
face o f the earth, is the concern o f every man . .

(pp. 63-64). O f course, while Paine

discusses at length Ms problem with hereditary monarchs as well as Ms belief that
America should be an independent nation-state, it is really his discussion of the origin of
govemmeiit and the purpose o f govereiaent that Is o f primary interest. It is in this regard
that Paine's Common Seme closely parallels classical liberalism. “[As] an exposition of
general liberal theoiy,” Isaac- Kramnick writes, “the intellectiial roots o f Paine’s firet
section are the late 17* century liberal ideals of John Locke . .

(p. 38). Paine uses

classical liberalisiiti in much the same fashion as have many of its subsequent proponents,
namely, as a justification for something else desired.^* Without question, Paine is arguing
for America’s coinplete Independence from Great Britain. As to whether or not he ac
tually believes in some o f the things he writes is anyone’s guess. Throughout, Paine
refers to a “state o f natural liberty,” much like Hobbes’ “natural condition” or Locke’s
“state of nature” (p. 66). Does he really believe that such a “state” exists or has existed? It
is impossibie to really know. The fact that he uses the “state of natural liberty” precept is
what is significant. It allows Paine to set the stage for what he believes to be the end or
“necessity” o f goverament (p. 66). And it allows Paine the ability to address why the
American colonies should be independent o f the British Crowm.
Paine’s pamphlet simultaneously poses two opposing perspectives with respect to
Much iike John Locke beftsre him, Thomas Paiae could verj' well be using &e “state of natai'e”
precept as a starting point as an expianatorj' piincipie of how he telieves man shoald be governed. Does he
believe that a state of nature actually did exist? Who knows? ft could be a situation whereby ideo!o,gy hap
pens to fit present circumstances.
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go¥emmeiit—that while government is inherently bad, it is still needed (p. 65). Ac
cordingly, “ . . . govemmeEt even in its best state is ta t a necessary evil” (p. 65). Much
like Locke, Paine sees a difference between society' and govemment, or between cMI
society and the state. Man creates society because he wants to do so; he creates governineiit because he has to (p. 65). Civil society, in this sense, is perceived as something
that encourages man’s “happiness,” while goveminent is perceived as something that in
hibits man’s “wickedness” (p. 65). Again, much iike Locke, Paine views man in his
natural state of being as something akin to impulse and uncertainty (p. 65). There is no
entity, in this regard, like government to ensure that law and oMer is maintained (pp. 6566). Hence, the chief end o f government, its very creation and its necessity, is to provide
for the security and welfare o f ail mankind (pp. 65-66). Man surrenders some o f his
natural liberty, out o f Ms own rational self-interest, in return for government’s protection
(pp. 65-66). Or as Paine suggeste: “[Man] finds it necessary to surrcader up a part o f Ms
property to fomish means for the protection o f the rest” (p. 65). In either respect, the
result Is the same—government originates witJiln man, out o f seif-interest, for the pur
pose o f protecting mao. Hence, it naturally follows that whenever govemment is no
longer capable of such a task, o f providing security and welfare, man reserves the right to
rebel against the govemment and replace it with another (pp. 50-55). It is with this per
spective in mind that Paine wrote; “A goveminent o f our own Is our natural right” (p. 98).

The Declaration o f Independence

If It was Thomas Paine’s Common Sem e that really helped spark America’s
aaimosity toward the British Crown, then it was Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration o f
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Independence that truly made such animosity lasting enough to call for complete sepa
ration and independence. Much like Cowmmn Sem e, the Declaratmn o f Independence is
an argument, a justification, as to why the American coionies should be independent from
Great Britain. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson was keenly aware that some kind of explanation
was needed to justify America’s call for independent, not only to persuade the poten
tially doubting American colonialist but also to persuade a |»teiitialiy suspicious world
(Graver, 1985, pp. 121-122). Nothing like this had ever been done before. If a would-be
doubter could not be convinced of the justness o f America’s cause, then at least he or she
could possibly be made to at least understand it. Tliis was Thomas Jefifersoe’s chief aim
and goal—

explain the rationale behind America’s desire for independence. It is also in

this regard that Jefferson brings forth many o f the principles o f classical liberalism.
Although depicted as an “expression of American sentiments,” Jefferson’s Declaration o f
Imiepemknce is really an elaboration o f classical liberal ideals, paiticalarly those
espoused by the likes o f John Locke (Vile, 2001, p. 4).
Thomas Jefferson’s Deciaratiom o f Independence suggests aa admiration and
respect for classical liberalism in at least three important ways: (1) his discussion of
human rights; (2) his discussion o f the proper ends o f goveromoit; and (3) his discussion
of the people’s right to revolution. All three are without question very similar to that of
Locke (pp. 4-8). With respect to human rights, Jefferson wrote: “All men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit o f happiness” (Lyons & Scheb, 2003, p. 629). In
much the same manner as Locke, Jefferson is eliciting the notion that man is bom with
certain individual rights and that these rights are his alone—^that they cannot be infringed
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upon by the govenimeiit. If anything, it is goYemment’s sole responsibility, being
preinised upon man’s own consent, to “secure” these inalienable rights and to provide for
“safety and happiness” (p. 629). It Is when go¥en»nent can no longer adequately provide
for these measures or starts acting against them that it becomes “destraetive” (p. 629).
Again, in concert with Locke, Jefferson asserts that, at this stage, government must either
be “altered or abolished” (p. 629). Man does not consent to tyranny, and if it is tyranny
that rules over him, then he is at liberty to revolt against it (p. 629). Jefferson does,
though, go to great pains to explain that revolution is only justifiable “when [there has
been] a long train o f abuses and usurpations” (p. 629). Ideally, “revolutions [should] not
happen,” according to Locke, “upon every little mismanagement of public affairs”
(Macpherson, 1980, p. 113).

The Madisonian Model and Classical Liberalism

The product that was bom out o f America’s revolutionary experience is an ode to
classi^l liberalism. While most textbooks on American politics typically label this pro
duct, the government that was created out o f the Constitution of 1787, as the Madisonian
model, it is much more than just that, an honor to one o f our foendiag fathers and
eventuai presidents (Bardes, Shelley, & Schmidt, 2002, pp. 44-46). Indeed, it is also a
description o f a tj-pe o f govemment—a regime-type. The M M i^nian model is a com
position o f many beliefs, most notably, the virtues o f representative democracy, a mixed
government federalism, a bill o f rights, and an independent judiciary'.^" TTiese ideas have

For purposes here, the terai “mixed goverainent” shall refer to sepai'ation of powers and checks
and balances. This is done primarily because the two are so interrelated with one another.
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come to represent a system of govemineiit whereby power is made to counteract power
or, as stated by James Madison, whereby “ambition [is] made to counteract ambition”
(Wills, 1982, p. 262). Power is purposely divided and subdivided in such a manner as to
prevent any one individual or group o f individuals (i.e, faction) from ever gaining too
much influence within, Ihe political process. This random dispersal o f |» w er ensures that
the goveroment caimot become a tyranny in Its own right with respect to society' and,
most importantly, with respect to the IndividuaL The government, in this sense, is hostage
to its own structural complexity, to the combination of representative democracy, a mixed
govemment, federalism, a bill o f rights, and an independent judiciary.

Representative Democracy

Believing that any form o f direct democracy was inherently dangerous, especially
given its turbulent past within the ancient world (e.g., Athens), the founding fathers were
very much enamored with what they believed to be the alternative virtoes o f a repre
sentative (i.e., repuMi«n) form o f goverament^^ As James Madison stales in Federalist
39,
it is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of
Amedca; with the fijndamentai principles o f the revolutioa; or with that honorable deter
mination, w'liidi aB,in5ates sv ay votaiy of fresdom, to rest all our political experiments on
the capscitj’ of mankind for self-govennnent {Wills, 1982, p. 189).

Republicanism, loosely defined, is a system o f govemment whereby consent to govern is
periodically given by the people to representatives who are selected for flie purpose o f

The concept of “repubiicanism” should not hs confused with classical republicanism, as in a cer
tain respect for public virtue. Here, “republicanism” and “representative democracy” are used iaterchangeabiy. Both, v/hi!e ncM; dired: products o f classical litseralism, do foster a sense o f indlvMualism, as in
individual frotajtions against the state.
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acting on those same people's behalf before go¥eminent (p. 190)?'* It is a system of
goveroment that is very macli attaoed to an indirect or represeotative form o f democracy.
The people select fepreseotatives who in tmn represent them in govemmeet. The ac
countability of these representatives, though, remains with the people who may opt for
whatever reason to choose new representatives at subso|ueiit intervals (i.e., elections).
The key to repiibiicanism, its very essence, is that it is Eltimately premised upon the
consent o f the govemal, the people. Power emanates at the grassroots level with the
people and flows upward to the government. The government, in this regard, is beholden
to the people for both its power and its legitimacy.
There are, o f course, other aspects of republicanism that were also enticing to the
Founding Fathers. Most notably the notion that a goveminent premised upon the consent
of the governed implies the superficial existence o f a social contract. Social contract
theory is very much at the heart o f classical liberalism. Individuals consent with one
another for the sole purpose o f leaving the state o f nature to create a government This is
done for any number o f reasons. For Instance, it might be done for the protection o f life,
liberty, and property. Govemmenfs sole duly, in this regard, is to ensure that man's
inalienable rights are preserved. This is all that he consents to when he leaves the state of
nature and nothing more. Once government moves beyond this realm, say with respect to
violating these rights, Hian then has the right to withdraw his consent—to replace that
government with another. This in fact was the gist o f the argument laid out by Thomas
Jefferson in his Declaration o f Independence. The King o f England has persistently
It should i* noted that Sie tem “people” has had diveree meaaings throughout Aiaerica’s history.
Instialiy, the ‘people” simply referred to white, male propsrty owners. Howeve’, since then, the term
“people” has been expanded to include most all American citizens and CTen some non-citizens, inogardless
of race, color, gender, or what have you.
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violated the natural rights of his American subjects. As a result, they in turn have a right
to withdraw their conseiil, by force if necessa’iy, and to create a new government—one
whose sole purpose again is to protect these same rights.

Mixed Government

Fearfiil o f concentrated power, such as that iepr«efited in a monarchial system of
goveroment, flie founding fathers were also enamored with the various attributes o f a
mixed form o f govemirient. Heavily influenced by the likes o f such individuals as
Montesquieu, the founding fathers believed that power had to be divided (i.e., separated)
and overlapped (i.e., checked and balanced) in such a manner as to forever prevent the
formation o f a tyranny (Wilis, 1982, pp. 243-250). The system o f government devised by
the Constitutional Convention o f 1787 is structured in this manner. It is a system whereby
power is divided Into three branches o f govemment. The Congress is the l^isiator of the
laws; the President is the enforcer of the laws; and the Supreme Court is the interpreter of
the laws. The separation o f the branches into distinct areas o f concern ensures, according
to James Madison in Federalist 47, that “the preservation o f liberty” is maintained (p.
244). For, as he continues, “there can be no liberty where the . . . powers are united in the
same person or body o f magistrates” (p. 245). Again, “ambition [mast be] made to coun
teract ambition” (p. 262). With the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers
divided between three branches, no one branch will tje able to assume absolute control
over all the reigns o f government—to, in other words, act is an arbitrary and dictatorial
manner (pp. 244-246).
This does not, however, mean that each department o f government should be
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totally separate and independent from the others. Indeed, as James Madison writes in
Federalist 48; '‘Unless these departments be so &r connected and blended, as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree o f separation . . . essential to a
free government can never in practice be duly maintained” (p. 250). As a result, inter
departmental dependency is very much at the heart o f the mixed government that was
created out of the Constitutional Convention o f 1787—Interdependency that is not only
maintained but is also enhanced by a complex network o f checks and balances. It is these
checks and balances, these powers that are seemingly overlapped between the legislature,
the executive, and the judiciaiy, that ensure that no one department o f government can
ever act on its own accord with supreme felicity. And it is these checks and balances that
ensure that no govemmentai tyranny (i.e., tyranny of the majority) can ever prevail
against the will o f the minority—that being, in this case, the individual.

Federalism

While the concept of federalism is nowhere specifically mentioned within the
Constitution, it is still an important product o f the Madisonian model (Bardes, Shelley, &
Schmidl, 2002, p. 85). Its origins, though, are more a result of the final distributioji of
powers between the national goverameiit and the various state govemments than any
intentional act on the part of the founding fathers (p. 85). Indee4 as stipulated to by the
Constitution, specifically within the Tenth Amendment, “the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Coostitiition, aor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people” (Lyons & Scheb, 2003, p. 64§). In this sense, power
is divided between the national government and the state govemments in such a mariner
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as to allow each level o f govemment to be semi-independent o f the other (Bardes,
Shelley, & Schmidt, 2002, p. 82). The mtloaal govemmenf s powers, its enomerated
pow'ers, are speciically granted to it by the states and the people, as spelled oat in the
Constitution, while the various states’ powers, their police powers, are reserved to them
selves (pp. 85-89).^^ To ensure that there is no redundancy or diiplication in the laws
b^ween the two levels of government, a supremacy clause is also added to prevent any
conflict between the two (pp. 8§-§9). As set out in Article VI, Clause 2 (of the Con
stitution), “the Constitution and the laws o f the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof. . . , shall be the supreme law of the land” (p. K8). Meaning, more
specifically, the laws of the national government will always seemingly prevail whenever
similar laws are concurrently enacted by the state governments (pp. 88-89).
More importantly, though, federalism might also be thought o f as a form of
double security against any violation o f the individual’s personal rights on the part o f
either the national govemment or the various state govemments. As James Madison
writes in Federalist No. 28; “Power being almost always the rival o f power, Ihe general
goveminent will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state govemments, and these will have the same disposition towaids the general goveiiimeiif’ (Nivola
& Rosenbloom, 1999, p. 78). Under such a scenario, the people, their rights, will neces
sarily pfedominate fj). 78). They will do so, in many respects, “by throwing themselves,”
accordingly, “into either scale” (p. 78). Whenever, the national government, for instance,
becomes too encroaching upon the people’s personal liberties, “they can make use o f the
Bnana'ated powers are defined as those “powers .^>ecificaily panted to fee national govenmeat
by tbe Constitation” (Bardes, Sheli^, & Schmidt, 2002, p. 85). Police powers are reserved powers of the
states which grants them “the authority to legislate for the protection of the health, morals, safety, and wel
fare of the people” (p. 86).
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other [i.e., the state gO¥emments] ^ the instriiment of redress” (p. 78). The same can also
be said Ib the other respect, with the national go¥eniiiient being used as an “iiistrament o f
redress” against encroaching state goYemmcnte (p. 78). In either respect, die national
goYemment and the various state govemments check one another in such a way as to
prevent the foimatiofi o f any tyraiiii)? (pp. 78-79). Under such a system o f double
security, in the end, it is the people that quite naturally prevail, with the preservation o f
their own personal liberties (pp. 78-79).

Bill o f Rights

Merestiegly, although “the colonial experience, climaxed by the Revoiution,
honed American sensitivity to the need for a written constitution that protected rights
. . . few of the founding fathers believed that it was necessary to incorporate such rights
directly into the document itself (Levy, 1999, p. 8). Their logic was simple; If the Con
stitution only provided the national govemment with certain delegated powers, and since
no such powers existed with respect to the individiial’s inalienable rights, then the
national goveminent was without power to do anything to them (pp. 19-20). In other
woids, why should the ability o f goveniment to restrict speech be limited, for Instance,
when that same govemment is without power to even do such a thing (p. 20)? What does
not exist csnnot logically be restrained (p. 20). Alexander Hamiltoii, in Federalist No. 84,
even went so far as to say that a bill o f rights would “not only be unnecessary in the
proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous” (Wills, 1982, p. 437). His belief
was that such an inclusion “may serve as a specimen . . . which would be given to the
doctrine of conslxiictive powers” (p. 437). Meaning, that if what does not exist can be
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limited, then what dc«s not exist can also be created—^an s y s h greater threat to individual
rights (p. 437), Such reasoning, at least for those such as Hamilton, was soaad but would
not prevail in the long run. With the adoption o f Ae Constitution hanging in limbo, the
addition o f a bill of rights would become central to Its eventual ratification.
The Bill o f Rights, as originally set forth (in 1791), was a list, o f rights guaranteed
to the people o f the United States against the .national govemment Interestingly, state
governments were not inciaded, in large part, because it was generally telieved that the
people were already protected at the state level, within the various state constitutions,
even though many o f them did not even possess such protections (Levy, 1999, p.
But as Leonard Levy recounts; “[The] states [that] had no bills o f rights were [con
sidered] as fe e as those with bills o f rights” (p. 21). In this respect, it was the national
government that was perceived to be the greatest threat against individual liberties. In one
of many complaints leveled against the foraiatioa o f a stronger national government,
Patrick Henry writes: “This Constitution is said to have beautiful features; but . . . sir,
they appear . . . hoiridly frightfol,. . . [with] squints toward monarchy” (Ketcham, 1986,
p. 213). Such things as the creation o f a president, the allowance for an elastic clause,
and the inclusion o f a supremacy danse aroused great alarm among many so-called Antifederalists.
Believing that individual liberty could very well be at the mercy o f a distant
govenmieat reminisceat o f what existed in England, Anti-federalists demanded that a bill
of rights be included wiAin the new Constitution (before they would ratify it). These
This logic would of c»iirse change in later years, as many states readily demonstrated their ability
to be just as repr^sive (e.g., Jim Crow laws). The original belief nonetheless was premised upon the fact
s«ne o f the states ah'eady possesMd a ‘%ill o f rights” and upon ilie fact that states were closer to the
people (i.e., could be more eas.ily controMed).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
indiYidiial rights, according to John DeWitt, another Anti-federalist, would ensure that
‘■‘the compact it^ I f is a recital upon paper o f that proportion o f the subject’s natural
r i^ ts ” (p. 196). As a result, It would be left to Janies Madison, originally aa opponent o f
a bill o f rights himself, the task o f determining which individual protections against the
national govemment would be incorporated into the Constitution (Bardes, Shelley, &
Schmidt, 2002, pp. 48-49). The significance o f such an inclusion, according to Leonard
Levy, was the &ct that “America had [finally] become accustomed to the idea that gov
emment existed by a consent o f the governed, that people created govemment . . . by
written compact, that the compact constituted fijndamentai law, [and] that the govern
ment must be subject to such limitations as are necessary for the security o f the rights of
the people” (Levy, 1999, p. 24).

Independent Judiciary

With power fragmented and decentralized, the Madisoniaji model was not de
signed by any stretch o f the word to be an efficient system o f govemment. Still, the
founding fathers were keenly aware that the Madisonian model did need to be an ef
fective system o f government. In other words, it had to work even if ever so slowly. To
ensure its effretiveness, the founding fathers devised what might be referred to as a
“referee” system. Typically, a referee, in the modem sense o f the term, is an individual
who is primarily responsible for ensuring that the rules o f a particular game are followed
as closely as possible. A referee ensures that the game Is played feirly by all sides and, if
need be, the referee determines who wins and who loses. Tbe “referee” that the founding
fathers had in mind with respect to the Madisonian naodel is the judiciary geaeraily m d
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the United States Supreme Court speeificaliy. Article III o f the United States Constitution
states: “The jadicia! power o f the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior coiirts as the Congress may Jtohi tiine to time ordain and establish”
(U.S. Constitution, Art, III, Sec. 1). How does the judiciaiy, the Supreme Court, serve as
a “referee” in the American game o f politics? What does it do?
The Supreme Court is without question an unusual Institution within American
govemfsent For one thing, its memijers are not directly elected by the people. They are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, Secondly, its mem
bers do not serve clearly defined terms. They are appointed for what amounts to life or, as
the Constitution stipulates, “good behavior” (U.S. Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 1). It is
these characteristics o f the Supreme Court which allow it to be a quasi-independent com
ponent (i.e., institution) o f American government. It is also these characteristics o f the
Court which allow it to serve out its role as final “referee.” In this regard, the Court’s
most fundamental duty is to protect and preserve the Constitution o f the United States—
to ensure that the rights and the privileges contained therein are niaiiitaiaed for the
present generation and secured for foture ones. As Alexander Hamilton writes in Fed
eralist 78: “The independence of the [Supreme Court] is requisite to guard the Con
stitution and the rights o f individuals from the effects o f those ill humors which the arts
of d e sirin g men, or the influence o f particuiar conjunclares, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves” (Wills, 1982, p. 397).

Conclusion

While the concept of mdividualisiii has existed since the 14* century, it is really
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not until the advent of classical liberalism that it becomes truly appreciated as a central
comporient of human behavior. Indeed, the whole nolion o f indivMuailsni is at the core o f
classical liberal thought and is best represented in its acceptance o f man ^ a rational
being with certain inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property. The M ie f that man is
an individuaiistic animai felly capAIe o f taking care o f his own destiny has many rami
fications. Most notable among them is the realization that man does not need the help of
an overly intrusive govemmeiiL Man only consents to the creation o f government to
protect his life, liberty, and property—to provide for some sense of order and sta
bility—and no more. Whenever goveminent begins to act arbitrarily or without regani to
man’s inalienable rights, man reserves the right to withdraw his consent and, if need be,
to revolt and replace that government with another. It Is in this regard that the indi
vidual’s rights, his interests, are paramount to those of the state.
Without question, classical liberalism, with its keen sense o f appreciation for the
individual, would have tremendous influence upon America’s founding, from the period
o f publication o f Common Seme (1776) to the adoption o f the Bill o f Rights (1791). The
principles o f classical liberalism can be found throughout. Classical liberalism thus
served as a justification o f America’s war and eveiitual independence fiom the British
crown. Iiidee4 as Thomas Jefferson wrote in his Declaration o f Independence:
Ws hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en
dowed by fhsir Creator with certaiB inalieaable rights, that among these are life, liberty,
aad fpropal}'I—that to secure fiiese rights, govemments are Inslitaled smoag mea, deriv
ing their jast powers froia the consent o f tbe governed, that whenever any form o f gov
emment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to, alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and
oiganizing its powers in such forms, as to them shall sesm most likely to effect their
safely and happiness (Bardes, ShellQr', & SchiHidt, 2004, p. 521),

Moreover, classical liberalism also underscored America’s creation and adoption o f a
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new coQstitotioii. One might stipulate that the very essence and design of American
goveminent pays sincere homage to classical liberal principles. The respect and admira
tion for the rights o f the individual embodied In classical liberalisin can be found
throughout American constltationalism. Whether it be by means o f repiibiicanism or
federalism, the protection o f the individual an 4 in particular, the individiiaf s rights me
the primary basis of Amsrican govemiHent.
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CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL’S INALIENABLE RIGHT TO LIFE: AN ANALYSIS
INTO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S UNDERSTANDING
OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Introdaction

One o f the principal themes adYocated by classical iiberalism and, in particuiar,
John Locke is that an individual has an inalienable “right to life.” By “inalienable,”
Locke Is referring to man’s natural right, or his God-given right. Man is given the “right
to life” through the very creation o f his own being; he is, in other words, bora with such a
right. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the tenn “inalienable” as that
which is “incapable o f being alienated, surrendered, or transferred” (Webster, 1993, p.
586). Because man is bom with such a right, neither he nor any other entity (e.g., gov
ernment) may conceivably alter the nature o f its possession. It is an innate part o f himself
and, as such, an essential part o f his own inner being. By “right to life,” Locke is refer
ring to man’s right to “a system o f justice that is free of arbitrary action and pays proper
attention to legal procedure” (Herson, 1984, pp. 46-47). It is a system whereby an indi
vidual’s ^Vorth and dignity” ai'e considered as paramoant to the Interests o f society and,
in particular, to the interests of state (p. 46). Rule of law, as applied to both ruler and
ruled alike, ensures that the individuars rights, his right to life, remain guarded against
any potentially arbitrary, undue government intrusion. This is the individual’s inalienable
right, to be guaranteed some sense o f procedural due process on the part of the state.
61
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Man’s inalienable right to life is ¥cry much at the heart o f America’s founding
and is certainly key to the development o f the Madisonian model. Indeed, one o f the
strongest condemnatioas o f the British govenaiieiit by Thomas Jefferson, among others,
was that it had consistently violated the procedural due process rights o f its American
subjecte. To the say the veiy least, the American colonial experience with King George
III has been “a history o f repeated injuries and iisurpatiotis, all having in direct object the
establislimeiit o f m absolute tyranny” (p. 521). Accordingly, the King o f Great Britain
has, among other things,, . .
refused his assent to laws; . . . obstructed the administration of justice; . . . made judges
dependent on his will alone;. . . aboiisli{etij the free system of English laws;. . . tak[en]
away our cfaartere;, . . saspeod[ed| our m m legislatures;. . jand] abdiiated government
here (pp. 521-522).

The key, o f course, is to determine in what maimer if any the United States Supreme
Court has preserved and perpetuated such precautionaiy devices as set forth by the
Founding Fathers to ensure that no such tyranny on the part o f government could ever
potentially happen again with respect to an individual’s inalienable right to life. Although
there are several such devices found within the U.S. Constitution’s Bill o f Rights,
including an Individual’s protection against self-incriminatioii, double jeopaidy, and cruel
and unusual punishment, none are probably any more significant to an individuars
procedural due process rights ttian the protection afforded against unlawful searches aad
seizures.^’ This right provides procedural protection o f the individual against the state
and thus preseiv^es one o f the central most important tenets o f classical liberalisiB, an
individuars “right to life.”

Tbe Eighth Aramdmoit’s p-otection against “auel and umisaal” punisijniait will be covered extossively withia the oosciucling chapter. C h a ts ' VI, which wil! look at other protections beyond just those
covered here.
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The History Behind Unlawful Searches and Seizures

According to the Foarlii Amendiiieiit o f Ihe United States Constitution, “the right
o f the people to be secure in their homes, houses, papers, aad effects, against un
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particiilarly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (U.S. Constitution, Amend.
4). The fiindaineiitai basis o f the Fointh Amendnneiit is the whole notion that an “[indi
vidual’sj home is [his] castie” and that no one person, group or entity, speaking primarily
o f government, shall have the right to violate the sanctity o f that castle without some
prior recourse to procedural due process (Vile, 2001, p. 154). Clearly, in this regard, the
individual’s inalienable right to life, or his right to due process o f law, is considered by
far more slgnificaiit than any particular ajnbition or desire on the part o f the state. As
such, the Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the U.S. Constitution for the specific
purpose of protecting the rights of the individual against what James Madison has re
ferred to as “the superior force o f an interested and over-bearing majority” (Wills, 1982,
p. 43). O f course, this does not mean that the government is forever prevented from
searching the individuars “homes, houses, papers, and effects”; it only means that the
goveroment is forever prevented from searching them in an arbitrary manner (U.S. Con
stitution, Amend. 4), In lieu of the Fourth Amendiiieiit, the government must adhere to
some sense o f procedural due process before it can even think o f infringing upon an
individuaf s right to life. The individual’s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures is sacrosanct against any potentially arbitrar>' action on the part of the state.
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Tlie historical basis o f the Foiirtli Amendmenf s protection agakst unreasonable
searches and seizures is very miich rooted in English legal custom, or what might be
referred to here as English heritage (Cummmgs & Wise, 2001, p. 34). Ind^d, according
to Leonard Lc¥y: “The Fourth Amendment would not have been possible but for British
legal theory, which Britons o f Norfh America inherited and cherished as their own”
(Levy, 1999, pp. 150"15l). There are, o f course, any number o f precedents within
English heritage that would eventually serve as a foundation for the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures but none o f them have been any more influential than
the Magna Charta of 1215 and the “inspiring imagery” that was eventually bom out of it
(Levy, p. 151). Tlie Magna Charta o f 1215, oflsntim® referred to as the “Great Charter,”
is really the first written constitution o f Great Britain. Being a constitution o f sorts, a list
o f grievances as well as demaiids, the Magna Charta sought to address what many o f the
feudal barons of England at the time perceived as an aAitrary abuse o f royal power by
the monarch. King John (Perry, et a!., 1985, p. 209).^® The significance o f the Magna
Charta of 1215 for present purposes, though, is really its discussion o f the issue sur
rounding “due process” within Clause 39. Indeed, it is this aspect of the Magna Charta
that maay, including Robert Beale, among others, have periodically referred to as being
the primary source o f the whole notion that “a man’s house is his castle” (Levy, 1999, pp.
151-153).

One o f iie sigiificant proHeins that the baroas had with King John mas. their belief that lie had
shown il! regard for ti'aditional feudal practices. For instamx, he had demanded far more revenue from
them than he was entitled to, plus he had punished many of them without proper due process (i.e., trial)
(Perry, et al., 1985, p. 209).
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While Clause 39 of the Magna Chaita does not specifically allude to an indi
vidual’s protection against unlawfal searches and seizures, it is this compooent o f the
Great Charter from which it has historically been derived. As stated within: “No freemen
shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawfiil judgment o f his ^ r s or by the law of
the land” (http://www.csJndlana-edii/statecrafb'magna-carta.MmI). Still, although the
Magna Charta was instituted in 1215, it was not until 1589 that anyone even thought of
making the connection between its contents (i.e.. Clause 39) and a man’s right to some
sense o f household privacy (Levy, 1999, p. 151). As with the whole episode that even
tually culminated with the adoption o f the Magna Charta in 1215, again, royal preroga
tive, or the abuse thereof, was at issue. Indeed, according to Robert Beale, the royal court,
from which he was also a member, had shown unbridled disrespect for the privacy o f a
man’s home (p. 151).^^ Whenever the court was so obliged, its officers were free to enter
into any man’s home, search through Ms personal effects, and take whatever they desired,
or that which they consMered to be evidence (p. 151). Such actions on the part o f gov
ernment, at least in Beale’s mind, were in clear violation o f the Great Charter (p. 151).
For, although Clause 39 d<*s not speak directly to privacy itself, it may be carefully
construed or inferred from it (pp. 151-152). This, according to Leonard Levy', is what has
become part o f the “inspiring imageiy” or “creative glosses” that encapsulates the Magna
Charta (p. 15!). Oftentimes, “what mattered was not what Magna Charta actually said but
what people thought it said or, rather, what it had come to mean” (p. 151).

According to Lo)Bar{l Levy, Robert Beale was m f x i a clerk for fee Prhy Coancil of Qt&X
Britain—that nation’s highest 'tribuaal (Levy, 1999, p. 151).
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Colonial Experience With Searches and Seizures

Robert Beale was certainly not alone in his belief that the Magna Charta Implied
some sense of protection against the ramiiiaging effects o f an otherwise overzealoos gO¥emmeet bent upon invading the privacy o f a man’s home. Others, too, followed in
Beale’s steps including, among them, Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew' Hale, and Sir
William Blackstone (Levy, 1999, pp. 150-154). All o f them would have a tremendous
influence upon early colonial American legal thought, specifically as it would relate to
the whole notion that “a man’s house is his castle” (p. 151). Throughout the colonial
period, particularly after the English ParliaiBent adopted the usage o f writs o f assistance
(i.e., general search warrants) in 1662 and then extended them on to the colonies in 1696,
the British govemnient routineiy showed little If any regard for tie sanctity o f the sub
ject’s personal effects (i.e., home) (O’Brien, 2003, pp. 835-836; Levy, 1999, pp. 156157). Such writs enabled British authorities (e.g., customs officials) to arbitrarily “enter
and go into any house, shop, cellar, warehouse, room, or any other place, and in case o f
resistance, to break open doors, chests, tranks and other package, and there to seize any
kind of goods or merchandise whatever prohibited” (Peck, 1992, p. 121). The primaiy
purpose o f these general warrants was, in most cases, to collect contraband that was typi
cally smuggled to avoid paying roj^ai taxra (pp. 120-121). This was especially true at
around the time o f the French and Indian Ware within colonial America (1756-1763) and
shortly fliereafler, when England imposed additional taxes on various goods to help com
pensate for the war effort (Vile, 2001, pp. 1-2). For instance, in 1764, the British imple
mented the Sugar and Currency Acte; and in 1765, the British impleinented the Stamp
and Quartering Acts (Graver, 1985, pp. 106-111). These acts were subsequently followed
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by the Townshend Act in 1767 and then the Intolerable Act in 1774 (pp. 111-117). Such
arbitrary actions on the part o f the British government, as at least perceived by the
Americaii colonialists, would have a tremendous effect upon the American colonies,
initially spawning resentment and, in time, outright challenge.
One o f the first and most significant chaileiigK in the Aiaerlcan colonial court
system that was used to determine whether or not Clause 39 o f the Magna Charta of 1215
did in fact infer some sense o f privacy on the part of the individual and his personal
effects came in 1761 within the Colony o f Massachusetts (H otter & Kanovitz, 1991, pp.
174-175). M what has since become known as the “Writs o f Assistance” case or the
“Paxton’s” case, the issue at hand was whether or not the British government could in
fact use general warrante, or writs o f assistance, to search merchant properly throughout
the city of Boston (pp. 174-175). Operating under a general writ issued by King George
I! in 1755, James Paxton, an Engllsli customs officer, routinely used tie writ to search for
smuggled contraband for the Crown as well as for his own personal gain (Peck, 1992, p.
121). Described as a “rat gnawing at the [city’s] innards,” Paxton was by far the most dis
liked English official presiding in Boston at the time (p. 121). His unseemly reputation
plus Hs arbitraiy use o f searches and seizures came to a hsM in 1760 (p. 121). With the
death of King George II, under whose power the general writ had been originally issued,
Paxton would neoJ to apply for a new writ under the new monarch. King Geoige III;
how'ever, as routine as that may be, this would be the spark that would ignite colonial
challenge to the a rb itra l use o f such writs (pp. 121-122). Eager to challenge the legit
imacy o f such WTits on behalf o f the American colonies was James Otis, Jr., former
advocate general for the English Admiralty (p. 122). The gist of Otis’ argument: Such
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writs are illegal because they are simply too general and because they place too much
power “in the hands o f every petty officer” (p. 122). Accordingly, general writs are
Eothing more than devices that can be used for “revenge, ill-tomor, or wantonness” (p.
122). This, in Otis’ mind, was “the most destmctive of English liberty, and the fundaHiental principles o f the constitution” (p. 122). While Otis, in the end, did in fact lose the
case, he did leave significant impression upon the American colonies (p. 123). In fact,
John Adams, ^ o actually did ob^rve the trial, would later comment that “then m d there
the child Independence was bom” (p. 123).

Constitutional Debate Over the Fourth Amendment

Given the colonial experience with the writs of assistance, it is little wonder that
the founding fathers would feel compelled to incorporate a protection against the use of
general warrants within the U.S. Constitution itself. Ironically, though, this was an issue
o f debate. Many, Including Alexander Hamilton, believed that such a protection was not
really wairaiited, citing that. . .
bill o f rights are in their origin, stipulations bet\¥een kings and their subjects, abridgments
of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surreadered to the prince. . .
They have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the peo
ple, and executed by their immediate represaitatives aad servants (Wills, 1982, p. 436).

Others, such as 'Thonias Jeffereon, w'ere a bit more waiy o f the iiew constitution believing
that “a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every goverrnnent on earth,
general or particular, and what no just govemmeiit should refuse, or rest on inference”
(Peck, 1992, p. 62). Ultimately, the very ratification o f the Constitution itself would be
dependent upon the inclusion o f some forai o f a bill o f rights. The founding fathers had
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become estranged into two dominant camps: the Federalists and the Anti-federalists.

40

While the Federalists (e.g., Hamilton) did not believe a bill o f rights was essential to the
new constitiitioi!, the Anti-federalists (e.g., Jefferson) would not sign on until one was
added to it. In the end, it would be James Madison who would seek to bring the two sides
together in compromise. In response to Jefferson’s ix^ncems, Madison wrote:
My own opinion has always beei in fevor of a bill of ri^ ts , provided it be so framed as
not to imply powers not meant to be included in the emioieratioii. At the same time, I
have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by
amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I have
favored it because I supposed it might be o f use, and, if properly esecated, conld not be
of disservice {p. 62).

However, Madison’s perceived lack of enthusiasm for the addition o f a bill of rights
worried some Anti-federalists (p. 69). Believing that Madison could very well be waf
fling on the idea, Anti-federalists [soon] spread rumors that [he] opposed a bill of rights”
(p. 69). Fearing that tire last few slates may not ratily the Constitiition (e.g.. North
Carolina and Rhode Island), and fearing that Ms owe bid for Congress could very well be
in jeopardy, M^fison was compelled thereafter to strengtheii his own position on the
matter o f including a bill of rights by openly stating:
It is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to be revised, and that the first
Congress routing under it, ought to prepare and TOommend to the stat« for ratification,
the most satisfactoiy provisions for all esKntM rights, parfeulariy tie rights of conscleice in the Mlest latitude, the fi'eedom of the press, trials by jury, security against
general v/arrants, [etcetera] (p. 69).

O f course, believing that a bill o f rights should be added to the U.S. Constitution
and having some idea as to which rights ought to be included within such a HI! soon
demonstrated itself to be a particularly onerous task, especially for James Madison. Be
tween 1787 and 1789, more than 200 recommendations were offered up by the various
The dispute smse priaiarily bKstiss o f disagrwoieats over the fcnctioniEg o f the Articles o f Q>nfederatioe—America’s first constitution. Federalists believed that it needed to be either fixed or scrapped,
while Anti-federaiists believed that it was working just fine.
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tes for inclusion into a bill o f rights (Levy, 1999, pp. 1-43). Interestingly, though,
while Madison, and others, were compelled to m rt through and condense the myriad o f
rights offered, historical experience would soon lead a hand. Nowhere was this more
evident than with respect to what would become the Fourth Amendment-—-the individuaf s protection against uni’easonable searches and seizures. The experience with the
British go¥erniiieiit’'s utilization of general warrants would serve as a clear precedent for
what not to allow in the new government Stiil, although Madison, and others, were
keenly aware that some sort of protection against general warrants ought to be included,
the exact phraseology o f such an iecliision would become an issue of debate. As a source
and a guide, Madison, and others, turned to what many o f the states had already included
in their constitutions with respect to the issue o f searches and seizures (pp. 168-179).^*
However, in many of the states, including Virginia and Pennsylvania, there was reluc
tance to completely outlaw the use o f general warrants (pp. 168-170). Both states clearly
expressed disdain for the “grievous and oppressive” manner of general warrants but only
went so far as to stipulate that they “ought not to be granted” (p. 168). Other states, such
as Maryland and Delaware, were eager to cite general warrants as “illegal” but remained
vague on the specificity' as to what grounds such a document might be voided (pp. 170171)."^^ In the end, it was the directness, specificity, and succinctness o f Massachusetts’
constitution that would most .impress Madison and his colleagues. Strongly influenced by
the %'rits of Assistance case in 1761 and written by Jolm Adams himself, witness to the

Several o f the states implemented their own constitations shortly after America’s Declaration of
Independence in 1776.
.Both Maryland’s and Delaware’s constitutions did not provide for a “specificity” requirement as
to what items may tie searched and seized—an awkward contradiction to tbeir outlawing of general war
rants as “illegal” A e w , .1999, pp. 170-171).
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event, Article XIV o f the document states;
Evay sabjsct has a right to be secure from ai! unreasonable searches, and seizures of his
person, his houses, his p a|» s, and all his possessions. Al! wan'aats, tfeerefoie, are contrary to tMs right, if fee cause or foiindstioii of them be not previously supported by oath
or atSrmatiors; and if the order In the warrant to the civil officer, to make search in
saspecled places, to arrest one or more suspected pereons, or to seize their propert;/, be
not accompanied with a special designation o f the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizare; and no wan'ant o a ^ t to be issued but in cases and with fee formaiities, pre
scribed by the laws (Levy, 1999, pp. 170-171).

The significance of Massachusetts’ constitution, at least for Madison, was not just the
fact that it provided for a guarantee against unreasonaMe searches and seizures bet that it
also referred to such a guarantee as a fimdamental ‘Tight” that “eveiy subject” possesses
(p. 171). The aliowance for such a protection against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” as a basic human right would become central to the eventual development and
ratification o f the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (p. 171). Indeed, as should
be evident below, the parallel between the two documents is rather strlldng:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
imreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized {U.S. Constitution, Amend. 4)

The U.S. Supreme Court and Unlawful Searches and Seizures

Ideally, a central principle o f American constitiitionaiisin is the inherent tselief
that the judiciary is the final interpreter o f the law. Meaning, the judiciary is responsible
for deterniioing the definition o f the law as it specifically relates to the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, according to Chief Justice John Marshall, “it is emphatically the province and duty
o f the judicial defmrtment to say what the law is. TTiose who apply the rule to particular
cases, must o f necessity expound and interpret that rule” (Nivola & Rosenbloom, 1999, p.
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501).“*^ This is how the U.S. Supreme Court must understand the U.S. Constitution. It
must inteipret it, or gi¥e meaning to it. The U.S. Constitution is by m means a specific
docmneiit; it is ¥eiy general and vague in most o f its content. By the fact that the U.S.
Constitution is so general enables it to be adapted to the generational circumstances or
differences that may exist at the time o f its interpretation. By no means, for example,
does “unreasonable” mean today what It may have meant during the founding era. But
given such broad language as contained within the Constitution, the Court can readily
apply new interpretations to fit new generations. This does not, however, mean that the
Court has the right to read into the U.S. Constitution what may not exist, or what may not
be inferred. According to former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, ^1;hose who framed
the Constitution chose tiieir words carefully; they debated at great length tilie most minute
points. The language they chose meant something. It is incumbent upon the Court to
deteiminc what that meaning was” (Fisher, 1990, p. §8).^

Understanding the Language o f the Fourth Amendment

Language is undoubtedly the single most Important aspect o f the law. Words
carry with them an array o f historical occurrences, traditions, and understandings. One
might say that a word is just not a word; it can and often does have a history behind it.
Witfain America’s constitiitioeal arrangement, it is the judiciary that is responsible for
understanding constitutional language. What does a particular word or phrase mean?
More specifically, as in this case, what does the language o f the Fourth Amendment of

Marbiiry MmMson, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),
^
This quote is 'taken from an exceipt used by Louis Fisher: The Doctrine o f O rigim i Intent: At
torney General Meese Versus Justice Brennan (Fisher, 1990, pp. 86-91).
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the U.S. Constitution mean; what does it entail? At first glance, the Fourth Amendment
looks rather simple and straightforward; “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, aad the persons or
things to i3e seized” (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 4). The problem arises, though, when the
Amendment is broken down into its constituent parts. For instance, what constitutes an
“unreasonable” search and seizure, as opposed to a “reasonable” one? Moreover, what
does “probable cause” mean? “The answers to [such] questions are,” according to Lee
Epstein and Thomas Walker, “o f critical importance if the Fourth Amendment is to have
any for<x” (Epstein & Walker, 2001, p. 486).

The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
. . . . The word “right” itself is rather self-explanatory. Indeed, to some degree, it has al
ready been covered in the sense of man possessing an inalienable “right” to life, liberty',
and property. However, in typical terms, a “right” is nothing more than “that which is
proper under law, morality, or ethics” (Black, 2000, p. 1060). It is “something that Is due
to a pereon by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle” (p. 1060). In this case, man
has a “right,” a “just claim,” to be secure in his own “person, house, paper, and effect,
against iinrcasonable searches and seizures . . (U.S. Constitutioii, Amend. 4). A prob
lem in terms of definition, though, arises when we turn to the rather general and broad
sweeping language o f “persons, houses, papers, and effects” (U.S. Constitution, Amend.
4). What exactly is a “f^rson,” a “house,” a “paper,” and an “effectT’ One way to deter
mine the scope o f such language Is to begin by defining it as the “premises” and “areas”
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that are protected by the Fourth Amendnient to the U.S. Constitution (Klotter &
Kanovitz, 1991, p. 258). Again, however, the concepts o f “premises” aad “areas” are just
as vague in their specificity, or the lack thereof. At one tiine, the U.S. Supreme Coiiit
mled that a “dwelling/’ whether occupied or momentarily unoccupied, carried with it the
Fourth Ameadiaent’s piotectiofi against unrea^iiaHe searches and seizures (p. 258)."*^
The Court defined “dwelling” as an indivlduafs home, apartment, hotel room, or place o f
business (Kiotter & Kaaovitz, 1991, p. 258). Only when that individual permanently
“vacated” Ms “dwelling,” his home, apartment, hotel room, or place o f business, did his
Fourth Amendment protection subside or end (p. 25K). O f more recent, the U.S. Supreme
Court has modified its understanding o f “premises” or “areas” in al least two important
ways. In 1967, in the « s e of Kaiz vs. United States, the Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment extends to “people” and not necessarily to just “dwellings”—^that each individua! cames with him, wherever he is, “a reasonable expectation o f privacy” (389 U.S.
347, 351-361).^ And in 1987, the Court, again, amended its understanding o f ^‘premises”
and “areas” by developing a four-pronged test, reiterating its earlier position on “dwell
ing,” that the protection o f the Fourth Amendment extends to: (1) the proximity o f the
area to the [dwelling]; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the
[dwelling!; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the
resident to protect tfm area ftowi observation by passers-by (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p.

258).*^^
. . . agaim i m m m onable searches and seizures, shall mat be violated, . . . . The

45
46

47

United States vs. Rabimwits, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Kaiz vs. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
United States vs. Dimn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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word “unreasonable” can have a multitaie o f different meanings, mostly all dependent
upon the maiiner and the timieg in which the term is applied. B lack’s Law Dictmnary, for
instance, defines “unreasonable” as “not guided by reason; irrational or capricious”
(Black, 2000, p. 1247). As it relates to the Fourth Amendment, “unreasonable” carries
with it a procedaral componest. A search and seizure that is not procedural may quite
respectfiilly be considered as “unreasonaMe.” However, a search and seizure that is con
ducted pursuant to procedure may quite respectfiilly be considered as “reasonable.” In
this context, procedural due process determines the “unreasonableness” or '“reasonable
ness” o f a given search and seizure. Black 's Law Dictmmwy defines “procedural due pro
cess” as ‘hhe conduct of legal proceedings according to established roles and principles
for the protection and enforeement o f private rights” (p. 406). A search and seizure that is
conducted in lieu o f the Fourth Amendment’s requirements for a search warrant would
then be considered as “reasonable.” All other searches and seizures would be considered
as “unreasonable,” p-ovlded, o f course, that the U.S. Supreme Court has not allowed for
what it considers to be “reasonable” exceptions to the rule. Such exceptions have histori
cally Included what is often referred to as a search “incident to a lawful arrest,”^®“volun
tary consent” search,® “plain view” search,^^ a search through “lawful impoundment,”^^
“stop and frisk” search,^^ and “compelliag government interest” search.^^
. . . and m Warrants shall issue, . . . . A “search wairant” is a rather simple
concept in and o f itself. As defined, a “search warrant” is “a 'written order authorizing a

4S
49
50
51
52
53

United States w. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
SckmcMoth vs. Bmtamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Cooper vs. CaUfomis, 386 U.S. 58 (1968).
Terry vs. Ohio, 393 U.S, I (196*).
United States b s . Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
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law-enforcement officer to conduct a search o f a specified place and to seize e¥idence”
(Black, 2000, p. 1085). But a probiem arises when we get to the point o f who “shall
issae” such a search warrant (U.S. Constitutioii, Amend. 4). The U.S. Constitution is
rather ¥ague on this notion, in the sense that it does not provide any clear indication at all
as to who should be authorized to issue search warrants, as to who should determine
whether or not law enforcement have met their minimiiin threshoM o f probable cause.
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, in lieu of an individual’s procedural right
to due process of law, that a search warrant “shall [be] issue[d|” by a “neutral, detached
magistrate.”^'* What this means is that “the issuance o f a search warrant is a function of
the judicial branch o f government” and is not the domain o f law enforcemeat officers and
prosecuting attorneys who have a vested interest in the search (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991,
p.

As clearly stipulated to by Justice Robert Jackson in the case o f Johnson vs.

United States:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it dmies law raforcement the support o f the iisual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidsace. its protection consirfs In leqairiEg tiiat flsose inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en
gaged in the often competitive enterprise o f ferreting out crime. Any assumption liiat evi
dence sufficient to sappoit a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justily the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave ttie people’s homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers. Crime, even in the prlvasy o f ooe’s own quarters. Is, of ooHise, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be rrached on profKr showing. The
right of officere to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chcwses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy mast reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rale, to be decidal by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or goveminent en
forcement agent (333 U.S. 10,13-14).

. . but tspon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, . . . . The word

Johm m vs. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Coolidge m New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 450
(1971); Heiler vs. New York, 413 U.S. 489 (1973); and LO-Jl Sales, Im . vs. New York, 442 U.S. 327
(1979)!
Coolidge vs. Metv Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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“probable cause” can have a multitode o f different meanings. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “probable cause” as “a reasonable ground to suspect that a person has coimnitted
or is committiag a crime or that a place contains specific Items connected with a crime”’
(p. 977). “Probable cause,” as such, “amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction” (p. 977). “Probable cause” may also be thought
o f in the context of the term “reasonable suspicion,” which is “a particularized and ob
jective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person o f crim
inal activity” (p. 1018). In the context o f the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, law enforcement must have “probable cause” in
order to obtain a search warrant (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 4). What this entails is that
the police must have reasonable suspicion that they will find illegal contraband (e.g.,
illegal narcotics) within the specified area or location that they wish to search. In the case
o f Brim gar vs. United States, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “probable
cause” must involve "“the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal tectmicians, act (338 U.S. 160, 175).* The U.S.
Supreme Court underscored this perspective in the case of Illinois vs. Gates by pointing
out that “probable cause” must take into consideration an “assessment o f p*obabilities in
[a] particular factual context” (462 U.S. 213, 232).^'^ What both cases similarly propound
is an earnest belief that “probable cause” is a “fluid concept” that must eventually turn on

Brinegarvs. United S t a t e s , 160 {1949).
The case o f Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), actually oveirules two earlier decisions that
followed Brimgar m. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Both Aguilar vs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
fflid Spim lli ¥S. United StMes, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), sought to put into place a rigid two-pronged test that
police had to follow in ordo* to use an informant’s tip. The two-ponged test involved, first of all, the ade
quacy of flie inforBianfs own knowledge about the matter and, secondly, the reliability of that knowledge
(Epstein & Walker, 2001, p. 488).
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the “totalitj-' of the circumstances” in which it is iiiYolved (462 U.S. 213, 230-233). As
such, “probable cause” exists . . .
where ‘the facts aad circmnstanees within ftlie officers’] knowledge aad of wMcIi they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a m,an of
reasonable caution in die belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed {338 U.S.
160,175-176).

. . , am i parlicularfy describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 4). One thing that the U.S. Supreme Court
has determined is that while the “place to te searched” does not have to be “particularly
described” with utmost specificity, its description does at least need to be “practically
accurate” (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, pp. 202-203). What does “practically accurate”
entail? According to John Klotter and Jacqueline Kanovitz, ‘hhe description must be
sufficiently definite so as to clearly distinguish the premises from all others” (p. 202).
The objective, of course, is to be specific enough so as to prevent the usage o f openended general searches but practical enough so as to allow law enforcement to do its job
(pp. 202-203). to 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court even allowed for the possibilit}' o f a
“good faith” type of error with respect to a police search, stating, with some caution, that
“we must judge the constitutioaality o f their [the police’s] conduct in l i ^ t o f the infor
mation available to them at the time they acted” (480 U.S. 79, §5).^® Likewise, “the
persons or things to be seized” must be “particularly described” as well (U.S. ConstitutioH, Amend. 4). The primary purpose o f this requirement is to ensure, again, that law
enforcement is not left with an unspecified or a general warrant that could be used for
whatever purpose (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, pp. 204-205). In the case o f Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. vs. New York, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “the Fourth

Maryland vs. Garrmom, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
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AmesdfBent [does not] countenance open-ended warrants, to be completed while a search
is teing conducted and items seized or after the seizure has been cairied out” (442 U.S.
319, 325)."^ Hence, “the f^rsons or things to be seized” must be adequately describo! in
such a manner “that even an officer who is unfamliiaf with the case can read the descrip
tion and iaiow what items should be seized” (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, pp. 204).

Incorporation of an ExclusioBarv Rule into the Fourth Amendment

The various principles bom out o f such language are at the heart o f American
constitutionalism and serve as the primaiy basis for protecting and preserving American
individualism. Throughout, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown a respect for the individ
ual’s rights while, at the same time, acknowledging the need on the part o f the state to
provide some sense o f law and order. There are, of course, any number o f cases that stand
out wdth respect to the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. However, some of these cases are more significant to constitutional law
than others. We might refer to such cases as “landmark” decisions in the sense that they
have become absoiately contingent to understanding a particular area o f the law. Conceming the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and seiz
ures,” such historic cases have seemingly revolved around the Supreme Court’s applica
tion o f the so-called exclusionaiy' rale. The gist o f the exclusionary rale is that “evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourtli Amendmeat to
the Constitution will not be admitted as evidence in court” (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p.
177). In this respect, the exclusionary rule has become one o f the Court’s primary tools to

Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. vs. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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ensure that the state does not arbitrarily encroach upon the Fourth Amendment rights of
the individual aad his personal effects—to ensiire, in other words, that the individual’s
due process rights, his right to life, are preserved and protected.
Interestingly, the exclusionaiy rule is nowhere specifically stated or alluded to
within the U.S. Constitution; and yet, this very same rule has tecome pivotal to the
enforcement o f the Fourth Amendment. The development o f the exclusionary rule within
American jurispindeiice evolved at the begiiming o f Ihe 20* centufy, in the case of Weeks
vs. United States {232 U.S. 383).® Prior to this case, American courts followed the com
mon law principle that “it wcaild be a dangerous obstacle to the administration o f justice
to hold that because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against
a part>' charged with m offense” (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p. 178). The Weeks case,
however, transformed this argument by putting into place an enforcement mechanism that
could be used to punish police in the event that they did violate an indivMiial’s Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule can
be looked at as a consequence, as a punishment for bad police work. Thus, according to
Justice William Day:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the countr}' to obtain conviction
by means of unlawM semires and enforced a>nfessions, the latter often obtained after
sibjecting accused persons to uBwarranted p^ctices destructive o f the riglife secured by
the Constitution, should find no sffliction in the judgments o f the courts, which are
charged at ail times with the support of the Constitution, and to vAich people of all con
ditions have a right to appeal for the maintefiaiK® of such fundamental rights (232 U.S.
383,392).

Clearly, the Fourth Araendiiient would have no due process value at all if law en
forcement was able “to discover and seize the fruits” of an illegal search and then be able

®

re e ls vs. United Slates, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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to keep them for proseciitoriai effect (232 U.S. 383, 392). The ¥er>- parpose behind
adding the FoHrth Amesdinent to the U.S. Constitution was to ensure that ‘dhe sanctity of
a mao’s home and the privacies o f Piis| life” were safeguarded against any arbitraiy
action on the part o f the state—that against the state, man has an “indefeasible right of
personal s«iirity, personal liberty, and private property” (232 U.S. 383, 391).^*
The exclusionary rule, though, as adopted in Weeks vs. United States, was only
initially applicable at the national level and, as such, did not apply to the various states. It
would be almost 50 years before the U.S. Supreme Court would feel obliged to extend
the procedural protection afforded by the exclusionary rule onto the stetes, via the due
process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth Ainendments (338 U.S. 25).®^ O f course, this
is not to say that the Court did not dabble with the idea during the interim period. In
1949, in the case of Wolfvs. Colorado, the Court considered the idea but then seemingly
backed away from It. Speaking for the Majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter stated:
The securiiy of one’s privacy against arbitraiy intnision by the police—-m'Wch is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment—^is basic to a free society. Accordingly, we have no hesi
tation ia saying that were a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into
privacy it would run counter to the guai*ant>' of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ways
of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different older (338 0.S, 25,27-28).

Much o f the Court’s rationale in Ihe W olf case revolved around the notion that other
deterrents at the state level might be just as effective in ciirtailing police misconduct as
the exclusionary rale (338 U.S. 25,30-33). The proximity o f the police to the crommunily',
the Court noted, for instance, could potentially have the same effect as the exclusionary
rule, eosuring that any due process violations on the part o f local law enforcement would

This is actoaliy a quote from a quote, contained wltiiin fee case o f W eeb vs. IMited Slates, 232
U.S. 383 (1914). The quote used by Justice William Day Is taken from the rase o f Boyd vs. United States,
116 U.S. 630(1886).
®
M'olfvs. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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be readily observed and corrected (338 U.S. 25, 32-33). Stiil, while such reasoning was
notable and qaite possibly e¥en plausible given tie right circninstaiices, others on the
Court fiindameiitally disagrred with its basis premise —4hat “a state’s reiiance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective” (338 U.S. 25, 31).
Justice Frank Murphy, writing in dissent, stated:
Imagination and zeal may ieveat a iomm mefiiods to give <»ntsnt to the commaBds o f the
Fourth Amendment. But this Court is limited to the remedies currently available. It can
not legislate the idea! system. If we would attempt the enforcement of the search and
seizure clause in the ordinary case today, we are limited to three devices: judicial exclu
sion of tbe iiJegalJy obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators; and civil action
against vioiato-rs in the action o f trespass. Altemativra are deceptive. Their veiy sMement
conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as fee next. Is this case their
statement is blinding. For there is but one altemaiive to the rule o f exclusion. That is no
sanction at all (338 U.S. 25, 41),

Justice Frank Murphy’s logic, though in dissent in the W olf case, would eventaally
become the majority viewpoint some 11 years later. The case of Mapp vs. Ohio would
serve as the “leading case” to selectively incorporate the Fourth Anaendnient’s exclu
sionary rule onto the states via the Fourteenth AmendineEtis due process clause (367 U.S.
643).®^ Again, just like the Weeks case, there is a strong sense o f respect and admiration
for an iiidividiiars procedural right to life or due process of law. Speaking for the major
ity, Justice Tom Clark wrote: “Since the Fourth Amendment’s right o f privacy has been
declarai enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause o f the Fourteenth,
it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
federal government” (367 U.S. 643, 655). Contetnplating staunch criticism o f Ihe Couft’s
decision to uphold the exclusionary rule by making it further applicable to the various
states, the majority reiterated a point made in an earlier decision—that “for good or for

®
Mapp w. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Selective incorporation or incor}x>ratioe theory is defined as
“the view that most of the protections of the Bill of Rights are applied against state governments through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause” (Bard®, Shelley, & Sctimidt, 2004, p. 553).
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ill, [the government] teaches the whole people by its example . . . [and] if [it] becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds conteinpt for law; it invites every man to become a law imto MmselF (367 U.S. 643, 659).^ Clearly, ia this regard, it is better that “the criminal go free
because the constable has blundered” than to reward the constable for Ms blunder (367
U.S. 643, 659).®^

Exceptions to the Applicability o f the Exclusionary Rule

In nearly all cases, there is going to be an exception to evety rule and nowhere is
this more true than with respect to the exclusionary rale. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court
has been willing to exclude evidence that it considered constitutionally detrimental to an
individuars due process rights, it has also shown some leeway with respect to law en
forcement. Does this mean that the Court has reneged on its duty to uphold the rights o f
the individual against the stMe? One couM certainly get that impression; however, flie
Court has neither yet dismissed the relevance of the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment in preserving the individual’s rights, nor has it yet completely abandoned the
use&lness o f the exclusionaiy rule in ensuring that those r i^ ts are respected by law
enforcement. Rather, the Supreme Court has shown a degree o f understanding with
respect to the needs o f law enforcement, paiticalarly at a time when the crime rate has
started to soar, during the 1970s aad 1980s. One might say that while the Court has in no
way abandoned the personal protections guaranteed to the individual by the Fomth

The quote that Justice Tom Clark Iwnxjws in Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), comes from
Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissenting opinion in the case of Olmstead vs. United States, 111 U.S. 438, 485
(1928).
^
Tbe quote that Jastice Tom Clark bonmvs, in this case, ojmes from thea-Jud^ Beoiamin Cardo2»
in the case of People m. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926).
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Amendment, it has at least considered that the timing of such protections is an issue of
real cQjicerri—that the Court must somehow acknowledge that the rights of society must
be weighed in coiijuactioa with the rights o f the indivlduai As Joha Klotter and
Jacqueline Kanovitz write: “The exclusion o f evidence is not a personal constitutional
right bet a remedy, which, like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of
its imposition” (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p. 182). Having said this, there are at least
three noticeable exceptions that the U.S. Supreme Court has carved out o f the exclu
sionary rale as applied by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. These include, in
general terms, a “collateral use” exception, an “inevitable discovery” exception, and a
“good faith” exception.^
First o f all, the “collateral use” exception is really a product o f the case. United
States vs. Havens (446 U.S. 620).®’ In it, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “a defend
ant’s statements made in response to proper cross-examination . . . are subject to other
wise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally
obtained and is inadmissible as substantive evidence o f guilt” (446 U.S. 620, 620-621).
The exclusionary rule, as such, while potentially applicable in such a situation as this,
cannot be used as a shieid, as a defense, for f»ijiiry (446 U.S. 620, 627). Accordingly, the
“integrily of the fact-finding goals of the criminai trial. . . [cannot] permit or require that
false testimony go unchallenged” (446 U.S. 620, 621). The government, in this sense, has
a right to challenge or impeach such testimony (446 U.S. 620, 627-62S). Secondly, the
“inevitable discovery” exception is a product of the case, Nix vs. Williams (467 U.S.
**
Other exceptiMis exist bat not in relation to the exciusioBafy rule. Notable exceptiom such as
“plain view” are more directiy pertiaeBt to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for a search warrant than
the exclusionarj' rule.
United States vs. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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431).*® le it, the U.S. Siipreme Court ruled that the “exclusion of physical evidence that
would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness o f a
criminai trial” (467 U.S. 431, 446). As a matter o f f ^ t, the Court reasoned, such an
exciosion would ''"wholly fail to take into account the enormous societal cost o f excluding
truth . . . in the administration o f justice” (467 U.S. 431, 445). And, “nothing in this
Courf s prior holdings supports any formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach . .
(467 U.S. 431, 445). Finaiiy, third, the “gcx>d faith” exception is a product o f the case.
United States vs. Leon (468 U.S. 897).*^ In it, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled “that the
exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence ob
tained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the
Fourth Aineadment” (46S U.S. 897, 909). Recognizing that the exclusionaiy rule, when
strictly construed, can exact “substantial societal costs,” the Court reasoned that some
“balance” must be allowed between an individuaFs right to privacy, his due process
rights, and society’s right to justice (468 U.S. 897, 907-922). Allowing for the admission
o f evidence that was sought for and « ized on the basis o f what was believed at the time
to be sound Fourth Amendment principles ensures such balance (468 U.S. 897, 913).

Considerations Beyond the Dictates o f the Exclusionary Rule

A consideration to keep in mind with respect to the Fourth Amendment’s pro
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures is that there is obviously more to this
amendment than jest the exclusionary rule. Indeed, the exclusionary rule is a device that

Nix vs. Wrnisms, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
United States vs. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted to ensore “good police conduct” as well as “judicial
integrity” but that is certainly not all o f it (Klotter & Kanovitz, 1991, p. 177). ’%diat
should never be overlooked is the fact that the Fourth AmendiBent also cafries with, it a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” (389 U.S. 347, 360).'® Certainly, it is plausibly accu
rate, to paraphrase Justice Tom Clark, that the Fourth Ameadment would be seemingly
useless without some soft of tool, such as the exclusionary rule, to punish would-be
traasgressoK of its procedural due process requirements (367 U.S. 643, 656-660).^’ But it
should also be remembered that the exclusionary rule is really a Court-created plienomenoa, and did not become part o f the Fourth Amendment until the early part o f the 20"*
century.^ In this sense, while the exclusionary rule is certainly key to the preservation of
an individual’s procedural due process rights, the Fourth Amendment is kherently, so to
speak, already in possession of such protection—that while law enforcement may not
always be penalized by the courts for violating such rights, there are still certain indi
vidual parameters that they must abide by in order to achieve their aim. Among these
include the area or location o f such a search and seizure. In this regard, is there an “arti
ficial boundary” wherein law enforcement are expected to remain in order to respect the
sanctity o f an individuafs own existence? In other words, does the Fourth AmeBdmenf s
protection against unreasonaMe searches and seizures recognize a difference between the
“public sphere” o f an individual ’s existence and the “private sphere?”
The first case that the U.S. Supreme Court used to delve into this debate, as to
whether or not a public-private dichotomy really exists with respect to an individual’s

Katz Rs. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (!967).
Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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rights, was the case o f Boyd vs. United States (116 U.S. 616).'^ The gist o f the case
re¥ol¥ed around whether or not the national gO¥emmeiit couM in fact compel .an indi
vidual to prodiice evidence (e.g.,. invoices, affidavits, letteis, papers, or statements) that
couid veiy well be used to demonstrate personal guilt in a particular matter or situation
(116 U.S. 616, 622-623). Drawing on the historical experiences that colonial America
incurred with England's use of general warrants, the Court reasoned that it could n o t . . .
(116 U.S. 616, 622-638). The Court’s rationale: “It is not the breaking o f . . . doors, and
the rummaging o f . . . drawers, that constitutes the essence o f the offense; but it is the
invasion o f [an individoai’s] indefeasible right o f personal security, personal liberty, and
private property” (116 U.S. 616, 630). “

to require such an [individual] to produce his

private books and papers, in order to prove his breach o f the laws, and thus to establish
the forfeiture of his property,” the Court reasons, “is surely compelling Mm to furnish
evidence against himself’ (116 U.S. 616, 637). And this, to put it bluntly by the Court, is
assuredly “erroneous . . . unconstitutional and void” (116 U.S. 616, 638). In this sense,
the Court inferred a rather “liberal” Interpretation o f the Fourth Amendment—that it is
the judiciaiy’s solemn duty

be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizens,

and against ^ y stealthy encroachment Ihereon” (116 U.S. 616, 635). Anything less, the
Court concluded, could very well “depreciate . . . [the] constitutional provisions for the
security o f person and property”—^“pereon or property” being defined here as tangible
assets that have some vested proprietary value (116 U.S. 616, 635). The government only
needs a “first footing,” a precedent, that is “illegitimate and unconstitutional” to begin the
process of denying an individual his right to due process of law (116 U.S. 616, 635).

”

Boydvs. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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The case of Olmstead vs. United States fiirther underscored the notion set forth in
Boyd, although more constricti¥eIy, that an “iadefeasiMe right o f personal security, per
sonal iiberty, and private property” exists, only so loag as it relates to “tangible material
effects or an actual physical invasion” (277 U.S. 43§, 466).'^'^ Such privacy does not exist,
the Court re^oned, with respect to telephone wires, which “are [no more] part o f [an
individual’sl house or office . . . than are the highways along which they are stretched”
(277 U.S. 438, 465). In this sense, there is no justification for “an enlargement o f the
language employed beyond the possible practical meaning o f houses, persons, papers,
and effects, or so to apply the words search and ^iziirc as to forbid hearing and sight”
(277 U.S. 438, 465). The case o f Katz vs. United States, however, would later overturn
such reasoning (389 U.S. 347).^^ Returning to more o f a “liberal coestractlon” o f the
Fourth Amendment, as earlier espoused by the Boyd case, Katz expanded upon the scope
o f what constitutes “tangible material effects or

actual physical invasion” (277 U.S.

438, 466). Speaking for the Court, Justice Potter Stewart writes: “Wherever a man may
be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures; [and such] considerations do not vanish when the search in questloii is trans
ferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that o f a telephone booth”
(389 U.S. 347, 359). Whenever there is a “reasonable expectation o f privacy,” the pro
tections that are guaranteed to an individual within the Fourth Amendment hold fast and
true (389 U.S. 347, 360). The key though o f course is that the “expectation” itself be
‘freasoaaWe,” meaning that it is “one that socMy is prepared to recognize” (389 U.S. 347,

”

Olmstead vs. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Katz vs. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89
361).

76

Conclusion

The resultiag cultural and societal impact o f the Fourth Amendineiit should be
somewhat obvious; it is a strong admiration for the various tenets o f Indlviduaiism.
Throughout, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown a remarkable degree o f respect for the
righte o f the individual, as stipulated to by the AmeiicaH Bill o f Rights. Such respect has
even elicited the creation of a “tool,” the exclusionary rule, to adequately ensure that the
rights o f the individual are preserved and protected. O f course, the exclusionary rule has
not been without its critics. Since its application on flie national government in 1914 and
its application on the various state governments in 1961, justices from one era or another
have all questioned the constitutionality o f excluding evidence from a trial that was
deemed to have been in violation of an individual’s right to due process of law. Much of
the criticism has stemmed in large part from the notion that the exclasionary rule Is no
where explicitly provided for within the Fourth .Aniendineiit o f the U.S. Constitu
tion—^that if the founding fathers would have intended such a rule to exist, they would
have incor^rated it into the Fourth Amendmeet tfiemselves. Others have asserted Ihat an
exclusionary rale is by implication essential to the preservation o f the Fourth Amendrnenf s protection against unrcasonaMe searches and seizures. What else can a court do
but deny the admissibility of evidence that was attained without due respect for the
Fourth AiBenduient rights o f the individual? O f what value would an individuars

’’’
The case of K ylh vs. United States, 000 U.S. 99-8508 (2001), expanded upon the notion o f “rea
sonable expectation o f privacy” by restricting the police from using thermal imagers to detect the presence
of heat within a particular dwelling.
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protection against unreasonable searches and seizures be if law enforcement were able to
keep the “fruits o f a bad search?” Clearly, there wmald be no incentrce, other than maybe
a respect for rule o f law, for police officers to follow the reqiiirements laid out in the
Fourth Amendment. In this sense, there is a deterrent value to the exclusionary rule, if
nothing else. Even o f recent, while the U.S. Siipresie Court has been willing to carve out
exceptions to the applicability o f the exclusionaiy' m k , the fact remains: the exclusionary
rule does still exist. And the Court has bees anwilling, in this regard, to go the entire
distance and dismantle the rule in its entirety.
In lieu of the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has also made it clear
that with respect to an individual’s due process rights, there is a division between what
might be referred to as a “public sphere” and what might be referred to as a “private
sphere.” Early on, the Court reasoned that such an expectation can only extend to those
partioilar items in which there was a vested proprietary interest on the part o f the indi
vidual. Meaning, more specifically, only “tangible property,” such as an individual’s
personal effects, could be considered as being protected by the Fourth Ainendinent Such
a strict interpretation o f the Fourth Amendment has since been altered, to allow for an
expansion to those persons, places, or things ia w'hich there might be a “reasonable ex
pectation o f privacy.” As aforementioned, though, the term "reasonable” Is not to be
construed as something akin to ‘"anything goes.” Rather, it is to be understood in terms of
what society believes to be “reasonable” at the time o f the occurrence. An individual, for
instance, who uses an open public telephone booth, with no doors or windows attached,
must realize that his conversation may very well be subject to public hearing. However,
an individual within Ms own home has some “reasonable expectation” to believe that his
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ino¥eir!eBts are not being inonitored by a thermal detection device used by the
police—that he is m fact guaranteed some ‘‘reasonable expectation o f privacy.” This
expectation goes to the heart o f the Fourth Amendiiieiit and ensures that whenever
government feels that it must encroach upon the “life” o f an iadividiial,” it must do so
with procedural due process in mind—Ahat an individuaPs inalisnable right to life is
sacrosanct unless otherwise procedurally stated. The endeavor now is to see if the same
also hoMs true with respect to ae individuars taaiienable “right to lib e rt/’—^his right to
the free exercise of his religion without any undue government interference.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INDIVIDUAL’S INALIENABLE RIGHT TO LIBERTY: AN ANALYSIS INTO
THE SUPREME COURT’S UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

latrodiictlofi

Aaother o f the priiidpal themes advocated by classical libeialism is its belief,
again as propounded by the likes o f Jolm Locke, that an individual also possesses an
“inalienable right to liberty.” While the whole notion o f “inalienable” has already been
discussed, in the sense that it Is something innate or a part o f being, the concept o f
“liberty'” itself needs ftirther elaboration and explanation. To carry Locke’s oft-quoted
statement one step iirther, an individual not only has an “inalienable right to life,” he
also has an “inalienable right to liberty.” Still, an individual’s “right to liberty” should not
be misconstrued as anything even closely re^m biing perfect or unfettered Ireedom. By
no means would John Locke advocate that an individual has an inalienable right to abso
lute liberty, to do whatever it is that he so wills to do. Indeed, as John Locke writes:
Freedom then is
. . . a lifaerty for everyone to <to what he lists, to live as be pleases,
and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men isnder government is, to have a
standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the iegislative
power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rale prescribes
not; and not to be subj«:t to the inconstant, uncertein, Hnknown, arbitraiy will of another
mm: as freedom o f nature is, to be under no othw restraint but the law of nature
(Macpberson,
p. 17).

Heace, an individuars Inalienable right to liberty may

aptly defined as the freedom

that the .individual possesses absent any “arbitrary or imdae external restraint P>y|
government” (Black, 2000, p. 743). In this sense, government is still deemed some degree
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of regulatory power when it can compellingly demonstrate an inherent need to protect
“the public’s health, safety, and welfare” (p. 743). One might stipulate, to use an oM
ciiehe, that “>'oiir feedom ends where my nose tegiss.” The law, according to John
Locke, is absolutely pi¥otal to the organization and well-being o f society. Man leaves the
uncertainty of the .state o f nature for the comforts asd conveniences that are to be found
within political society. Certainly, man would not consent o f his own freewill to allow
everyone an absolute right to interfere with everyone else’s freedom, particularly his
own. So, how should an individual’s “right to liberty” be understood? What are the limits
beyond which an individual cannot freely exei'cise Ms own liberty without interfering
with that o f another? These are questions that the U.S. Supreme Court has had to grapple
with for the better part o f 200 years, particularly with respect to m individual’s right to
the free exercise o f his own religion. While the U.S. Supreme Court has fostered and
preserved the sanctity o f the liberty that exists with respect to religious exercise, it has
also maintained the classical liberal stance that no freedom is absolute—^that there are
instances, within a free society, whereby one’s liberty can become an impediment to the
liberty of others, or whffeby one’s liberty can become an obstacle to the well-being o f a
free and democratic society. Throiighout, though, the U.S. Supreme Court has still
demonstrated a keen sense of admiration and respect for the rights o f the individual—that
the individual’s practice of his religion should be viewed as paramount to all other
interests, unless an alternative compelling state interest is demonstrated. As John Vile
writes: “The Court itself has sometiroes referred to [such a| guarantee . . . as enjoying
whM it called a ‘preferred position’” (Vile, 2001, p. 129).’^’^

This quote is more or less referring to al! o f the constitutional guaranfses contained within fee First
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The History Behind Freedom of Religion

According to the First Ammdmeiit o f the United States Constitiition, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof’ (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 1). Without question, there is probably no other
aspect o f American constitutional law that incites more controYersy and debate than the
First AmendQieot’s treatment o f “religion” (Vile, 2001, p. 130). In large part, what makes
religion such a central component o f American legal jurispradetice is the fact that
America was founded upon religious principles. The first English settlers that came to
America sought escape fiom religious persecution (Pafrick & Long, 1999, pp. 1-8). They
wanted to be able to practice their own religious beliefs without any undue goyemmental
influence. This is especially true o f the Pilgriiss which settled within the Plymouth area
at around 1620 (p. 2). Toleration o f one’s own religious beliefs and values was central to
their endeavors, and the principal reason they emigrated to America (pp. 2-5). Unfortu
nately, though, as time would pass, the whole notion o f tolera.tion began to slowly
subside, even for them (pp. 2-3). Those who had escaped religious persecution soon
demonstrated a similar tact in dealing with those that seeralngly disagreed with their own
religious beliefs and practices (pp. 2-4), In time, within many o f the American colonies,
such as the Massachusetts Bay colony, religious intolerance was just as rampant as it had
been within Great Britain (pp. 2-4). In fact, some of the colonies, soon to be states, freely
engaged in wfrat might be considered as tlie “estaWishmenf’ o f religion (pp. 2-4). Such
historical experiences, both within Great Britain as well as within the AmerieaE colonies,

A m e a c h n Q it

of the LIS. Cosistitotion, including religion, speech, p r e s s , and assembly (Vile, 2001, p . 129).
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would have pFofound influence upon the founding fathers. So much so, in fact, that they
would incorporate a protection witMn the Constitution to not only allow an individual to
freely exercise his own religion but also to be free o f any state-sponsored religion. While
certainly not advocating anything closely resembling absolute freedom, the founding
fathers were at least adamant In their belief that toleration was key to the libei'al society'
that they were hoping to set forth. Indeed, as James Madison writes: "The religion of
every man must be left to the convictios and comcience o f every man; and it is the right
o f every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is, in its nature, an
[in|alienable right. . . ” (Pfeffer, 1979, pp. 15-16).^®

English Heritage and Freedom o f Religion

The Mstoricai basis of the First Amendments religion clauses, bofli establishment
and free exercise, is very much rooted in English antiquity P*eck, 1992, pp. 83-89). But
for rciigioiis persecution within England, the Separatists, or Pllgrinis as they have since
become known, may never have set sail for America in search of freedom (pp. S4-85).
The system that they were fleeing was one premised very much upon a close historical
alliance between chiirch and state (pp. 83-84). Begkiiiing as far back as 1000, the Roman
Catholic Church routinely used its power and wealth to establish such a relationship
throughout Western Europe, including England itself (pp. 83-84). And with the passage
of time, the two entities, according to Robert Peek, “began to share an unshakable
identity of interests” (pp. 83-84). The relationship, though, was really not one of equal

Quote is taken specifically from James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments {1785).
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power, shared between monarch and pope; rather, it was one o f monarch subservient to
pope (pp. 84-85). For, “control over land as well as teiief made the [Pope] a formidable
political figure in, the Western Europe” (p. 84). Few kings challenged the Pope’s position
and those that did, such as King Jolio in Ihe 13* centui^', came to eventually regret it
(Perry et al,, 1985, p. 209)7"'^ ,fadee4 it was not iintil the 16* century that the veiy notion
of “king and coiintry” would challenge and then eventually preempt papal power (pp.
308-310). In fact, within Englan4 during the year 1534, King Henry VIII declared him
self head o f his own church, the Church o f England (a.k.a., the Anglican Church) (pp.
308-309). Desiring a male heir, the King had asked the Pope for an annalnient o f mar
riage (pp. 308-309). However, on becoming impatient with what he perceived to be the
Pope’s lack o f interest in the matter, the King angrily petitioned and received Parlia
ment’s blessing for an acceptance o f Reformation (i.e., Protestantism) and a schism with
the Church of Rome (p. 309). The result o f this action would set in motion a whole host
o f historical events that would eventually culminate with the adoption o f the First
Ajnendment to the U.S. Constitution in the year 1791.
Probably the single-most important outcome o f England’s official disavowal of
the Roman Catholic faith was the intolerance, mass confiision, and eventual civil wars
that ensued. Since Protestantism was now to be considered as the official state religion o f
England, King Henry VIII readily declared war on any other denomination, including
Catholicism, that attempted to flourish alongside It (Peck, 1992, p. M). To make matters
even worse, upon the death o f King Henry VIII in 1547, England would change official

K.ing John actually confiscated Church property in an efTort to finance his war with France. Such
action, however, eventually Isd to the development of the Magna Charts o f 1215, whereby his own vassals
sought to rratrain what they' believed to be an abase o f monardiial pow'er (Peny al., 1985, p. 209).
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state religions two times over the next decade (Perry et aL, 1985, p. 309). His daagliter.

1558—^both times with ensuing religions persecution (p. 309). England would, for the
most part, remain Protestant, at least as oificially recognized by the state, nfitil the
ascension o f King James I in 1603 and King Charles I in 1625 (pp. 359-360). Both kings
sought strenuously to return England to its Catholic roots and to a system of divine
absolutism (pp. 359-360). Their ambitious endeavors, however, ended in revolution in
1640, and with the execution o f King Charles I (pp. 359-361). Kings Charles II and
James II, both sons o f Charles I, attempted to restore order to England in 1660 and 1685
respectively (p. 361), Both being Catholics, though, turmoil still ensued (p. 36!). As a
matter of fact. King James II, on ascension to his brother’s throne in 1685, and realizing
that a Catholic restoration was m oot attempted to make goodwill overtures by allowing
for the free exercise of religion (Peck, 1992, p. 87). In 1687, he even decreed a Declar
ation o f Indulgence, which forgave punishment to anyone that was charged with prac
ticing a faith (e.g., Catholicism) outside that o f the official state’s religion (Le., Anglican

throne (p. 88).

In 1688, he was peacefully succeeded by the royal couple William and

Mary who were both placed on the throne by an act o f Parliament (Perry et al., 1985, p.
361). And in 1689, the English Bill of Rights was adopted, which granted to all
Protestants a sense of religious liberty (Peck, 1992, pp. 88-89). Catholics or any other
non-Protestant sect were not granted similar freedoms (pp. 88-89), As a matter o f fact,

This event is often referred to as the “Glorious Revolution” (Perry et al., 1985, p. 361).
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the EDgiish Bill of Rights forbade England from forever being “governed by a popish
prince, or by any King or Queen marrying a papist” (p. 89). Religious tolemtioii was
allowed but only if one was aa Anglican Protestant!

Colonial Experience With Freedom o f Religion

With England as ite backdrop, the stege was set for a free and tolerant American
colonial society, or at least so it seemed. While many of the original immigrants came to
America in search o f religioiis freedom, they too quickly learned how' to te just as
intolerant as their British counterparts. In fact, throughout America’s early colonial
experience, religious persecution, while maybe not as tumultuous as it had been within
England, was just as common (Peck, 1992, p. §9). Indeed, as Melvin Urofsky and Paul
Finkelman write: “The English who came in the first half o f the 17***century—even those
who fled religious persecution— did not cany in their cultural baggage any belief in reli
gious pluralism or toleration. Thus, once here, they set about establishing religion as a
bulwark of both state and society” (Urofsky & Finkelman, 2002, p. 26). O f course, every
colony that was established in the New World was quite diifereat from any other in the
sense that it “established” its own version o f religious faith (pp. 26-27). For instance, the
first religious dissentere from England to arrive in America were the Pilgrims tiiat settled
at Plymouth in 1620 (Patrick & Long, 1999, p. 2), Their ambition was rather simple: To
advance their own version of the Protestant faith (p. 2). However, it would be liie
Puritans, who began to settle within Massachusetts Bay (i.e., modern-day Boston) in
1630, that would have the g r^test impact on early colonial Americ-an religious thought
(p. 2), Much larger in number, the Puritans saw no difference between church and state,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
so long as the two were o f the same denominational faith (p. 2). As stated in their original
charter:
We do of oar fiirthe- grace, certain knowledge and mere motioH give and grant lo the said
Governor and Company, and their successors, that It shall and may be lawful to and for
the Governor or deputy Governor and Siicli. . . to make, ordain and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions, and instractions . . . for the directing, ruling, and disposing of all other mattas and things
who-eby oar said people inhabiting fliere may be so religiously, peaceably and elviily
governed, as tlieir good life and orderly convereation, may win and invite the natives of
that coanfay to the knowledge and obedience o f the one trae God and savior of mankind,
and the Christian faith, which in our royal intention, and the advetiterere free profession
is the principal end of this plantation . . . (Patrick & Long, 1999, p. 10).

Compared to most other Protestaat denomlBations at the time within the American
colonies, Puritanism was by far the most intolerant and rigidly applied (p. 3). Within New
England, there was only one religious faith entitled to any sort o f liberty and that was
Puritanism (p. 3). All other faiths were denied such a right (p. 3). However, liberty
should not be construed as anything even closely resembling that o f today’s under
standing of it (pp. 12-13). Puritans had liberty but only in the sense that they were rightfiilly obligated to be devout Puritans (pp. 12-13). Anything less could very well subject
the individual to punishment and retribution (e.g., fine, imprisonment, or even banishment) (p. 3). Such rigid thinking with respect to religion, though, would eventually
provoke contoversy and dissent, and w iii both, the first glimmer o f hope for some
essence o f religious liberty within America.
The colony o f Rhode Island, established in 1636, for instance, served as a kind o f
religious sanctuary for those who had fallen victim to Puritan orthodoxy and had been
sent into exile (Patrick & Long, 1999, p. 3). Founded by Roger Wiliiaisis, a banished
Puritan himself, the colony of Rhode Island promoted an individual’s right to religious
liberty (p. 3). As set forth in the Rhode Island Charter o f 1663;
No person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise tnoleste4
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punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in raatters of
religion,. . . ; but that all and eva-y ptsson and persons may . . . have and eajoy Ms and
their own jedgments and coEseiesces, ia matters o f rdigioas concemfaents . . . ; they
behaving tliemselves peaceably and quietly and not using this liberty to lieentioiisness
and profaaenss, nor to the civil injury or outward disturbance of others; any iaw . . .
using or custom of this realm, to the coetraiy hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding . . .
(Patrick & Long, 1999, p. 16).

Likewise, the colony of Pennsykaaia, established in 1682, also served as a kind of
religious sanctuary (p, 4). Founded by William Penn, a banished Quaker from England,
the colony o f Pennsylvania promoted not only an individual’s right to religious liberty
but also an individual’s right to freedom o f conscience (p. 4). As stipulated to by the
Great Law o f Pennsylvania o f 1682:
No person . . , who shall confess jsid acknowledge one Almighty God to be the creator,
upholder, and ruler of the world and that professeth him or herself obliged in conscience
to live peaceably and justly under the civil government, shall in anywise be molested or
pre|udiced for his or her conscientious persuasion or practice, nor shall he or she at any
time be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatever, caatrarj' to his or her miad, but shdl fresly and folly enjoy his or ha- Christiai
liberty In that respect, without any interaption or reflection. . . (Patrick & Long, 199A p.
18).

Still, even with the great strides made in these colonies, among others (e.g., Delaware),
religious intolerance o f Roman Catholics, Jews, and nonbelievers remained common
throughout (pp. 5-6). For only a short period o f time, Roman Catholics were granted
some degree o f religious freedom mdthin the colony o f Maryland, but siich freedom
would not last (pp. 5-6). By the time o f the American Revolution in 1776, most all o f the
colonies recognized denomiiiationai differences wiAin the Protestant faith, and many of
them, even went so far as to sanction multiple established religions—^with the stipulation,
though, that they were all Protestant (pp. 6-8). “Genuine religious toleratioii . . . was
[clearly] the trend,” so long, of o)urse, as that trend remained religious-based and
Protestant (p. 8).
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Constitutional Debate Over Freedom o f Religion

If anything, the religious experiences lx>th within England ss well as within early
colonial America, demonstrated to the foundiog fathers the apparent need to protect the
indi¥idual from government and to allow that same individual the liberty to choose his
own religious beliefs and values. O f course, while many o f the founding fathers, or at
least diose that weie Federalists, did not believe such a stated protectioa was acteally
needed, especially given the fact that the national government only possessed delegated
powers and as a result could not do what was not specifically p'anted to it, they did place
religion at the top o f their agenda when it te a m e evident that a bill o f rights would have
to be adde4 at the demand of the Anti-federalists, as a restriction on national powers.
With this in mind, James Madison made his proposals on “establishmenf ’ as well as “free
exercise” to Congress on June 8, 1789 stating: “The amendment which [has] occurred to
me, proper to be recommended by Congress to the State Legislatures, [is this]: . . . the
civil rights o f none shall be abridged on account o f religious belief or worship, nor shall
any national religion be established, or on any pretext, infringed” (Patrick & Long, 1999,
pp. 61-62).®* After slight modification within both chambers o f Congress as well as
between them, the resulting amendment that was proposed to the U.S. Constitution read
as follows: “Congress shall m ^ e no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 1).
The issue surrooiidiiig the “eslablishneat o f religion” was one that basically
provided for two different interpretations. On one hand, the fact that “Congress shall

**
It sliouM be aolcti feat James Madison’s proposal o f religion clauses was “Iborfr.” on tiis list of
suggested recommeadations to Congress (Patrick & Long, 1999, pp. 61-^2).
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make no law respecting an estaMishment o f religion” might be interpreted to mean that a
rigid “wall o f separation” would remain steadfast betw'een eharch and siate; and, on the
other, the feet that “Congress shall make no law . . .

might also be inteipretal to mean

that no preference should be given by the state to any particular type of church (i.e.,
reiigion) (Levy, 198S, pp. 174-181). The toimer interpretation, does not allow for any
•entanglement whatsoever, while the latter allows for some entanglement so long as it is
not preferential in treatment (pp. 174-181).®'^ Given the records that do exist on this
matter, both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison would seemingly appear to cast their
lot on the side o f a rigid “wall o f separation” (Epstein & Walker, 2001, pp. 143-146). In
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, for instance, Thomas JefTerson wrote;
Believing with you that reiigion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for fais faith or his worehip, that the legislatwe powers
of govomniefit reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever
ence that act of the \^hole American pa>ple which declared that their legislature should
‘make no law respecting an establishment o f religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof/ thus building a wall of separation between Church and State (O'Brien, 2003, pp.
665- 667).

This only reiterated Jefferson's earlier position, as set forth in his Virginia Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, that “no man [should] be compelled to frequent or sup
port any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever” (Pfeffer, 1979, p. 19). That to
do so, would be an “Infringenient o f Pils] natural right” and also a cornjpting Mliience
upon the “very reiigion [such action] is meant to encourage” (p. 19). In a similar vein,
James Madison, likewise, expressed concern over the potential dangers o f rolling religion
and state onto the same pathway. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religiom

Assessments, Madison Incoiporated mankind’s history as a primary re« > a why church
It should be noted that the “non-preferential” perspective on church and govesnment was predom
inantly supported at the state level by Anti-federalists, such as Patrick Henry. Thomas Jeflet'son, of course,
was an excqjtion to this maimer of thinking.
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and state should remain separate (pp. ,15-18). At no time in histoiy has a close relatlonsMp between church and stale yielded amthlng o f positive value, either to the
religion, to the civil autlior%, or to the people (pp. 16-17). If anj-thing, all that has ever
resulted .is “superstition, bigotry, and persecution . . (p. 16). As such, “the preservation
of a .free goverameat requires . . . that neither o f them be suffered to overleap the great
barrier which defends the rights o f the people” (p. 16).
The issue surrounding the “free exercise o f religion” also carried with it similar
perspectives, at least as espoused again by the likes o f Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. Both coming from the standpoint that an individual has an inalienable right to
liberty—meaning that an individual has a preordained right to do whatever he wishes so
long as it does encroach upon the rights o f others—Jefferson and Madison believed lhat
“freedom o f conscience” was absolutely essential to a free and well-ordered society (pp.
14-15). In fact, according to Jefferson, the state has “no authority over [our] natural
rights, only [those] as we have submitted to [it]; the rights o f conscience we never
suimiitted, we couM not submit” (p. 14). This does not, o f course, imply that the state is
forever prevented from intervening between a man and his right to liberty (p. 14).
Assuredly, “the legitimate powers o f [state] extend to such acts . . . as are injtirious to
others” (p. 14). But there is a noted distinction, in this regard, between an individual’s
beliefs and that same iiidivldiiars practices (p. 14). Whether he chooses to believe in
“twenty gods or no God” is completely irrelevant and has no direct .impact upon the
rights of his fellow citizens within society (p. 14). What does matter, though, is when the
individual’s beliefs are translated into actions (p. 14). 'ITie individuafs belief in ‘Twenty
gods” is fine in and o f Itself, so long as he does not attempt to forcibly impose his belief
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relentlessly on others (p. 14). As Jefferson notes, merely believing in something “neither
picks my pocket nor breaks my leg . .

(p. 14). In much the same fashion, James

Madison also advocated that the free exercise o f religion be left to the “conviction and
conscisece of every man” (p. 16). Accordingly, “we assert for ourselves a freedom to
embrace, to profess, and to reserve, the religion which we believe to be o f divine origin”
(p. 16). Such a “right is, in its nature, an [injalienable ri ght . . . but only so long as it is
not directed “by force or violence” (pp. 15-16).

The U.S. Supreme Court and Freedom o f Religion

In its roie as “guardian” o f the American Constitution and “protector” o f indi
vidual rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has been deemed the responsibility to try to make
sense o f the First Ameoctaieiit's clauses on religion. Undoubtedly, there is historical
precedent or tradition, as aforementioned, but the Court must still try to understand
exactly what is meant by the phrase, “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab
lishment o f religion, or proMbitiag the free exercise thereof’ (U.S. Constitatlon, Amend.
1). To begin, it is fairly obvious that the protection itself is only applicable against
Congress (i.e., the national govemmeiit). As the phrase itself states: “Congress shall make
no law . . .

This means, at least initially anyway, that the protections afforded the

individual by the FiM Amendment are guarantees against the national goveminent—not
the various state govemments. This o f course would change, througli the application of
the due process clause o f the Fourteenth Anisadiiient and selective Court incorporation,
several decades down the road. The U.S. Supreme Court must also provide definitional
detail or parameter to such words as ^‘establislinieet” and “exercise.” SpecifiCTlly, what
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does the phrase “Congress shall make ao law respecting an establishment o f religion”
entail? What does it mean, for instance, to “establish” a paiticalar religion? And, what
does Ae phrase “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]” involve? Should such “free exercise” be perceived as absolute, as in Congress
may never “prohibit the free exercise” o f an individual"s religion, or should such a state
ment be perceived as “qualified,” as in Congress may sometimes “prohibit the free
exercise” of an individual’s religion? Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court must also try to
understand what exactly is meant by a “religion.” In other words, when is a “religion”
perceived as a “religion?” And by what standard, if any, can the Court judge the integrity
o f a particular religion? Ideally, the answers to such questions as these will determine the
degree of admiration and respect the U.S. Supreme Court may or may not hold in regards
to an individual’s “'right to liberty”—his right to practice his own religion without any
undue government influence or intnislon.

Understanding the Language o f the Religion Clauses

As already alluded to, one o f the most difficult tasks for the U.S. Supreme Court
in its role as final interpreter o f the U.S. Constitution is to make some sense out of the
immensely broad and vague lafiguage contained therein. And, without question, no other
task Is more daunting for the Court than its duty and obligation to provide meaning to the
religion clauses o f the First Amendment As written, “Congress shall make no law
respecting ae establishment o f religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ (U.S.
Constitution, Amend. 1). Given what has already been provided, the statement itself
requires at least three definitions: (1) What is a religion; (2) What is an established
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religion; and (3) what is the free exercise o f a religion? Comprehension o f these questions
and their respective answers (i.e., definitions) is absolutely pivotal to any imderstanding
o f the U.S. Supreme Court’s roie in protecting and preserving the individaaf s inalienable
right to liberty, particularly as set forth in Ms liberty to freely exercise his own religion.
First of all, what is a religion? According to B lack’s Law D ictiam sy, a “religion”
is “a system of faith and worship usually involving belief in a supreme being and usually
containing a moral or ethical code: especially, such a system recognized and practiced by
a particular church, sect, or denomination” (Black, 2000, p. 1036). Given the obvious
lack o f clarity and precision in such a definition, it should come as no real surprise that
the U.S. Supreme Court has had, to say the very least, a difficult time in trying define the
term “religion.” Still, it is a task that the Court must endeavor to undertake, even if only
reluctantly, to determine the breadth and scope of the First Amendment’s protection of
individual rights. The first case that the Court used to define religion was Reynolds vs.
United States (98 U.S. 145).®^ Involving the Mormon religion and its practice of polyg
amy, the Court asserted, through Chief Justice Morrison Waite, that a “religion” may be
defined based upon the “history of the times” (98 U.S. 145, 162). By this, the Court more
or less reasoned that if a “religion” was new or not broadly recognized, it or its various
practices could not claim constitutional protection under the First Amendment—that to
Ijelieve in something is one thing but to practice it is quite another (98 U.S. 145, 166167). A few years later, in Davis vs. Season, the Court, through Justice Stephen Field,
narrowed its understanding of “religion” even ftirther by limiting it to the existence o f a

*'

Reymids vs. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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single “Creator” or “Maker” (133 U.S. 333, 342).®'^ Such narrow/ understandings o f
“religion” were, howe¥cr, eveHtiially 0¥ertonied ia the 1940s, in the case of United States
vs. Ballard (322 U.S. 78).®^ Writing for the Court, Ju.stice William Doagks stated that
“men may believe what they cannot prove, [and] they may not be put to the proof o f their
religious dodrines or beliefs” (322 U.S. 78, 8h). Ideally, in this respect, it is the sincerity
of the “religious beliefs” held by a religion’s followers that truly matters—^not the truthfiilness o f them (322 U.S. 78, §5-88).
Secondly, what is an “established” religion? Again, according to Black’s Law
Dictionary, an “established religion” is “a particular religion [that the] government
creates or favors” (Black, 2000, p. 449). Historically, the clearest example o f an “estab
lished religion” would be that o f the Anglican Church o f England during colonial times.
As a sponsored religion, the Anglican Church was set up, preserved, protected, and per
petuated by the state—^all at the dire expense o f other faiths and religions. Such an
example, though, really undermines the true intent o f the Establishment Clause. No
doubt, it is certainly to e that Congress may never establish an official state religion for
the United States. But such a prohibition has quite frankly not been that much o f an issue
for real concern. Instead, the gist o f the matter comes down to the “fine lines” or “gray
areas” that are found in between. For instance, does the reimbursement for transportation
costs to parents o f parochial school children constitute an “estaWishraent” o f religion?®*
Or, does the recitation of prayer before morning classes begin in a public school consti
tute an “establishinent” of religion?®^ What about a provision for a state-fiinded instractor
Davis vs. Season, 133 U.S 333 (1890).
United States vs. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (!944).
Everson vs. Board o f Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Engel vs. Viiak, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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of sign-langiiage to be assignee! to a disabled student at a parochial school?*® Is that
promoting the “establisimeBf’ o f a religion? In earnest, these arc the types o f questions
that the U.S. Supreme Court has had to grapple \¥ith since the addition o f the First
Amendnient to the U.S. Constitution in 1791 These are not the types o f qaestlons that
in¥oi¥e Congress purposely setting oat to create and promote a national reiigion. Even
the founding fathers were seemingly confiised as to what exactly constitutes the “establishmenf’ of a religion (Levy, 19M, p. 176). As Leonard Levy writes; “The ratification
controversy yielded no evidence that reveals [any certain] understanding . . . of the term
“establishmeef’ (p. 176). The only thing that is truly clear is that the foandiag fathers
intended the “establishment clause . . . to protect religion from government, and govern
ment from religion” (p. 194). And to this, one might very well add, eveiytliiiig in the
middle was to be left up to the courts to decide.
Finally, thir4 what is meant by the “free exercise” o f a religion? Black's Law
Dictionary defines “freedom o f religion” as “the right to adhere to any form o f religion or
none, to practice or abstain from practicing religious beliefs, and to be free from gov
ernmental interference with or promotion o f religion” (Black, 2000, p. 533). With respect
to “religious liberty,” B lack’s Law Dictiofmry also adds, “[so| long as [the exercise itself]
is consistent with the peace and order of society'” (p. 743). The latter addition to this
definition is probably the single-most important aspect to understanding just exactly what
the “free exercise” o f a religion truly entails. Any individual may, o f course, believe in
whatever he wishes. Indeed, according to John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Madison, eveiy individual has m inalienable. God-given right to liberty—to be free from

Zobrest vs. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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external impedimeiit (i.e., goveminent). However, does this mean, or would these same
men advocate, that the individual may do or say whatever it is that he wishes to do or
say? In other words, does an indivldijai have an “aissolute” right to liberty, as in an
“absolute” right to perfect, unhindered freedom? Certainly not! An individaal’s liberty
extends only so fer as It does not impose on the liberty o f others. As B h c k ’s Laif
Dictionary itself indicates, an individuafs liberty must be “consistent with the peace and
order of society” (p. 743). No freedom or literty is without its limitatioas. If no such
restrictions on liberty were permitted, in all likelihood, anarchy would eventually prevail.
And for this veiy reason, in lieu o f John Locke, government exists—

establish peace

and order. An individual may freely believe in whatever religioiis faith he chooses to;
however, when that individual translates Ms belief into practice, he must realize that no
such freedom is “absolute.” In this sense, the “free exercise” o f religion is a “qualified”
liberty, whereby It most be evaluated in the context o f what effect it may have on others
within society.

Principles Set Forth by the Estabiisbment Clause

Having some idea as to the history o f a particular clause within the U.S. Con
stitution Is one thing, but being able to adequately apply that history in the modem
context is quite another. Such has been the challenge for the U.S. Supreme Court and its
understaiidiiig o f the First Amendment’s Esteblishment Clause. Indeed, according to
Robert Peck, “finding a defensible fonmila for analyzing issues o f church-state separation
has proven [rather] elusive for the [U.S.| Supreme Court (Peck, 1992, p, 209). On one
side o f the issue, there are those who believe that a strict separation o f church and state
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may be inferred by the eonstitutional phrase, ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment o f religion” (O’Brien, 2003, pp. 668-670). Others, however, read the very
same statement and believe that It may only be infened that Congiess may not establish
any preference with respect to religion-—^that all religions should be treated the same (pp.
668-670). The former belief advocates a rigid “wall of separation” with no entangleiaent;
the latter belief advocates a softer “wall o f separation” with non-prefCTentia! entangle
ment (pp. 668-670). The ensuing Mstoricai dilemma for liie U.S. Supreme Court has been
“how to draw the line between” the two positions—^between what has sines become
known as “high-wall theory” and “non-preferentialism” (pp. 668-670).

The task at

present, though, is to determine in what manner, If any, the U.S. Supreme Court has used
the Establishment Clause to protect and preserve American individuaiism, as specifically
represented in the individual’s right to liberty. In this sense, there are basically two areas
that the Court has examiaed with respect to the Establisiiinent Clause. The first area tends
to involve certain types o f state- or govemment-fonded aid to religious oiganizations
(e.g., textbooks to parojhial schools, or tax exemptions for church supplies). And the
second area tends to involve what might be considered as state or government promotion
o f certain religious exercises or pr^tices (e.g., prayer in school, or Christinas festivities).
It is the second area that is of primary concern, In large part, because it is in this area that
the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to promote the “di^stablishment o f religion.” O f
course, one might very well ask: '^Tiat does “disestablishment o f religion” mean or
entail? A n4 more importantly, what does the “disestablishment o f religion” have to do
with an individual’s right to liberty?
One would have to be naive not to notice that religion has played a major
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component throughout America’s history. Yes, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
among others, ha¥C all ad¥Ocated that a rigid ‘V ail o f separation” be maintained between
church and state. Their argtinient: The two hs¥e had an historical tendency to corrupt one
another. Indeed, one only has to peruse the historical accounts of colonial Americans to
truly appr^iate the inherent daageis o f combining cliurcb and state into one. But the fact
remams, America was founded upon certain religious principies and, to say the very least,
these very same p*incipies continue to anderecore American goveraance. Really all one
needs to do is to look at American money, attend an opening session o f Congress, or
watch a newly-elected president being sworn into office to truly appreciate the fact that
religion is still very much a part o f American govemmeiit. Given the relationship that has
existed in the United States between church and state, the U.S. Supreme Court; has really
not had to concern itself so much with the “establishment” o f religion as it has with the
“disestablishnjent” o f i t What d « s this specifically mean? The Court has really had to
separate what has already been put in place, between church and state. It has had to
“disestablish” reiigion from the state’s sphere o f influence. Probably flie best example o f
a situation whereby the Court has had to “disestablish” religion has involved prayer in
public schools. Prayer has more than likely existed in public schools since their initial
inception; however, it was not until 1962 that the U.S. Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality o f the issae. For instaiice, does & state’s reqtilreinent for prayer to be
recited at the beginning o f a public school day constitute an “establishment” o f religion?
What about the reading o f Bible verses within a public school? Does this constitute ao
“establishment” o f religion? What if such practices have “always” been done? If it has
always been done that way, so to speak, then there should be no problem wdth it. Correct?
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The issue of “estabiisliment,” after all, only involves those scenarios in which the state
actively sets out to promote or establish a pailicular religion. Right? Wliat if the prayer
itself is nondenominationai, or even better, what if the prayer itself is nondenominatiojial
and silent? Does this constitute an “establishinent” o f reiigion? These are issues that the
U.S. Supreme Court has had to grapple with for the better part o f a half centuiy', or at
least since it has tegun the process o f “disestablislinient.”
O f course, one might just as well ask: What does any o f Ihls have to do with an
individuars right to liberty? In other words, what does “estaMishment” or even “disest^iishm etif' have to do with an Individual’s freedom o f religion? And, how might the
U.S. Supreme Court’s actions, in either respect, enhance or undermine American indi
vidualism? Hie answer to any o f these questions is rather simple. I f the govemmoit does
not “establish” a particular religion, then it is leaving the choice o f the matter up to the
individuaL Just the SMie, when the Court attempts to “disestablish” a religion, it is free
ing the individual from a perceived sense o f obligation or cooptation. No longer does the
individual have to participate, whether by choice or not, in an activity that he is seem
ingly uncomfortable with. In the case of Engel vs. Vitale, for instance, which involved a
state-sanctioned nondeeominationai prayer in public school. Justice Hugo Black wrote:
“When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain” (370 U.S. 421, 431).®®
“Thus,” he coatinues, “the Establishmeot Clause stands as an expression of principle . , .
that religion is too personal . . . to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil

Engeivs. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
magistfate” (370 U.S. 421, 431-432).

Expressing similar sentiment, in a later case

involving a state’s reqiiirement that Bible verses be read at the begiiming o f each pablic
school day, Jastice Tom Clark, in the case o f School District o f Abington Township,

Pennsylvania vs. Schempp,^ aptly stated:
The place o f religirai in otir society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of
reliance o h the home, the dniroli and the Inviolable dladel o f She iadividual heart and
mind. We have come to rccognizs through bitter experience that it is not within the power
of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to
advance or retard. In the relationship betw'een man aid religion, the State is finiily com
mitted to a position of neutrality (374 U.S. 203, 226).

The U.S. Supreme Court

also stricken down volantary moments o f silence in public

schools, as it did in the case o f Wallace vs. Jaffree, asserting that “just as the right to
speak m d the right to refrain from speaking are complemenlary components . . . o f
individual freedom . . . , so also the individuars freedom to choose his own creed is the
counterpart o f his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority”
(472 U.S. 38, 52).^* Even public school-sponsomd prayers at graduation ceremonies and
football games have come under Court scrutiny (505 U.S. 577 and 530 U.S. 790).^^
Writing for liie majority in the case o f Lee vs. Weisimm, a case involving prayer at
graduation ceremonies. Justice Anthony Kennedy writes: “The undeniable fact is that the
school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students . . . . [To| the dissenter o f
high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the state to
pray in a manner her conscien« will not allow, the injury is no less real” (505 U.S. 577,
593). All o f these cases seemingly exhibit issues o f “establishmenf’ or “disestablish-

Schooi District o f Abmgton Township, Pemtsyhania vs. Sckempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
472 0.8.38(1915).
Lee vs. Weismam., 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Santa Fe ImiependeRt School District vs. Doe, 530
U.S. 790 (2000).
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ment,” as the case may be. But, what about an individual’s right to the free exercise o f his
religion? What has the Court said in this regard?

Considerations Beyond the Establishment Clause

Just the same as the U.S. Supreme Court must work to prevent the goverament
from excessively entangling itself with religion, in potentially establishing or promoting
religion, it must also ensure that the government does not unnecessarily “prohibit the free
exercise” of religion (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 1). While the first part o f the statement
deals primarily with government and its direct relationship with religion, the latter part of
the statement mostly involves the relationsMp between the individual and his religion The
state is certainly involved with both aspects but to a different degree. In the first, the state
cannot involve itself in the estaMishmeet o f a particular religion; however, in the second,
the state cannot deny an individual the liberty to exercise a particular religion. According
to David O’Brien, the “free exercise clause ptself| embodies the principle o f freedom
from governmental coercion in choosing a religion or no religion” (O’Brien, 2003, p.
785). However, as already noted, an individual’s right to liberty is not to be understood in
absolute terms; there may very well be limitatioiis on such freedom. To believe in some
particular faith of idea is one thing but to actually practice it is quite another. As Thomas
Jefferson himself wrote: “The legislative powers o f the govenmieat reach actions only,
and not opinion” (O’Brien, 2003, pp. 665-667). Historically, as will become evident, the
U.S. Supreme Court has to a large extent deferred to the rights o f the individual to freely
exercise his own religion. At the same time, though, the Court has also recognized that
there may veiy well be times when Hie state may have a “comf^lling interest” to
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intervene and possibly curtail or police sach exercise. But even then, the Court still has in
most cases given benefit of'the doubt to the rights o f the ladividuaL
Probably the most drastic position taken by the U.S. Supreme in regarfs to an
individual’s free exercise of religion is when it has applied what might be referred to as a
“belief-action” scenario. Typically, this distinction usually encompasses a perceived
practice o f individual free exercise that seemingly goes against the rudimentary customs
or legal traditions o f a given culture or society. The case o f Reytmids vs. United States in
1879 is a prime example o f such a scenario (98 U.S. 145).^^ The gist o f the case involved
the practice of polygamy as then exercised by the Mormon religion o f Utah and a statute
o f Congress which forbade the practice o f polygamy (98 U.S. 145, 161-168). Writing for
the majorily. Chief Justice Waite reasoned that while “Congress was deprived o f all
legislative power over mere opinion, [it] was left free to reach actions which were in
violation o f social duties or subvereive o f good ordert’ (98 U.S. 145, 164). As such,
“polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations o f Europe
. . . and from the earliest histoiy o f England, polygamy has been fr«ted as an offense
against society . . . ” (98 U.S. 145, 164). Therefore, “to permit this [practice] would be to
make the professed doctrines o f religious belief superior . . . [to that o f govemiaent] . . .
and in effect to pennit every citizen to become a law unto bimseif (98 U.S. 145, 166167).

.. plural marriages shall not be allowed” (98 U.S. 145, 166).
Of more recent, the U.S. Supreme Court has seemingly moved away from the

rigid “belief-actioa” test it applied to the Reynolds case in 1879. In Reynolds, the
iegitimacy o f a particuiar religious exercise or practice was judged in large part based

Reynolds w. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
upoa wliat was generally deemed arceptable at the time. In this sense, it was the religion
itself that was more or less put on iriai However, la such cases as Sherbert vs. Vermr
and Wisconsin vs. Yoder, the Coart has attempted to strike more o f a balance between the
rights of an individual to freely exercise his own religion and the rights of the state to
maintaia good order and security (374 U.S. 39S aad 406 U.S. 208).®^ In both cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court expounded what has since become known as the “least drastic
means” test or the “compelling interest” test. In Sherbert vs. Vermr, for instance, the
Court, through Justice William Brennan, ruled that a state may not deprive an individual
o f unemployment compensation simply because he refused to work on the day o f his
religious exercise (e.g.. Sabbath) and as a result was fired from his job (374 U.S. 398,
410).®® Applying the “least drastic meaiK” scenario, the Court “consider[ed] whether
some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions o f the [state’s] statute
justifies the substantial infringenient o f [an indivMuars] First Amendment right (374
U.S. 398, 406). Indee4 “it is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
iiinitation” (374 U.S. 398, 406-407). "“No such abuse or danger h ^ been advanced in the
present case” (374 U.S. 398, 407). In the case o f Wisconsin vs. Yoder, the Court likewise
reasoned, this time tiirough Chief Justice Warren Burger, that “the essence o f all that has
been said and written on the subject is that only those [state] interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the [indlviduaFs]
Sherbert vs. Fertxr, 374 U.S. 398 {i963) m d Wiscamim vs. Yoder, 406 O.S. 208 (1972).
It should be noted for accuracy that the case o f Sherbert vs. Vermr, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), actaally
involves a female. But since male identity has been used throughout, given its emphasis within classical
liberalism, it has been, used here as well.
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free exercise of religion” (406 U.S. 208, 215).^^ Hence, . . . “however strong the state’s
interest, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination o f ail other interests
. . . ” (406U .S.2«§,2!5).
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet seemingly moved once more in its
understanding o f the Free Exercise Clause o f the First Amendment. In what has become
known as the “Smith” test, the Court in Employment Division, Department o f Human
Resources o f Oregon vs. Smith, reasoned that “the free exercise o f religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.
Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation o f religious
beliefs . . ( 4 9 4 U.S. 872, S77).®’ However, returning to something very much akin to
the “belief-action” test propounded in the Reynolds case in 1879, the Court asserted that
no one, regardless o f Ms respective beliefs, may be allowed “to become a law unto
himself’ and practice whatever it is he so desires (494 U.S. 872, 879). Such a notion
“contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense” (494 U.S. 872, 885). The
usage o f the drug peyote, as in this case, is illegal in the state o f Oregon (494 U.S. 872,
S90).*** Such usage o f an illegal drug is more than a belief; It is a practice and, as such,
“c-aii be discerned by the courts” (494 U.S. 872, §90). “An individuafs religious beliefs
[cannot] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct

^
While not directly alluded to atove, the case o f Wiscomim vs. Yoder specifically involved a state’s
compuisoiy sdioo! aKradance statute and its eaforcenieijt against aa Amish coHimuaity. The Court r ^ soned that since the Amish coirnnunity is a separate community, one that is for the most part agrarian, the
state could not unduly infringe by requiring its children to attend public schools beyond the eighth grade—
the point s which most children have learned to read, write, and do basic ariflimefe. As Chief Justice
Warren Burger writes; . . an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in
place o f their long-established program of inforrcai vocationa! education would do Mttie to save those
interests” (406 U.S. 222 (1972)).
Employment Division, Department o f Human Resources o f Oregon vs. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
The case itself. Employment Division, Department o f Human Resources o f Oregon vs. Smith, in
volved the Native American Church and its practice of using the drug peyote (494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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that the state is free to regulate” (494 U.S. 872, 878-879). Unfortanate!y, this is an
“niiavoMable cxjnssquences o f daaociatic gOYerninent . . . [whereby] judges [must]
weigh the social iiBpo,rtaiice o f ail laws against the centraliiy o f all religious beliefs” (494
U.S. 872, 890). The decision reached In Employment Division, Department o f Human

Resources o f Oregon vs. Smith really, for all intents and purposes, brings the U.S.
Supreme Court fiill circle with respect to its earlier decision in Reynolds vs. United

States, excepting o f course that it is not the religion Itself being put on trial, only the
exercise of that religion. An individual still has a right to believe in whatever his beliefs
entail; he just has to te aware fliat certain limitations may exist once he puts those beliefe
into actual practice. In this respect, an individuafs right to liberty is clearly not
“absolute,” an assertion that is certainly not new.

Conclusion

The resiiitlng impact o f the U.S. Supreme Court’s understanding o f the First
Amendment, that “Congress shall mdce no law respecting an establishment o f religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” has been to protect and preserve the individual’s
inalienable right to liberty against any unnecessary encroachment o f that liberty by the
state. However, this has not, nor has it ever, meant that the stale is forever forbidden from
interfering with such liberty when it has been able to demonstrate a compelling public
interest. An individual is free to exercise his own religion so long as it does not interfere
with the customs, traditions, and legalities o f society. An individual is also free to
exercise his own religion so long as it does not interfere with the rights o f Ms fellow man.
Just the same, this does not mean that the state may arbitrarily impose its will on the
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individual. There is a necessary divide between church and state. And has James Madison
has written; “We must say that the will o f the legislature is the only measure of their
authority, and that, in the pieetitiide o f this aithority they may sweep away ail our
fundamenta! rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and
sacred” (Pfcffer, 1979, p. 17). Accordingly, any mixture o f the two, as history has clearly
foretold, leaves in its wake “superstition, bigotry, and persecution . .

(p. 16). The

individual should be able to freely exercise Ms own religion on the basis of ‘Teason and
conviction,. . . not force or violence” (p. 15). However, given America’s unique history,
what has been required to accomplish this feat is a Court willing to in some cases
“disestablish” religion from the public arena (e.g., prayer in public schools). In so doing,
the Court has readily been able to further enhance the liberty o f every individual,
whereby no one is compelled to do what his own conscience may not allow. Personal
conviction is as much a part o f liberty as is free exercise o f religion. Under the guise of
the First Amendment, an individual has just as much right to not exercise a particular
religion as he has k feet to exercise one. Indivlduailsm, through reasonable choice, is
paramount.
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CHAPTER V
THE INDWIDUAL’S INALIENABLE RIGHT TO PROPERTY: AN ANALYSIS
INTO TOE U.S. SUPREME COURTIS UNDERSTANDING
OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

Introduction

WiAoat question, ao other right is more central to classical Ifcralism, to individuaiisHi, than an individual’s right to property. The right o f ownership, or the right o f
possession, is absolutely key to any understanding of classical liberal thought, especially
as espoused by the likes o f John Locke. Man is bom within a state of nature and anything
to which he mixes Ms own labor is Ms and his alone (Morgan, 1992, pp. 745-749). Such
adherence and rrapect for the right o f tie individual to hold and maintain properly would
have a tremendous influence upon many o f the founding fathers. Indeed, as David
O’Brien writes: “The Framers took to heart the teaching o f the English philosopher John
Locke . . . that property is a natural right. . . and its preservation one o f the chief ends o f
government” (O’Brien, 2003, p. 223). James Madison, for instance, clearly believed that
“government is instituted to protect property o f every sort; as well that which lies in the
various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the
end o f goverament,. . (Paul & Dickman, 1989, p. 12). The whole notion o f property, or
private property, was looked upon by the founding fathers as not only a source of dignity
but also as a source o f power (O’Brien, 2003, pp. 222-223). “[It is] property [that] gives
life to ittdustT}',” Thomas Jefferson believed, “and enables us to gratify the most dignified
120
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natural affections” (Paul & Dickman, 1989, p. 69), Property', in this regard, was essential
for “establishing the economic basis for freedom from govemmental coercion and the
enjoj^ment o f liberty” (Ely, 1998, p. 3). Nonetheless, as with an individuafs right to
liberty, property was clearly not to be understood in “absolute” terms. Even Locke him
self did not advocate an absolute right to property (Morgan, 1992, pp. 749-753).
Accordingly, an individual was only entitled to as much property as he could effectively
utilize and not te v e to any notion o f spoilage (pp. 749-753). SlmilM-ly, the founding
fathers believed that the right to property carried with it some degree o f personal
responsibility (Ely, I99S, p. 33). The individual, for instance, was expected to “sub
ordinate private interests to the pursuit o f public w elfare,. . . for the greater good of the
whole” (p. 33). Even so, according to James Ely, Jr.: “A widely shared desire to acquire
and enjoy property has long been one o f the most distinctive features o f American
society- The founding generation [especially] stressed the significance o f property owner
ship as a safeguard for political liberty against arbitrary government as well as the
economic utility o f private property” (Ely, 1998, p. xi). And really for all intents and
purposes since, it has been the U.S. Supreme Court that has “miiTor[ed] this attitude . . .
[and] championed [the uidividuaFs| property rights against [govemmeatai] interference”
(p. xi).

The History Behind Property Rights

The issue o f property has had a long histoiy both within England as well as within
the United States. Indeed, one could very stipulate that property has really been the
primary linkage between the two, both historically and today. As Justice Joseph Bradley
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once stated; “[The] people o f this couiitr>' brought with them to its shores the rights of
Englishmen; the rights which had been wrested from the English sovereigis at ¥arious
periods of the nation^s histo,iy” (Siegan, 2001, p. 2). Among these rights ha¥e, o f coaree,
Included man’s inalienable right to property. The preeminence that propeily has been
given throughout America’s histoty can be attributed in large part to several primary
English sources, incladiog the Magna Charta of 1215 as well as the various commentaries
on proper^' written by such noted scholars as LorI Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone (pp. 5-46). These sources in conjunction with the work o f John Locke h imself (i.e.,
classical liberalism) would have tremendous influence upon the founding fathers in their
endeavors to create a lasting independent American nation-state (pp. 46-50). With prop
erty as one o f its core, if not the core, the American state was set forth, according to
James Madison, to be a “free system o f commerce . . . [whereby] if industry and labor are
left to take their own course, they will generally be directed to tfiose objects which are the
most productive . .

(p. 82). As such, “government is [neither] just, nor is property

secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to . . . its
citizens the free use o f their faculties, and free choice o f their occupations, which not
only constitute their property . . . hot arc the means o f acquiring property'. . (p. 81).

The very premise o f property rights within Anglo-American history can be traced
to the Magna Charta of 1215. Much like the Declaration of Independence that was composed over 500 years later, the Magna Charta, or Great Charter, as it is sometimes called,
is a list of grievances against King John, who from about 1205 until 1215 rated largely by
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decree and without m y regard to the notion o f “feudal law and custom” (Siegan, 2001, p.
6). Precipitated largely by a power struggle with Papal Rome, in which King John him
self was excoiiiiniinicated and then eventually deposed, Ihe Magna Charta was liie first
attempt in English history to restrain the power o f the monarchy by means o f a mTitten
docameflt (i.e., constitution) (p. 6). Upon the success&l revolt o f his own barons, who
likewise had to struggle because o f the King’s quarrel with Rome, King John was more
or less forced to submit to their (i.e., the barons’) demands (p. 6). O f course, while the list
of demands runs the gamut o f possiMlities, the ones that are directly pertinent for pur
poses here involve issues o f property. Indee4 as Bernard Siegan writes:
The b»ons had many grievances against King John. They suffered from gross Hialadministration in Ms government and his courts. He had exacted the surrender of castles and
otherwise made exorbitant fiaancial demands upon eveiy class. He baiged fsisoners
whom be seized in battle and he forced barons whom he suspected of treasonable in
clinations to' s5MTCBdef tlieir ctiiidren to Mm as hostages. He also .seized lands of ttie
clergy (Siegan, 2001, pp. 6-7).

Rule under King John during this time was clearly one of arbitrary disregard for the rale
o f law. By ruthlessly seizing his own countrymen’s property, the King had shown ill
repute for the rights and privileges o f his own subjects. Hie Magna Charta, in this sense,
would serve as not only a constraint on his own power but also on the power o f his future
successors as well.
There are several components, or chapters, o f the Magoa Charta of 1215 that are
pertinent to the issue o f property itself. Some o f the more notable ones Include the
following:
12. No scutage or aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common
counsel o f our Mfigdom, except for ransoming our person, for maMog our eldest son a
knight, and for once marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall not be levied

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124
more than a reasonable aid.^^
20. A freeiBaQ shall not be amerced for a slight offense, except in .accordance with
ihe degree o f the offense; and for a grave offense he shall be amerced in accordance \«th
the gravity o f the offense, yet saving alm'ays hi.s “contentment”; and a inercliant in the
same way, saving his “merchaadise”; and a villein shall be amerced in the same way,
saving his “wainage” if they have fallen into our mercy: and none o f the aforesaid
immiirements sh.all be imposed except by the oath o f honest men o f the neighborhood.
21. Earls and barons shall not 1* amerced except through their peers, and only in
accordance with the degree o f the offense.
22. A clerk shall not be amerced in respect o f his lay holding except after the
manner of the others aforesaid; further, he shall not be amerced in accordance with the
extent of Ms ecclesiastical benefice.
28. No constable or other bailiff o f ours shall lake com or other provisions from
anyone mdthout immediately tendering money therefore, unless he can have postpone
ment thereof by permission o f the seller.™
39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him or send upon Mia, except by the lawfiil judgment o f
his peers or by the law of the land.*”*
4D. To iio one will we sell, to no one will we refiise or delay, right or justice.*”^

Chapter 12 is specifically referring to the notion o f “no taxation without representation” (Siegan,
2001, p. 7).
Oiapter 28 is very siiiiilar to the raod«n concept o f a “taking clause” (SiegMi, 2001, p. 8).
Chapter 39 refers to due pwcess of law issues, as in no person shall be denied life, liberty, or
property without due process of law (Siegan, 2001, p. 7).
®
Chapter 40 extends the wtiols notion o f rule of law^ to be equally applicable on everyone (Siegan,
2001, p. 8).
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52. If anyone has been dispossessed or removed by us, without the legal judgment
of his peers, from his lands, castles, ffancMses, or from his righf we will ifninediately
restore them to him; and if a dispate arise over this, then let it be decided by the five and
twenty barons o f whom mention is made below in the clause for secaring the peace.
Moreover, for all those possessions, fioin which anyone has, without the lawful judgment
of Ms peers, been disseised or removed, by our father. King Henry, or by our brother.
King Richard, and which we retain in our hand we shall have respite until the usual term
of crusaders; excepting those things about which a plea has been raised, or an inquest
made by our order, tefore our taking o f the cross; but as soon as we return from the
expedition, we will immediately grant foil justice therein.
55. All fines made with us unjustly and against the law o f the land, and all
Immurements, imposed unjustly and against the law of the land, shall he entirely re
mitted, or else it shall te done concemiag them according to the decision o f the five and
twenty barons whom mention is made below in the clause for securing the pease, or
aajording to the judgment o f the majority o f the same, along with the aforesaid Stephen,
archbishop o f Canterbury, if he can be present, and such others as he may wish to bring
with him for this puipose, and if he cannot be present the business shall nevertheless
proceed without him, provided always that if any one or more o f the aforesaid five and
twenty barons are in a similar suit, they shall be removed as far as concerns this particuiar
judgment, others being substituted in their places after having been selected by the rest of
the same five and twenty for this purpose only, and after having been swom.
56. If we have disseisai or removed Welshnien from lands or liberties, or other
things, without the legal Judgment of their peers in England or in Wales, they shall be
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Immediately restored to them; and if a dispute arise over this, then let it be decided in the
marcties by the Jadgment of their peers; for the tenements in England accoidifig to the
law o f England, for tenements in Wales accoMing to the law o f Wales, and for ihe
tenements in the marches aceording to the law o f the marches. Welshmen shall do the
same to us and oars.
61. Since, moreover, for God and the amendment o f our kingdom and for the
better allaying o f the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted
all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in complete and firm endur
ance forever, we give and grant to them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons
choose five and twenty barons o f the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be
bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be cbserve4 the peace and
liberties we have granted and conftrtned to them by this our present Charter, so that if we,
or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one o f our officers, shall in anything be at fault
towards anyone, or shall have broken any one o f the articles o f this peace or o f this se
curity, and the offense be notified to four barons o f the foresaid five and twenty, the said
four barons shall repair to us and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that
teesgression redressed without delay (www'.cs.IndiaEa.eda/statecrafl/magna-carta.html).*'^^
These componeBts, or ch^ters, o f Ihe Magaa Charta o f 1215 have without
question become lynchpins to the preservation o f property r i^ ts throughout the AngloAmericaa world. In fact, subsequent aHiendments would only serve to sti'engthen the
rights contained within them. In 1225, for instance. King Heniy*’ III substituted his own 38

'
It should be noted that the chapters included here out of the Magna Charta o f 1215 are verbatim of
the text used to gather them.
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chapters for the original 63 o f the Magna Charta (Siegan, 2001, pp. 10-12). Combining
what was originally duplicated and strengthening what was already stated, tfie Magna
Charta of 1225 is considered by most, iadadiag Edwarf Coke and Williain Biacfatone,
to be the “definitive veisioii” o f the original document, specifically as it pertains to due
process of law issues (p. 10). In it, “the birthright o f the people o f England” has been
preordained and established (p. 10). For example, the Magea Charta o f 1225 enhances the
protections already afforied by Chapter 39 o f the original document, now to be refened
to as Chapter 29 of the revised one. As formerly stated in Chapter 39:

freemen shall

be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him or send upon him, except by the lawftil judgment o f his peers or by the law of
the land (www.csindlana.edij/statecrafb'iiiagna-carta.htnil). However, Chapter 29 o f the
revised document reads as follows:
No freemen shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised o f his freehold, or liberties, or
free customs, or be oudawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor wdll we aot pass
upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peel's, or by the law of the
land. We will sell to no m m , we w il not deny or tiefa' to miy man either justice or r i ^ t
(Siegan, 2001, p. 10).

While the Magna Charta itself was subsequently amended again, during the time of King
Edward III, it is the revisions made to Chapter 39 in 1225 (i.e.. Chapter 29} that common
law seemingly emulates (pp. 12-46). And with respect to the issue o f propertj' at common
law, it is from this chapter that Coke and Blackstone link dae process o f law to property-'
rights (pp. 12-46). As such, no individual may be denied his right to property without
proper accord given to due process o f law (pp. 12-46).

Coiomal Experience With Property Rights

According to James Ely, Jr., “English common law provided the legal foundation
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for property ownership in the colonies . . . [which was] from the very begijming . . .
closely linked with economic rights” (Ely, 1998, p. 10). Indeed, “the colonialists vener
ated Magna Chaila as part o f their birthright as English subjects’’' and colonial judges
applied it as such (pp. 13-14). With the plentiful avaiiablHty of property throughout the
American colony, just about anyone who worked hard enough could attak the slates of
ownership and economic well-being (p. 25). In fact, by some accounts, “most o f the
colonialists [already] owned land, and §0 percent o f the population derived their living
from agriculture” (p. 16). However, “the widespread ownership o f land made the coloni
alists especially sensitive to any interference with their property” (p. 25), And when the
British failed to take into consideration the sensitivity with which American colonialists
regarded such property, their miscalcuiation inevitably set in motion the chain o f events
that would inevitably culminate with America’s independence (p. 25).
Much o f the British govemment’s miscalculation o f American proprietary inter
ests stemmed to a large degree from its ievolvement in the French and Indian Wars,
which lasted from about 1756 until 1763. Having accrued some 147 imillioa pounds In
national debt, the British were in dire need of new sources of incoine (Graver, 1985, pp.
105-117). A couple means by which they could quicMy atiain such revenue included the
streamlining o f administration over colonial assets or the levying o f new taxes over such
assets ( ^ . 105-11'7). In either respect, the British were determinal to make the American
colonies “share more o f the costs o f adininistering and defending the empire” (p. 105).
The Proclamation of 1763, for instance, sought to alleviate the need to maintain large
military forces along the Western frontier o f the American colonies by aelualiy restricting
colonialists from crossing over the Appalachians and settling onto Indian land (pp. 105-
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106). Howe¥er, with America’s population growing even larger, such a move was only
pieceineal at best (pp. 105-106). In fact, as George Waslilngton himself would write:
“Any person . . . who neglects Ihe present opportunity o f hiiHting oat good lands, and in
some measure marking and distinguishing them for his own will never regain it” (p. 105).
The British also imposed new taxes on the American coloiiies in an effort to help
pay for colonial administration and defense (pp. 106-117). Beginning in 1764, the British
government imposed a revised sugar duty (i.e.. Sugar Act) oa the American colonies (p.
106). The Act itself expanded the number o f commodities covered by the tax, including
sugar, and made the smuggling o f such comniodities perilous for those that attempted it
(p. 106). Those that were caught and made defendants were seemingly denied due pro
cess by being “presumed guilty until proven innocent” (p. IC^). The British government
also imposed the Currency Act in 1764, which forbade the issuance o f colonial paper
currency (pp. 106-107). Sach a move, however, placed the colonies under extreme
hardship and eventual economic depression since most Americans lacked the necessary
hard capital (i.e., gold) for which to purchase goods and trade (pp. 106-107). Even so,
other new tax measures soon followed (pp. 107-117). In 1765, the British government
imposed the Stamp Act, which required new fees (i.e., direct taxes) for such items as
newspapere, almanacs, and liquor licenses (p. 107). The Quartering Act followed shortly
thereafter, reqairisg colonial Americans to “accommodate” British soldiers by providing
them with room and essential supplies (p. 107).
All of the British govemmenf s endeavors to recover much needed revenue were
met with complete contempt and disdain on the part o f the A m sicaa colonialists. In
some cases, the British were compelled to modify their taxing elforts, as in the case o f the
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Sugar Act whicli was revised to a single tax on sugar only; and in others, the British were
forced to repeal their taxing efforts, as in the case o f the Stamp Act (pp. 110-111).
However, whatever leniency was teiiiporarily displayed, other more conteinptiWe acts
soon followed (pp. 110-117). The Declaratoiy Act, passed shortly thereafter in 1766,
allowed the British goveminent to “make laws and statutes o f sufficient foree aad validity
to bind the colonies and people o f America . . . in all cases w hatsoever (pp. 110-111).
Just the same, a whole neiv round o f taxes were also imposed —^this time la the form of
the Townshend Duties (pp. 111-112). The Townshend Duties, passed in 1767, placed
taxes OR all goods that the American coloniaiists couM only import froni Great Britein
(e.g., tea) (pp. 111-112). Requiring that they too be paid in hard currency, the British
government figured that the Anierican colonialists would be forced to submit and
eventually comply, given that they had no other real option (pp. 111-112). The Tea Act,
passed la 1773, allowed for die “dumping” o f East India Company tea on the American
colonies in such a maimer as to drive out all other competition and leave only British tea
as a source o f drink and as a tax (pp. 115-116). The final straw though came in the form
of the Intolerable Acts, passed in 1774 (pp. 116-117). These Acts effectively ended selfgovernment throaghout the American colonies and transferred power to the British
Monarch’s own royal governors (pp. 116-117). It was this action, according to Rebecca
Graver, that “brought the crisis between Great Britaiii and its [Americm| colonies to the
point o f no return” (p. 117).

Constitiitional Debate Over Property Rights

The experiences that the American colonies underwent throughout the period
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leading up to the Revolutionary War and shortly thereafter were o f tremendous Influence
upon maay o f the founding fathers. Individuals such as Patrick Henry, Thomas JefFereon,
Benjamie Fraeklia, James Otis, Jr., Saiiniel Adams, and many others, had all witnessed
and openly protested the British government’s perceived acts o f arbitrary hostility toward
the American colonies (Graver, 1985, pp. ! 12-113). Thomas Jefferson’s own Declaration
o f Independence detailed, to some extent, the American colonialists’ iist o f grievances
against the Crown as they would in some way relate to property:
1. He has . . . quarter[ed] large bodies o f armed troops among us;
2. He has . . . cut off our trade with all parts o f the world;
3. He has . . . Impos[edJ taxes on us without our consent; and
4. He has . . . depriv[ed| us in many cases, o f the benefits o f trial by jury . . . .
These concerns in conjunction with the actions taken by the several states during and
after the Revolutionary War would ali eventually make their way into the American Con
stitution, in some form or another.'®'* The objective in ail cases was to secure the very
essence o f property ownership, for without such insurance, liberty could not be expected
to flourish and succeed (Ely, 1998, p. 43). According to James Ely, Jr., the founding
fathers’ concern with the issue o f property rights can be broken d o ra into essentially four
different categories;
I. Provisions that restrict the power o f the national govertiment vis-a-vis property
rights;

As a roatine, maay of the states during the economic downslide of the 178Gs fMssed a whole host
of laws desipied to inten'cae between ddstor and eroiitM’ (Ely, 1998, pp. 36-41), These laws oftentimes
either forgave outstanding ddilts, aliowed leoglhy instaliments to be made on debts, or in some cases for
creditors to accept valueless paper money as payment on debts (p. 37). ITie Shay’s Rebellion of 1786-87 is
to a large degree the result of such state action and a primary reason vAy the founding fathers included the
Contract Clause within the U.S. Constitution (p. 39).
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2. Pro¥isions that streegthen the power o f the national government vis-a-vis
property rights;
3. Provisions that restrict Ihe power o f state govemments vis-a-vis property rights;
and
4. Provisions that protect slavery as a form o f property rights (Ely, 1998, pp. 4346).
The first provision primarily pertains to issues involviag bills o f attainder, for
feiture of property for treason, preferential treatment of state ports, export taxes, and
direct taxes (pp. 43-44). The sajond provision primarily pertains to protective tariffs, the
Commerce Clause, copyrights and patents, and bankruptcy laws (pp. 44). The third pro
vision primarily pertains to bans on import and export taxes, bills o f attainder, issuances
of legal tender, and impairment of contracts (pp. 44-45). Finally, the fourth and last
provision primarily pertains to the issue o f slaveiyf itself (pp. 45-46).
Even so, with the implementation o f all these provisions into the U.S. Consti
tution, “no language [exists] that broadly affirmed the right o f properly” (p. 46). Indeed,
as James Ely, Jr., writes: “For ali their devotion to property rights, the [founding fathers]
were content to rely primarily on institutional and political arrangements to safeguard
property owners” (p. 47). The key for them was separation o f powers, checks and
balances, as well as federalism (p. 47). If goveroroent was aiired down ia procedural
complexit>', there would be no way for it to infringe upon the rights of property owners
(p. 47). Furthermore, the founding fathers believed that the new govemiBent would be
prlmariiy composed o f property owners, itmcli like themselves (p. 47). What better
protection of propert)' rights than to have a fellow property owner oversee them (p.
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47).’® Still, for some, such guarantees were simply not enough. Fearing that the national
government may someday use its power to encroach upon the rights o f the stetes as well
as their iahabitsnts, many, most all o f whom were Anti-federalists, such as Thomas
Jefferson, advocated that a bill o f rights also be added to the final document (pp. 47-58).
In lies o f property rights, James Madison, himself somewhat concerned m this particular
ease, eventually accoimnodated (pp. 53-54). The final product, the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Conslltution: ‘‘No pers>n shall. . . be deprived o f life, liberty or property, with
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensatioii” (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 5). A statement very much reflective o f the
principles set forth early on within the Magna Charta as well as by classical liberalism.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Contract Clause

The property rights that are contained within the U.S. Constitution are the
responsibility o f the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret and to apply meaning. However, it
Is in this same capacity, as James Ely, Jr. notes, that the Court “has produced more than
its share o f dramatic moments” (Ely, 199§, p. xi). As guardian and protector of the
Americaa Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has on occasion been rather staunch in
its defense o f property interests (O’Brien, 2003, p. 223). In fact, the Court has at times
brought Itself into direct conflict with the other branches o f govermnent over the issue of
property. For example, from the very beginning o f the U.S. Constitution until the mid1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court readily “held that the govemnieiit existed to protect life,

The founding fafeeis also e.\pected, in le a of state voter reqiiireiBcnts, that pix^riy would be a
prerequisite to participation within government (Ely, 199S, p. 47).
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liberty, and property, with property accorded the greatest protection” (Fisher, 1990, p.
464). During this timefiame, the Court “promoted m exceptionally narroiv definitioa o f
piopsrt}^” which tended in most cases to cartail the ability o f the state to regulate the
more sinister side-effects o f a market-based economy (p. 464). Tims again, aoy economic
regulation passed by Ihe gOYeramefit, whether at the state level or national, was met with
strict judicial scrutiny and, in nearly all cases, d eian t judicial negation (pp. 464-477).
The individiiaf s right to property was quite literally taken to heart by the U.S. Siipreme
Court and placed on a constitutional pedestal above all other interests, particularly those
as represented by the goverament. Hircaigh broad interpretation o f such clauses as the
Contract Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court, whether for good or ill, has historically been
able to preserve and promote American iRdividualism, as represented by an individuafs
inalienable right to property.

Understanding the Language o f the Contract Clatise

Interestingly, while it has been the Contract Clause that the U.S. Supreme Court
has historically atlliffid for the purposes o f furtfierlng property rights and economic
liberty, the founding fathers themselves spent very little time actually discussing it (Levy,
I98S, pp. 124-136). In fact, according to 'Leonarf Levy, “aliBost no one cared about the
contract clause either at the Constitutional Convention or during the ratification contro
versy” (p. 124). The reasoning behind such indifference among the founding fathers is
not easily explained, especially given the fact that it was states that routinely interfered
with and irapaiied the obligation o f contracts (pp. 124-125). Still, there were some, in
cluding Janies Madison himself, that were more forthright in their position and believed
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that “laws impairing the oMigatioa of contracts [were] contrary to the first principles of
the social compact and to e¥eiy principle o f soimd legislation” (Ely, 1997, p. xi). They
believed that a contract danse would serve as a “bulwark in fevor o f persoaal securit).'
and private rights” (p. xi). Even so, such outspokenness was oftentimes muted by the lack
o f passion oa either side of the debate (Levy, 1988, p. 127). “Monumental indifference,
ill-considered judgment, and inconsistent approval” were common throughout (p. 127).
And with ratification by the Coastitutioiial Convention on September 12, 1787, the
apathy and disregard that many had for the Contract Clause were passed along right into
the U.S. Constitution itself (p. 127). The final product, as written: “No state shall. . . pass
any law .. impairing the obligation o f contracts” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10).
In due respect to the founding fathers, according to Benjamin Wright, “had the
[U.S.J Supreme Court adhered to [their] intentions, the Contract Clause would never have
attained a position o f great legal or economic importance” (Levy, 1988, p. 130). In large
part, it has been the U.S. Supreme Court that has been primarily responsible for providing
most o f the meaning to the Contract Clause. With so little precedent, other than maybe a
volatile history at the state level, and only a brief discussion at the Constitutional Con
vention, the Court has had to Infer much o f what it has come to understand by the Clause
itself. First o f all, the Contract Clause is only applicable to the various state governments
and not .specifically to Congress. As John Marshall himself wrote:
The power of c h a n ^ g the relative sitiiatioo o f debtor and creditor, of interfering with
contracts . .. had been used to such an excess by the State Legislatures as to . . . destroy
all confidence betweai man and man. The mischief had become so gre^, so alaiming, as
not oniy to impair t»mmercia! intes’course and threaten the existence of ta'edit, ta t to sap
the Hiorals of the people and destroy liie sanctity o f private faith. To guard against the
c»ntiiiuaiice of the evil was an object. . . aad was one o f the iniix)rtant benefits .expected
trom a refom of the government (Levy, 1988, p. 125).

Extending the language o f the Contract Clause to Congress “would be going,” in the
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words of one founding father, Gowemeur Morris, “[simply] too far” (p. 126). And
second, the word “contract,” .according to B lack’s Law Dictionary, is defined as “an
agreement tetween two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or
otherwise recognizable at law” (Black, 2000, p. 259).

With respect to the Contract

Clause itself, '“the U.S. Constitution proHbit[s] states from passkg a law that would
impair private contractual obligations (p. 266). What this entails is that the state simply
cannot intervene between two private parties, say a debtor and a creditor, and alter the
meaning or arrangement of an existing contract that is held between them (O’Brien,
2003, p. 224). To do so would in all likelihood be “impairing the obigatiofi o f contracts”
(U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10). And this would, for all intents and purposes, be a vio
lation o f an individuafs right to property (O’Brien, 2003, p. 224).

Principles Set Forth by the Contract Clause

With such a resounditigiy uncertain historical premise from which to work, the
U.S. Supreme Court has had to, according to David O’Brien, “[lay] the basis in con
stitutional law for the growth o f American capitalism” (O’Brisn, 2003, p. 223). As stated
in Article I, Section 10 o f the U.S. Constitution: “No state shall . . . pass any law . . .
impairing the oMigation o f contracts” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10). What many
have Mstorically taken this to mean is that the state may not intervene ia the private
property matters o f the individual—^that the “provision was ostensibly aimed at pre
venting the states from reneging on private contracts . . {O’Brien, 28Q3, p. 224). Quite
clearly put, as James Madison himself wrote:
1. That Is not a just goverament, nor is property' secure under it, where the
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property' wMcti a maa has in his persoaal safety and personal liberty, is violated by
arbitrary' seizures o f one class o f citizeiis for the services o f the rest
2. That is aot a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitraiy'
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their
faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their property in
the general sense of the word; but arc the means o f acquiring property strictly so called.
3. A just security to property is sot afforded by that goverament under which
unequal taxes oppress one species o f property and reward another species: where arbi
trary taxes Invade the domestic sanctuaries o f the rich, aad excessive taxes grind the feces
of the poor:. . . (Fisher, 1990, p. 479).**
The first major case that the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with that involved the
Contract Clause came in 1810, in the case o f Fletcher vs. Peck (10 U.S. 87).*°^ Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall broadly construed the notion that a state may
not only “impair the obligation o f contracts” between that o f private individuals but also
between that o f private individoals and ilself—the state (O’Brien, 2003, p. 224). In this
sense, the state is prohibited from “ impairing the obligation” of both “private contracts”
and also “public contracts” (p. 224). “I f . . . grants are comprehended under the tenn
contracts, is a grant from the state excluded from the operation o f the provision? Is the
clause to be considered as inhibiting the ^ t e from impairing the obligation o f contracts
between two individuals, but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself’
(10 U.S. 87, 137)? The Court reasoned that It could not (10 U.S. 87, 137). The sanctity of

Excapt is taken Yerbatisn irom M.adison’s Essay
Fleicher vs. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 <1§!0).

(Fisher, 1990, fsp. 47M 80),
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property itself is premised upon a fxrceived notion of trust, and that the indi¥idual may
not be divested of Ms “estate” simply because one legiskfcire disagrees with the etiiics o f
an earlier one {10 U.S. 87, 130-139). No matter the circamstance or rationale, “hhe state
, . . ps] constrained, either by general principles, which are common to our free institu
tions, or by the particular provisions o f the Constitution o f the United States, from
passing a law whereby the estate of [an individual i s ] . . . legally impaired and rendered
null and void. . (iO U.S. 87,139).
The expansive position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Fletcher case was
fiirther underscored in 1819, in the case o f Trustees o f D artfm nth College vs. Woodward
(17 U.S. 518).*®® Upon reviewing the constitutionality as to whether or not a state (i.e.,
New Hampshire) may ia feet alter a corporate charter (i.e., a contract) that was originally
negotiated and granted by another public entity (i.e., English Crown), the Court reasoned,
again through CMef Justice John Ms'shall, that it (I.e., the state) could not—^“that this Is a
contract, the obligation of which cannot be Impaired without violating the Constitution o f
the United States” (17 U.S. 518, 650). Viewing the corporate charter. In this case, as “an
artificial, immortal being,” the Court seemingly elevated, to some degree, the very status
o f the organization to coiistitutioiial heights (17 U.S. 518, 642). Meaning, it bestowed
upon the corporate charter a sense o f being, likewise protected by the U.S. Constitution
(17 U.S. 518, 642-654). The original parties to the corporate charter itself may have long
since passed, but their interests “collectively” live on in its present image and purpose (17
U.S. 518, 642-643). Accordingly, “the corporation is the assignee o f their rights, stands in
their place, and distributes their bounty, as they would themselves . . . , had they been

Trustees o f Dartmouth College vs. ¥/oo(hvard, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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imino^rtal” (17 U.S. 518, 642). Tlie corporation is a "iiving” trust o f their own ideals and
wishes (17 U.S. SIS, 642-654). To alter such a trust now would in eiFect be “impalriag
the obligation o f eontect” as originally stipulated to by ali o f the former parties or trus
tees of the same corporate charter (17 U.S. 518, 642-654). And this ¥er>' notion, the Coiiit
concluded, was “ropagnant to the Constitution o f the United States (17 U.S. 5 18,654).
And finally, in yet another decision, some 20 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court
further expanded upon its understanding o f the Contract Clause by also incomorMing a
“public virtue” componsnt in it (36 U.S. 420).'®® Backing away from its earlier more
rigid constriictloR o f privacy rights, the Court, ttirough Chief Justice Roger Taney, as
serted that whenever there is “any ambiguity in the terms o f [a] contract, [between a
company o f adveaturers and the public], [it] must operate . . . in favor o f the public (36
U.S. 429, 544). For, “the object and end o f all government is to promote the happiness
and prosperity of the community by which it is established, . .

(36 U.S. 429, 547).

Ideally, if any government is o f recognizable value to its own community, then it will
“accomplish the ends o f Its creation, and the fimctions it was designed to perfomi,”
instead o f transferring them “to the hands o f privileged corporations” (36 U.S. 429, 548).
In this fBTticular case, the state o f Massachusetts was performing its designated function
by accommodating the needs o f a “free, active, and eoterprising” country with the ad
dition of a new bridge over the Charles River (36 U.S. 429, 547). The fact that the state
had negotiated the building of a similar bridge some 70 years earlier, as a privately
operated toll service, is of no real concern (36 U.S. 429, 547-548). The life and times of a
country oiiist assuredly be expected to change. As such, ‘%hile the rights o f private

Charles River Bridge Co. vs. M'arren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 429 (1837).
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propert>' are sacredly guarded, we must aot forget that the community also have rights,
and that Ihe happiness and well being o f every citizen depends on their faith&l preser
vation (36 U.S. 429, 548).

Considerations Beyond the Contract Clause

The adoption o f the Fourteenth Amendnient in 1868 is, according to several legal
scholars—including David O ’Brien, among them—the primary reason why the U.S.
Supreme Court began the process o f reiaxing its interpretation o f the Contract Clause
after the Charles River Bridge cm e In 1837 (O’Briea, 2003, pp. 254-255). Indeed, ‘‘the
Fourteenth Amendmeat. . . provided the Court with a new basis for protecting economic
rights” (p. 254). As Section One o f the Foiateenth AmeEdment states:

state shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nw shall any state deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection o f the laws (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14, Sec. 1), Broadly construing such
language as “privileges and iminunities” as well as “due process o f kw ,” the Court was
able, over a period o f about 50 years, to “read” into the U.S. Constitution, or as some
might prefer, to infer from it, an indivldaaf s r i ^ t to “liberty o f contract”
While there are in fact several legal antecedents or precursors to the actual
creation o f a “liberty o f contract,” it is really not until the case o f AUgeyer vs. Lotiismna
in 1897 that the U.S. Supreme Court openly acknowledged its existence as a fondamental
right contained within the U.S. Coastitution (165 U.S. 57§).‘^®Prompted in large part by

AUgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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the rapid industrialization of the United States, the Court, through Justice Rufas
Peckhaia, asserted:
The iibsrty’ meationed in [the Foarteenthl Amendment means not only the right o f Ihe
citizens to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incai*ceration, but
the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment o f ali
Ms faculties; to be free to use them in all law&l ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his liveiihood by any lawM calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that puipo-se to enter sito all coatracts which may be {Moper, nec^saiy » d c s ^ t l d to
his carrying out to a succcss&l eoaclusion the purposes above mestiosed {165 U.S. 578,
389).

The statement put forth by the Court, to a large extent, reaily only reiterated the positions
taken within the dissenting opinioas o f two earlier cases. In Butchers ’ Benevolent Associ
ation vs. Cresent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Co., for instance, Justice
Joseph Bralley stipulated that “a law which prohibits . . . citizens from adopting lawful
employment. . . does deprive them o f liberty as well as property, without due process of
law. Their right of choice is a portion o f their liberty; their occupation is their property”
(83 U.S. 36, 122).” ^ Justice Stephen Fields likewise agreed in Ms own dissent within the
case o f Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S. 113, 136-154).“ ^ As stated: “No reason can be as
signed to justify legislation interfering wilh the legitimate profits o f [a| business, that
would not equally justify an intermeddling with the business o f every man in the comnranity, so soon, at least, as his business became generally useflil” (94 U.S. 113,154).
The U.S. Supreme Court fiirther underscorcd its position on the substantive
existence of a right to ‘liberty o f contract” in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 U.S.
45).” ^ Writing for the Court, Justice Rufiis Peckham aptly stated that “there is no reas
onable groaad for interfering with the liberty o f person or the right to free contract” (198

' “ Butchers ’ Bemvolemi Assocmfion vs. Cresent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhome Co., 83
U.S. 36 (1873).
*
vs. lUmois, 94 U.S. i 13 (1877).
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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U.S. 45, 57). In response to the state of New York’s decision to effectively limit the
niHHber o f hours per week that a person may potentially work in a b ^ e iy to sixty, the
Court re^oned that sucIi a restriction ‘‘necessarily interferes with the right o f contract
between the employer and employee” (198 U.S. 45, 53). And under the guise of the
decision set forth in AUgeyer vs. hruisiima^ “no state can deprive any person o f life,
liberty, or property without due process o f law (198 U.S. 45, 53). The same logic was
also set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the ease o f Adkins vs. C hildren’s Hospital
(261 U.S. 5 2 5 ) . This time. Congress had adopted a minimum wage law for women and
children who maintained employment within the District of Columbia (261 U.S. 525,
539-543). Writing for the Majority', Justice George Sutherland reaffirmed the Court’s
earlier stance that “the right to contract about one’s affairs Is a part o f the literly o f the
individual” (261 U.S. 525, 545). “To sustain the individual freedom o f action contem
plated by the Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it; for
surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served than by the preservation
against arbitrary restraiat o f the liberties o f its constituent members” (261 U.S. 525, 561).
However, just as the U.S. Supreme Court had been strongly influenced early on
by the rapid onslaught o f industrialization in 1S97, it was just as much influenced by the
lack o f industrialization in 1937. With the Great Depression in fiill swing, the U.S.
Supreme Court, whether by ifitcrnal reevalaatioa or external political pressure, reversed
its own course o f action, in the case o f West Coast Hotel Co. vs. Parrish, on the existence
o f a right to “liberty o f contract” as set forth in such cases as Adkim (300 U.S. 379).” ^ In

Adkim m. C M dren’s Hsspital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
West Coast Hotel Co. w. Parrisk, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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fact, writing for the Majority, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes sacciactiy stated that
“our coaciasion is that the case o f Adkim vs. Children’s Hospiiai, supra, shoeid be, and it
is, overraied” (300 U.S. 379, 400). Why? '‘The Constitution does not speak o f freedom of
contract. It speaks of libertjf and prohibits the deprivation of libertj' without due process
of law” (3CX) U.S. 379, 391). Hence, “ . . . the Coastitiitioii does not recognize an absoiute
and uncontrollable liberty,” as seemingly implied by earlier Courts (300 U.S. 379, 391).
When itecessary, the very essence o f liberty must on occasion be reevaluated and re
adjusted in conjiinctioa with what is going

oh

within the social atmosphere (300 U.S.

379, 391-392). Withoat question, it is within the prerogative o f the state to ensure that
the “hsaith, safety, morals, and welfare of the people” are preserved and protected at all
times (300 U.S. 379, 391). So long as a state’s regulation is reasonable and does not
unduly deprive an individual o f Ms due process rights, the U.S. Constitiitioii does not
prohibit such action (300 U.S. 379, 391-392). Clearly, as in this case, there are circum
stances, such as the Great Depression itself, vfhere the “bargaining power” of the working
class is left “relatively defenseless” and, as a result, is in dke need o f proper govern
mental relief (300 U.S. 379,399).

Conclusion

Interestingly, in a footnote to a case involving the constitutionality' of the Filled
Milk Act of 1923, Justice Harlan Stone asserted:
There may be a aarrawer scope fer oparatioit o f the presemptk® o f constitafioiiality
wben legisIatioB appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Cbastitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced withia the Fourteenth . . . (304 U.S. 144, 152-153).”*

United S t a t e s C a r o l m e Products Co., 3CI4 U.S. 144 (1938).
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And really, since then, the Court has predomiaaiitiy focused its atfentioa on the wider,
more diverse social issues ©f civil liberties and civil rights. Does this mean that the U.S.
Supreme Court has reneged on its earlier perceived duties to uphold the iBdividual’s
iiiaiienaMe right to property? Not necessarily. One might very well stipalate that the
Court, in ite heyday, may have possibly taken the protection of property a little too far.
While the U.S. Constitution is certainly general enough to be adapted to the times in
which it exists, it was not, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “intended
to embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for people o f fimdamentaliy
differing views, and the accident o f our finding certain opinions natural and familiar . . .
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitutioii o f the United Slates” (198 U.S. 45, 75-76). Still, the U.S.
Supreme Coiiit stands guardian to tiie various protections outlined within the American
Constitution. The inalienable right of properly is as relevant today as it was to the
founding fathers and to earlier episodes of the American Supreme Court (e.g., due
process clause and takings clause). While it is trae that the Court has shifted its focus
more so towards those principles that specifically pertain to issues of life and liberty, the
protections that are afforded to property are still very much a part o f the U.S. Con
stitution. The only real difference is in terms o f their substantive co n tm t The Court has,
ia this regsrff been reluclast to imply or infer any additioiial rights out o f them (e.g.,
liberty of contract). As Justice Hugo Black once stated in the case o f Ferguson vs.
Skrupa, “it is up to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utilily of
iegisIatioH” (372 U.S. 726, 719).™ O f coarse, one might very well amend Ms statement

Ferguson vs. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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by iBcliidmg, “as such iegisiatioB pertaios to the issues encircling economic regulations.”
Because, as &r as cM i liberties and civil rights are concerned, the Court has readily in
corporated substantive due process (e.g., right to privaey).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court has been willing to preserve and protect an ideal that
was to &large degree originaliy brought into fruition by classical iiberalism and that was
later fully accepted by America’s founding fathers. The ideal is individuaiisin, and the
priiiciples that underscore and enhance it are the individuars inaiieaable rights. Through
man’s inalienable right to life, liberty'-, and property, he has been able to propound upon
Ms own sense o f individualism, free from any undue or unnecessary outside influence,
particularly as represented, for instance, by the likes of the state. The very essence o f an
individual’s right to life carries wiA it a sense o f procedural due process—^that the state
itself may not infringe upon an mdividuai’s “life” without some adherence to due process
of law. The individual has a constitEtional right, for example, against uaiawM searches
and seizures. This is a right guaranteed to the individual by the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitation. In order for law enforcement to properly search the individual’s per
son, house, papers, or effects, they must have probable cause and a search warrant There
are, o f course, notable exceptions to this requirement, but the point is that the state, as
represented here by iaw eaforcement, mast adhere to proper procedure or due process.
The state cannot arbitrarily violate an iadividaai’-s “right to life” by encroaching upon his
own “person, house, papers, or effects” without reasonable cause and without proper writ.
146
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Similarly, the slate cauaot aitjiixaiiiy mfringe apoa the individual’s right to
liberty, Ms fteedom to do whatever it is that he wishes so long as it does not infringe
upon the rights of others. The individual has a constitutional right, for example, to the
free exercise of Ms own particular religion and to be free from any notion of an “estab
lished” or state-sponsored reiigion- Whst this entails is that the individual may freely
exercise Ms own religion withoat any andae govemmentai coercion or influence. The key
to this statement though is that such “free exercise” is only protected in terms of religious
beliefs or values. Oace these beliefs or values move into the realm o f action or conduct,
the state may be compeEed to restrict them. And fiaally, the state cannot arbitrarily en
croach upon the individual’s right to property, at least without some comideration for due
process. The individaal clearly has a constitutional right, for example, to fieely engage in
whatever contract he wishes knowing that the sanctity o f Ms proprietary interests within
that contract will be upheld by the legal system. Again, though, as with the two preceding
issues o f concern, such a right is not absolute; the state may intervene when it can
demonstrate a compelling interest to do so. Adherence to due process o f law remaias a
necessary prerequisite even in the presence o f a compelling interest.
The objective of course now is to evaluate just how well the U.S. Supreme Court
has been able to use these particular issue areas o f concem, within searches and seizures,
fieedom o f rsligioii, and contracts, to perpetuate the various tenets o f classical liberal
ism—^that is, to perpetuate tho.se values that pertain principally to American individual
ism, being life, liberty, and property. This requires rstumiiig to several o f the questions
posed at the outeet of this research endeavor for analysis aad evaluation. First of all, what
makes the U.S. Supreme Court institutionally suited for such a task, to being a pivotal
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player in pH>tec1iiig aad expasding upon Ameriean individiialisia? Moreover, how do
such cases within searches and seizures, freedoHi o f religion, and contacts actnally enable
the U.S. Supreme Coart to protect and expand npoa American indmdaaiism? And
finally, what is the resulting effect of the U.S. Supreme Coart’s actions within these
particular areas o f concern, witliin these particalar areas o f the kw , on American society
as a whole? Do the Court’s actions in effect preserve and promote individualistic ten
dencies? These questions go to the very heart o f this research endeavor and must be
evaluated to determine the piausibihty o f the hypothesis stated at the outset—that the
U.S. Supreme Court has seemingly peipetuatsd, in some o f its more fiindanaental coaslitutional decisions, an underlying predisposition toward those liormative ideals that per
tain primarily to classical liberalism— that is, toward those normative ideals that pertain
specifically to the value o f individualisHi.

The U.S. Supreme Court: The Right Institution?

First o f all, what makes flie U.S. Supreme Court the most appropriate, or wellsuited imtitution to actually endeavor the task of protecting aad expanding upon Ameri
can individuslisai? There is little doubt that the Coart occupies an unusual, maybe even
paradoxical position within American representative democracy (Ball, 1987, pp. 5-16).*^®

As Ho¥/ard Ball writes: “The paradox lies [in the fact that] the political system is democratic, yet a
noa-elected, lifetinje aH5ointed set of jnrists are nontaatively and coastitatioHaliy committed to preserving
and maximiziiig the contouis of ihe democratic system. The federal coart systan is an oligarcliic institution
fonctioning witlim a donociatic eaviroianeat” (Bail, 1987,
9-10). n re insulation o f flie U.S. Supreme
Court fioiffi direct public accoantabiiity, one might add, makes it the most suitable mstitation for protecting
individaal liberties. In this respect, the Court can safely act as a countermajoritarian institution without
having to face direct majoritarian pressures. Tbs elected branches of government, meaning the Congress
and the President, cannot act in such a manner since their very existence is dependent upon majoritarian
sopport.
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Of the three institiitions o f AjBerieaa natioasi govemiaeiit, incliiding the executive and
legislative branches, the judiciaiy is the only one that is not d ir tily accountable to the
American people. Unlike the President which is selected by popular vote in tandem with
the electoral college and the Congress which is selected by popular vote, the U.S.
Supreme Court is selected by a iiomiaation-confinBatioii p r o c e s s .A c c o r d i n g to the
U.S. Constitution, “[the President] shall nominate, and by aad with the advice and con
sent o f the Senate, shall appoint. . . judges of the Supreme Court,” who “shall hold their
offices during good behavior” (U.S. Const, Art. II, Sec. 2; U.S. Const. A rt III, Sec. 2).
The founding fathers and, in particular, Alexander Hamiiton chose this method for select
ing U.S. Supreme Court justices in large part because they felt it wmuid “secure a steady,
u p l i f t and impartial administration o f the laws” (Wills, 1982, p. 393). The general belief
was that consistency and stability in the law was absolutely essential to the presewation
of a well-ordered society (p. 393). More importantly, though, the founding fathers also
chose this method for selecting Court justices because it would enable them, meaning the
justices, to more adequately “ . . . guard the Constitution and ihe rights of individuals ..
(p. 397). It really is in this respect that the U.S. Supreme Court is not only institutionally
suited to be a protector of individual rights but also to be a proponent o f American
individualism.
Without question, the founding fathers were very much enamored bat quite fear
ful of the notion that the majority might be able to use its liuinbers ^ a source o f strength
to tyrannize over the miaority. As James Madison writes in Federalist 10: “

the public

It should Iw noted that U.S. senators were at one time selected by stale Isgislateires. This selcctioo
method was changed to a popalar vote, however, with the ratification of the Sixteenfli Amendment.
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good is disregarded . . . too often . . . by the saperior force of an iaterested and over
bearing majority" (Wills, 1982, pp. 42-43). Accordingly, “ . . , the majority . . . must be
rendered . . . unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression” (p. 46). The
U.S. Supreme Court, as an independent ffibunal, is just one of the means by which the
majoiity^’s potentially overwhelmiBg power may be cheeked aad if need be curtailed (p.
397). iBdesd, as Alexander Hamiiton remarks in Federalist 78: “the independence o f the
judges is equally requisite to piard the . . . rights of individuals from the effects of those
ill humors which the arts of designing men,, . . sometinies disseminate among the people
themselves . .

(p. 397). The Court, in this regard, is an essential componeiit o f the

elaborate system of separation of powers and check and balances that Madison Mnaseif
often alludes to and praises. It is part o f the whole notion that somehow “ambition must
be made to counteract ambition” (p. 262). Clearly, as Madison notes in Federalist 47,
“were the power of judging Joined with the legislative [or executive], the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,. . (p. 246).
Even so, the question still looms: Why the judiciary? Why was so much trust put
in it to protect individual rights and not the executive or legislative branches of gov
ernment? What was it about the U.S. Supreme Court, for many of the founding fathers
amyw'ay, that made it the most suitable branch to undsrtaks the role o f protecting the
righfe of the individuai? Apart from its semi-indepeiideiit (i.e., semi-isolated) status
within Anierican government, which certainly does help in this regard, the Court is,
according to Howard Bail, a prime example o f a coaatermajoritaiiaii institution (Ball,
1987, pp. 1-11). Unlike the President or Congress, which are majoritarian instituticHis in
composure, meaniag that they are designed to be accountable to a majority of their own

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
respectiY© constituencies at any one time, the Court is no t The U.S. Sapreme Comt’s
daly* is to protect the rights o f the indiviiuai, ttis minority, against the poteiitia! tyranny of
the majority. It can aceomplish this feat in large part because it is an independent tribanai. It does not need to answer to the public’s scratiny every two, four, or six years.
Justices are af^ointed for what the Constitutioii refers to as “good behsYior” (U.S. Con
stitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 1). In most eases, what this mra.ns is that they are there for life, or
at least close to it. Their independence and lack of public accountability makes them the
best institution to stand against the wave o f majoritarian pressures—^to protect ‘th e most
basic o f all of oar frewionas,” the Bill o f Rights (Abraham, 1991, p. 89), Unlike the
President and the Congress, which are directly accountable, the U.S. Supreme Court does
not, in most circumstances, need to immediately bow to the demands o f an anxious
public. It laay, one m i^ t ¥ery well say, bide its time.

The U.S. Supreme Court: Guardian of IndiYidual Rights?

Accqjtiiig that the U.S. Supreme Court is the most appropriate institation for such
a t^ k , in what nianner has it actually used its unique position within the American
system of goveroment to protect and expand upon American individuafism? Whether it
be economic r i^ ts or ci¥il liberties and civil rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown a
keen predisposition throughout its history for protecting the rights of the individual vis-avis the state. Through its unusual position within American govemment, the Court has
aot only been able to serve as the final inteipretsr of American constitutioial law, it has
also been able to serve as the final guardian of American individual rights. The Bill of
Rights was added to the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights of the individual against
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the potentially overwhelming power o f the state. Indeed, this was one o f the last, but by
fax most significant deniaads plac-ed on the Federalists by the likes o f such mdividmls as
Thomas Jeiferson (i.e., an Anti-fedei'alist).

A biil of rights was perceived as absolutely

essential to Ihe ratificatioii of the U.S. ConstitetioH. Aad ia the final hour, the preser\?ation o f the individuals' rights was paramount to all other considerations. As a semiindependsnt, countermajoritarian iiistitBtioa, flie U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated
time again its daty and oMigation to uphold the individual values placed in the U.S.
Constitution by the founding fathers. Classiea! liberal in origin, the individuars inalien
able rights to life, iiberly, and property are central components of the Bill of Rights and
are the responsibility of the Court to “preserve and maxiiaizs” (Ball, 1987, pp. 9-10).
How has the U.S. Supreme Court undertaken such a task? It has done so, in the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall, by “emphatically . . . saypng] what the law is” (5 U.S. 137,
177)^121

^

regard that the Court has been able to preserve and promote American

individualism. By upholding and expanding upon the rights o f the individual to life,
liberty, and properly, lie U.S. Supreme Court has contributed to the individualistic ten
dencies that exist within American society. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
Court’s understanding o f searches and seizures, freedom of religion, and contracts. All
three areas o f concern are very much pertinent to the issues o f life, liberty, aad property,
and all are contribiitiag elements to American incfividuafisai.

This is not to convey any notion that the Federalisfe were opposed to indivMaal rights; only that
they did not believe an actual bill of rights was needed in the U.S. Constitotion. Their argument »'as
premised upon the b eief that the national govemraeHl coidd only do what was delegated to it by ttie Constitetioa. If m such power existed which would enable Ifee n^iona! govemmeit to restrict speech, for
example, thai why was a biil of rights even needed? To the Federalists, the addition o f insiivMual rights
was contradictory to the mkole notion of delegated national power. The national govsmment can not do
what it in fad lacks the power to do . . . .
'■*
Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153
Right to Life: Searches aad Seizures

According to the Fomth Aiaendmeiit of the U.S. Constitiitioii, ‘‘the right of the
people to be secure in their homes, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon prob
able cause, supported by oath or affinnalioa, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 4). An
individusi’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures goes right to the heart
o f tiiat individual’s inaiienabie right to life. Procedural due process is key to its
understanding as well as its enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court, through such land
mark decisions as Boyd vs. United States, Olmstead vs. United States, m dK atz vs. United
States, has been able to proceduraily protect the individual’s right to life, Ms right to a
“rrasonable expectation o f privacy,” against any undue govemmeiital encroachmeiit (389
U.S. 347, 360).^^^ In tMs respect, the Court has been able to differentiate between the
“public sphere” o f as individiiars omm existence and the “private sphere.” There are
clearly certain areas of an individuars life that government should not be, and if it must,
through some sort o f compelling state interest, there are constitutiomlly established pro
cedural guidelines that it must adhere to and respect. First o f ail, the governm ent, miist
have probable cause, or a reasonable belief, that something has gone awry, it must know
what that something is, and it must have some idea where that something might be found.
In this sense, the- iadividuaFs right to life is protected against aibitraiy and potentially
ovsrzeaious govemmeatal action. As Justice Potter Stewart once wrote: “Wherever a man

Katz vs. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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iBay be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from uniBasoiiaMe searches and
seizures” (389 U.S. 347, 359). TMs is certamly a strong isdication that the U.S. Sapreme
Court holds the rights of the individuai as preeminent to those of societ}' and the state.
The U.S. Sapreme Court has even gone so far as to substantively incoiporate, in
an effort to ensure the sanctity of an individaafs right to life against unreasonable
searches and seizures, a punishment-type mechanism into the U.S. Constitution against
the state, via the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. First devised in 1914 to only be
applicable to the national govemiaeiit aad then later in 1961 amended to be applicable to
the state govemnients, the exclusionary rale is the areh-de-tromp protection o f an indi
vidual’s right to

How else could any judiciary, at whatever level, ensure that an

individual’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures be respected if there
no other Miereat device to punish the state when it opts to violate such a prota;tioii?
The loss of any evidence gathered as a result o f an improper search and seizure is
absolutely pivotal to the enforcement of an individuars right to life. There really is no
other recourse for piiuitive action, so to speak, than to let “the crimiiia! go free because
the constable has blundered” (367 U.S. 643, 659). Why should the constable be allowed
to keep fruits o f a bad search? Would this not just be rewarding him for a job poorly
done? Historically, this is how the U.S. Supreme Court has perceived the necessity of
incorpomting an exclusionary rule into the Fourfli and Fomteentli Amendments o f the
U.S. Constitution. As Justice Felix Frankfiirtsr wrote in 1949: “The security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intmsion by the police . . . is basic to a free society” (338 U.S.

Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) mAM app vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
25, 27-28).'^“^' Cleariy, in this regard, the exciasioimiy rule serves as a essential barrier
against police misconduct and as a strong proponent of an individual’s right to life, his
own protection against unreasonable searches and seiziiies. “For there is but one alterna
tive to the mie o f exciusion,”

ia

the words o f Justice Frank Muiphy, “ fand] that is

bo

sanction at all” (338 U.S. 25, 41). The exclusionary rule is a key component to the pro
motion of American iadividualism.

Right to Liberty: Freedom of Religion

According to the First Amendment o f the U.S. Constitution, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an estabtishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’
(U.S. Coastitation, Amend. 1). An iadividual’s protection against the imposition of a
sMe religion and Ms own right to freely exercise Ms own religion goes to the heart of that
individual’s inalienable right to liberty. On one side of the issue, the state is proMbited
from imposing a particular religion upon the individuai, and on the other side o f the issue,
the state is prevented from interferii^ with the individuars liberty to exercise a religious
belief. One denies the state flie power to “establish” a religion; the other allows the indi
vidual the right to “exercise” a religion. Again, both perspectives are essential to an
individual’s inalienable right to liberty —

be free to do whatever he wills, so long as it

does not infringe upon the rights o f others. The U.S. Supreme Court has taken the stance
of more recent, at least since the early 1960s, that because o f the close reiationsMp that
has existed in American Mstory between religion and state, some sense o f “disestablishment o f religion” must take place between the two. What this has entailed, in most

W olfvs. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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cases, is the removal of reiigioiis observances (i.e., pi-ayer) from paMic institetions,
p rim arily o f wMcii have iadaded piibMc schools. Whether it be a state-written prayer, a

personal prayer, or a moment of silence, the Court has found all to be in violation o f the
Esiabiishiagiit Clause.

Its rationale has been that it is “not v/ithin the power of gov-

emment to invade the citadel [of an iadividaai’s heart], whether its puipose or effect be to
aid or oppose, to advance or retard” (374 U.S. 203, 226). Accordingly, religion is a
private matter and should be left to the individuafs own choosing. “Just as the right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementaiy coinponeiits . . . o f
individual fe e d o iii. . . , so also the individaai’s freedom to choose his own creed is the
counterpart of Ms right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority”
(472 U.S. 38,52).
The Establishment Clause, o f c»urse, is only one side of the issue; the other side
includes the Exercise Clause. WMie the former clause primarily involves the government
and its direct relationship with religion, the latter clause pertains primarily to the indi
vidaal and Ms own religion. As such, in lieu o f an indivichial’‘s inalienable right to liberty,
he is constitutionally guaranteed the right to freely exercise Ms own religion, again
though, so long as such exercise does aot infiiage upon the rights of others. Just as it is
stipulated to in classical liberaiisni, no right is ever absolute. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has demonsteted iM'oughoiit that it is really the state that must evince a compelling
interest to restrict such a liberty.

f i a g e l 1®.

Sckempp,

Yitmie,

As written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, “the

( 1 9 6 2 ) ; School DistricS ofAbm gion TowmsMp, Permsyiwamio vs.
Stone vs. Graham, 4 4 9 U . S . 3 9 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Wallace vs. Jqffree, 4 7 2 U . S . 3 8
U . S . 5 7 7 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; mA Santa Fe Independent School District vs. Doe, 5 3 0 U . S .

3 7 0 U .S . 4 2 1

3 7 4 U .S . 2 0 3 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ;

(1 9 8 5 ); i e e

vs. Weisman, 5 0 5

7 9 0 (2 0 0 0 ).

Reynolds vs. United States, 9 8 U.S. 1 4 5 ( 1 8 7 9 ) ; Sherbert vs. Verner, 3 7 4 U . S . 3 9 8 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Wiscomin vs. Yoder, 4 0 6 U . S . 2 0 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; a n d Employment Division, Departtnenf o f Human Resources o f
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essence o f all that has been said aad written oa the subject is that oaiy those [state]
interests o f the highest order . . . c m overbaiance legitimate ciam s to the [iediviciaars]
free exercise of religion” (406 U.S. 208, 215). The assumption is that the individual may
freely exercise Ms own religion until such time w'hen the state can demonstrate a com
pelling reason otherwise. Typically, it is the component o f “free exercise” that involves
the “practice of a religion” that normally fails under this type o f scratiny. “The legis
lative powers of the goveminent,” Thomas Jefferson wrote, “reach actions only and not
opinion” (O'Brien, 2003, pp. 665-667). An individual may freely beleve whatever he
wishes, but Ms carrying out o f those beliefs into actions is something the state may
rightfully regulate and control. Again, though, the burden of proof is on the part of the
state. The individuaTs right to liberty is stiM paramount

Right to ProBsrtv:

According to Article I o f the U.S. CoBstitution, “no state shall . . . pass any law
. . . impairing the obligatioii o f contracts” (U.S. Constitutioii, Art. I, Sec. 10). Likewise,
according to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments o f the U.S. Constitution, “[no person
shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law (U.S. Con
stitution, Amend. 5; U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14, Sec. 1). Just as life aad liberty are
inalienable rights of the individual, so too is property. In fact, an individual’s inalienable
right to property is really, for ail intents and purposes, the end ali and be all o f classical
liberal thought John Locke, James Madison, T horns Jefferson, among others, ali placed
particular emphasis on the need for property to be preserved and respected. Similarly,

Oregm vs. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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tfffoagljout its Mstory, the U.S. Supreme Court has been just as strong o f an advocate of
an individuars right to hold and possess property. Some of the first cases that the Court,
dealt with were used to underscore the centrality of property rights within American
society. Broadly constfaing such facets of the U.S. Constitution as the Contract Clause,
for instance, Ihe U.S. Supreme Court was not only able to infer an “obligation of con
tract” between individuals but also an “obligation of contract” between private individuals and the state (10 U.S. 87).*“^ This was absolutely pivotal to the presen^'ation of an
iadividuaFs property rights sines it forbade the state from unduly encroaching upon
them. And ia a free society very much attuned to the values o f laissez-faire economics,
minimal stats interference was considered not only a virtue but an absolute necessity. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in 1819, even went so far as to grant “individijal status” to corporate
charters (17 U.S. 518).^^* Perceiving a corporate charter as “an artificial, immortal
being,” the Court was able to elevate such organizations to the status of an individual
with certain inalienable rights, and thus bring them under the protection of the U.S.
Constitotion (17 U.S. 518, 642). Hers, not only are the rights o f an individual guaranteed
with respect to his own proprietejy interests within a given contract, the rights of a
corporate entity are similarly guaranteed, as if they are one and the same.
With the omlaught of American indastriaimtion during the latter part o f the 19*
century, the U.S. Supreme Court went even further in its protection of the individuaFs
right to property by siibstaatively iocoiporatiiig a “liberty o f contract” into tie scheme o f
things, as a constitutionally protected individual right.'^® Again, broadly construing such

Fletcher vs. Peck, W U.S. 87 (1810).
Trmsteesof
Trustees ofDartmoutk
Dartmoutk Collegers.
College m. Wbodward,
Wa
17 U.S. 518 (1S19).
Bulckers
Bmevolemt Association wy. Creserti CiSy Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse C b 83
Btiickers’’ Bmevolmtt
U.S. 36 (1873); Mun.n vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); AUgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897);
'**
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language as “privileges and iiiimiiiiities” and “dae process o f law,” the Court m^as able to
infer the existence of a “contract” between employer and employee. What this entailed
was that the state could not infHnge upon such a “contract” without actually violating the
“liberty” that existed belrwesn the two parties that were a part of the contract. The
assuinptioa, o f course, was that both si«tes approached the “contract” from an equal
stance, whereby each party freely contracted with the other and was under no undue
pressure. Under such a scenario, Justice Rufus Pecidiam wrote: “There is no reasonable
ground for interfering with the liberly of person or the right to free contract” {198 U.S.
45, 57). Therefore, any sMe-sanctioned regulation or restriction, whether it be minimiiiB
wages or maximuiii hours, was perceived as “[unjnecessaryply] interfer[ing] with the
right o f contract between employer and employee” (198 U.S. 45, 53). Assuredly, “no
state [may] deprive any person o f life, iiber^, or property without due process o f iaw”
(198 U.S. 45, 53). Such thialdiig on the part o f the U.S. Supreme Court would reign
supreme until the Great Depression during the 1930s. Even then, though, the Court was
reluctant to move away from its earlier stance on flie existence o f a “liberty of contract”
between employer and employee. Only with the continuation of the Great Depression and
a detemiiaed executive branch of govemment did the U.S. Supreme Court finally yield in
its belief that the state possessed no such re^latory power to interfere in the “liberty of
contract” that existed between employer and employee (300 U.S. 379).^^^ Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes aptly stated: “The Constitution does not speak
of fieedom o f contract It speaks o f literty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without

Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); m&Adkims vs. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
W^est Coast Hotel Co. vs. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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due process o f law” (300 U.S. 379, 391). Whea reasonable pradence dictates, sncli as
with an economic depression, the stats may iatervene and provide relief to those that lack
“bargaining power” and are left “relatively defenseless” (300 U.S. 379, 399). TMs does
not, how^ever, mean that the state may trample npon the individiiai’s right to property.
Dae process o f lav/ still prevails aad is coastitntionaliy protected.

The U.S. Siiprems Court: Proponent of American Individoalisin?

Finally, what tes b ^ n the iraiilting effect o f the U.S. Supreme Coait’s endeavor
to protect the rights of the individual, Ms right to life, libert}’', and property, against the
state? Really, it has been through the protection of individuai rights, whether they be in
the form o f life, liberty^, or proper^-, that the U.S. Sapreme Court has been able to
promote and expand upon American individualism. The analysis of such issues as
searches and seizures, freedom o f religion, and contracts cleariy demonstrates that the
U.S. Supreme Court has been an ardent protector o f individual rights and, as a result, a
strong proponent o f American iadividaaiism. By protecting the individuars right to life,
liberty, and property, the Court has been able to play a pivotal role in fostering the
founding fathers’’ .adiniration and appreciation for the individualistic virtues o f classical
libsralisHL Thrwighout the landiaark cases that have been analyzed, the U.S. Sapreme
Court has readily identified the rights o f the individiml as paraiBoimt to those of society
and the slate. One might very

say that, at least within these 'three areas o f legal

concem, 'the virtues o f individuaiism are alive and well! Americans, ^ isdividaals, have
a right to be safe and secure in their own homes, houses, papers, and effects without
undue governmental interference. Just the same, Americans, as iadividaals, have a right
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to finely eagsge ia whatevsr religioa they wish to exercise, so loag as it does aot infiinge
apoa the rights of otheK. Aad finally, above all, Americans, as individuals, have a right
to the acquisition and possessioa o f prcsperty and that such property may not been
deprived to them without due process of law.
Classical libersMsin early on advocated the existence o f certain inalienable rights
of man to life, iiberiy, and property; the founding fathers later accq?ted these very same
rights of man as a basis of American government; and the U.S. Supreme Court has
continued to promote these same rights o f m as as a principle of Ameiicaii culture and
creed The principles o f an iadividijars life, liberly, and properly are just as important
today to American economic, political, and social thought as they were during the
founding period. While there is no statistical prcxjf to demonstrate the aceuiacy o f such a
statement, it is still probably quite safe to assume that most Americans today, as iadividuals, know about the existence of at least some of their rights. They may not .know the
history behind them, they may not even know the exact phraseoiog>^ of them, but they do
know that they are guaranteed eertain rights against the state. The whole notion th a t‘T
have riglite” is just as significant today to any American as it was to those who advocated
them during the revoiutionary period. Ask any American about what a police officer
needs to s o ic h his or her home or car? And th a i ask o f Mm or her what would happen if
the police officer did sot conduct such a search in a proper manaer? The exelasionaiy
rule is not even part of the U.S. Constitution; it was pet there by the U.S. Supreme Court;
aad yet, most Americaiis are aware o f its existence. The same is, ia many respects, also
true o f religion aad property. Most Americans probably do not eves know what the First
Ainendineiit contains, but many o f them are at least aware that there is something about
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“separation of cliareh and state” within it, althottgh the exact piirase iiseif does not
actually exist. Aad property. Weil, safe to say that Americans know all too well about
property. Ail one needs to do is allude to the so-called “American dream.” What is It?
Weil, many would say that it is a house with a two-car garage, a picket fence, and a
backyard. A picture very iadicatwe of the w in s attaclied to property withiii Amsrica’s
cultiffe and creed. By the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is guardian and protector of
the U.S. Constitution, it has played a significant role in perpetuating such beliefs and
values within American economic, poiiticai, and social th o a ^ t.

The U.S. Supreme Court: Consideiatioiis for Further Research

Certainly, while the existence o f individualistic tendenciss

been seemiEgly

demonstrated in the selected areas o f searches and seizures, freedom of religion, and
contracts, might the same also be said of other similar rights contained within the U.S.
Constitutioii? In other words, can fiirther research into other related areas o f concern
yield similar results? The short and simple answer is: “Yes.” While the analysis con
ducted here does not utilize a statistical model, it has at least beoi rigorous enough in its
application o f qualitative methods to apply to other related areas o f conoem. The issue
areas that were selected for this endeavor were chosen in large part because they have
been reflective o f specific historical American experiences. 'Whether it be searches and
seizures, freedom of religion, or contracts, at! have evolved out o f some historical occur
rence which spawned an apparent need, oa the part o f the founding fathers, for their
inciusioE into the U.S. Constitution. The same may also be said o f other rights and
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libsrties that are contaiaed thereia.^^* For instance, what about the iadiYidnars protection
against “cruel and unusuai” punisbmeats, or the imdividuai’s “freedom of speech ” or the
individaai’s right to “just compeimlioa” (i.e., afjon the state’s seizure o f Ms own prop
erty)? These are certaiidy all ‘life, liberty, and property” issues. Does the U.S. Supreme
Court similarly treat them in such a manner as to preserve and protect Americaa indi
vidualism? While the analysis tiiat follows is simply tm brief to yield any conclaslve
results, it does at least indicate that fiirther research within this area is warranted and that
similar positive results are highly probable. Given what has already been demonstratsd
within the areas of searches and seizures, fieedom o f religion, and contracts, such results
would only enhance the plausibility o f the hypothesis o f this research endeavor—that
there is a strong connection between the U.S. Supreme Court and the preservation and
promotion of American individuaiisHi.

According to the Eighth Amendment o f the U.S. Constitution, “excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishnients
inflicted” (U.S. Constitution, Amend 8). The fiindamental basis for the Eighth Amend
ment is the whole notion that the state cannot use excessiveaess to exact revenge or to
force confession—-that such motivations on the part of the state are in clear violation of
an iadiwduai’s procediiial right to life. While the first parts o f the Eighth Amendment,
dealing with excessive bail and excessive fines, are certainly important to an individuars

T ie additioiMl lib silia ctMtained wiiiio the Bill of R i'^ts woald ^rv e as good fodder fw a<Miticmal re s ^ c h beyoad the text presented here. The three areas briefly analyzed at the end are for illastratioB purposes only.
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dae process rights, it is the latter part o f the Ameadmeiil:, d o lin g specifically with cmel
and anasaai pimisiMneats, that is o f primary interest: h a ’s. The principles bom out o f the
language o f the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and untisiial punishmeiits
bear witness to the importance o f an individaars “right to life” within the Ainerican
system o f legal jarisprudence. Mowhere else in Americaa conslitutioeal law are an
indmdiiaFs procedural dae process rights any more important than they axe with respect
to that person’s own protection against the OYerwhelmiog power of the state to inflict
pimislmieiit upon him. Indeed, it is in this realm that an individual's “ri,ght to life” cam
tiiiiy come down to a literal umdsrstancfiiig o f the phrase itself. In this regard, what has
been the U.S. Supreme Court’s perspective on an individual’s right to life as it speci
fically pertains to the issue o f capitel punishmeiit?
Interestiagly, just as the U.S. Supreme Court lias bees w iling to provide for the
proeeduiai protection of an individuars right to life against imreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has also been wiliiag to extend similar procedural protection o f an
individuars r i ^ t to life against ciiiel and unusual puBishments. For instance, in the case
o f Furman vs. Georgia^ the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while capital punishment is
m t itself an iisconstitetional practice, the procedures by which it is executed may be .. .
(408 U.S. 238, 238-242).^^^ Clearly, as the Court stated in the case o f L o c k ti vs. Ohio,
other “mltigatiiig factors,” such as a defendant’s prior history, must be allowed to come
into play when an iadividaars own life is in jeopardy (438 U.S. 586, 604-609).*^'' As
Chief Justice Warren Burger writes; “When the choice is between life and death, [any]

Pmrmm m. G-mr^ei, 4l)i O.S. 23i (1972).
iocfe# w. Ohio, 438 U-S. 586 (1978).
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risk is iinacceptable and iiicx>iiipatible with die coiMaands o f the Eighth and Foiirteenth
AmeinJineiits” (438 U.S. 586,605). More recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions Imve only
farther entianeed the whole notion of mdividualized sentencing, as it specifically relates
to the death penalty. In Thompson vs. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that a minor may not be
executed who at the time o f the murder was at the age of fifteen or younger (487 U.S.

815) .’^^
Right to Liberty: Freedoia o f Speech

According to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right o f the people
peaceably to assenable, and to petition the government for a redress o f grievaac®” (U.S.
Constitution, Amend. 1). All of these guarantees, as set forth within the U.S. Comtitation, are similarly related to an individuaFs inalienable right to liberty. At the same
time, though, none of them are by any sense of the word “absolute” ia breadth. No
indiwdeal, for instance, has any more right to slander a fellow being than a newspaper
has to libel Mm. Just flie same, no individual or group of individuals may show up at a
court’s doorstep to demonstra,te a recent raling without some form o f prior aotification.
The individual has m inalienable right to whatever liberty he wishes to express, but only
so long as the expression o f that liberty does not infringe upon the rights o f others or does
not lead to any fomi of offensive conduct? In this regard, what has been the U.S.
Supreme Court’s perspective on an individuaFs right to liberty as it specifically pertains
to the issue of speech?

Thompson vs. OMa/ioma, 487 U.S. 815 (19S8).
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As with its treatment o f the rsiigion clauses to the F is t Araendineiit o f the
Comtitiitioa, the U.S. Supreme Coiirt has shown similar respect to the issue of speech.
An indiYidual may freely engage in whatever speech (i.e., personal expression) he so
desires, so long as that speech itself does not incite nnacceptabie conduct. For instance,
an individual may freely bam an Amsricaa flag as a symbolic gesture of protest agaiiist
the political establishment, but that same individual must also take care that such actions
do not incite violence (488 U.S. 884).^"^ Lighting “Old Glory” up in front of a veterans’
hall may not be the smartest move to imke. The timing of the speech is, in many respects,
absolutely pivotal to its acceptability and overall constitutioiiality. At one time, coadenMiiag the American government at a time of war constituted a “clear and present danger” to
the very fabric of public oMer (249 U.S. 4 7 )/^ However, in later y eas, advocating the
violent overthrow of the American government would only constitute a “bad tendency”
effect (268 U.S. 652).’'’'^ Even pornography has come under the protection o f the First
Amendment, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Couit, so long o f course that it is
acceptable by “connnniiity” standards and does not include minors (413 U.S. 5 and 495
U.S. 103).'^®

According to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Comtitution, “no person shall be
.. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compeasation” (U.S. Constitution, Amend.

“
**

Texas » . JoMson, 488 U.S. 884 (1989).
Schenckvs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Githw vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Miller vs. Caiifemm, 413 U.S. 5 (1973); and Osimme vs. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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5). The Fourtettth Ameadiiieiit underscores tiis protectioii by fttrther adding that “no
state shall [likewise] . . . deprive any person o f life, liberty, or prof^rty, witlioiit due
process of law"’ (U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14, Sec. 1). The Takings Clause, sometimes
also referred to as eminent domain, allows the goYemment the “power to take private
property for public purposes, subject to the just compeasatioii of the owners” (O’Brieii,
2003, p. 286). Under certain circiimstances, for instance, the state may have to purchase
private property for the purpose o f rumnng an interstate highway througli i t This is a
fairly clearcut and straightforward example o f a situation involving the govemmeat’s
power of eminent domain, and one that has readily been applied since the creation o f
America’s interstate highway system back in the 1950s. However, the issue becomes
blurrier when the govemnient has not actually invoked flie Takings Clause, but the effects
o f its actions would seemingly ap|»ar otherwise. In this regard, what has been the U.S.
Supreme Court’s perspective on an individuaFs right to property as it specifically per
tains to the issue of eminent domain?
To determine whether or not eminent domain is at issue, the U.S. Supreme Court
must effectively pose three simple questions: (1) What has in fact been taken; (2) Does it
have a public use; and (3) Have the owners been Justly compensated? In Pennsylvania
Coal Co, vs, ifakon, the Court ruled that in order for private property to bs considered as
taken, the owner must dsmonstrate tta t he has in fact suffered a nearly complete loss to
the use of Ms property (260 U.S. 393).^^® In tm n s o f public use, the Court has reasoned,
as set forth in Hawaii Housing Authority vs. M'lidkiff, that '%here the exercise o f the
eminent domaia power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Coart has

Penmytmnia Coal Co. vs. Mahon, 260 tf.S. 393 (1922).
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never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Claase” (467 U.S.
229, 2 4 1 )/* Clearly, private properly may be takes so long as a “legitimate publie
purpose” is demonstrated witfiin the confines of the state’s power (467 U.S. 229, 245). In
terms o f jast coiapsnsation, the Court has simply stipulated that a “fair market value” be
appraised (169 U.S. 557, 557-576).*'^^ As slated ia the case o f Sackm vs. Fort Street
Union Depot Co., “all that is essential is that in some appropriate way, before some
properly constituted triburial, inquiry shall be made as to the amount of compensation,
and when this t e been provided there is that dae proiess o f law which is required by the
Constitution” (169 U.S. 557,569).

Conclasion

In the end, the research and analysis conducted here demonstrates that the U.S.
Supreme Coiiil has historically played a pivotal role in promoting the various tenets of
classical liberalism, as represented by the individual’s inaiienable right to life, liberty,
and property. What one should come away from this analysis with is an understanding
Ihst the U.S. Supreme Court has remained consistent in its treatment of individual free
doms and liberties. And to a large extent, this holds trae regardless of the Court’s ideo
logical eompositioa, whether that be liberal or conservative. The landmark cases that
have been selected for this endeavor cover, for the most part, the entire history o f the U.S.
Supreme Court’s existence in American govemment No particular Court has been
selected for analysis and scratiiiy. O f course, different Courts have focused their attention

Hmvmii HomiBgAutkmity vs. M i& iff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Backus vs. Fori Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1898).
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.and time on difterent issues, but they have all still remained consistent in placing
particular deference upon the righfe o f the individual. In some cases, the- U.S. Supretne
Court has mired itself in controversy, particularly when it has substantively incorporated
additiomi rights into the U.S. ConstitutiorL The addition o f “liberty o f contract” to the
Constitsitioa, for instance, eventually brou,ght the Court into confrontation with its fellow
branches o f govsniment, particularly the presidency. Just the same, although not speci
fically alluded to here in any detail, the addition of a “right to privacy” to the Constitution
has had similar controversial results. The U.S. Supreme Court is traiy an unusual institutioa within the Ainerican system o f goverament By the fact that it is not directly
accountable to the American people, to the pressures of their majoritarian tendencies, has
made it the “right institution” for protecting and preserving the individual’s right to life,
liberty, and property. No other institutioii within American govemmeiit couM have done
what the U.S. Supreme Court has accomplished with respect to individual rights over its
200 plus years of existence. While numerous judicial scholars have chosen to depict the
U.S. Supreme Court as an institotioii o f unusuai paradox, it is this very same institutioii
that has been the strongest proponent o f those classical liberal beliefs and values that
form the foundation of American government The U.S. Supreme Court, in this regard,
has remained steadfast in its protection and promotion of Americaa individaalism. It has,
in the words o f Justice Harian Stone, ensured that such ideals aie “"preserved at ail costs”
(310 U.S. 586, 606-607).” ^
While niiHieroiis studies have been conducted on the U.S. Supreme Court, most of
them have either sought to detemiliie a proper role for the Court within American

Mimrsvilie School District vs. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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democracy, or have sought to find ways o f explaining the Court’s power. This research
endeavor

been altogether different is that its primary objective has been to detennine

if in fact a to e linkage exists between the Court’s intexprstation of the Constitution and
the founding fathers’ admiration and respect for classical liberal principles (i.e„ individ
ualism). Clearly, the deinoastratioa o f such a consection adds a whole new dimension to
the study of judicial politics. O f course, one might just as well say that the U.S. Supreme
Court is only adhering to original intent This is indeed very true; the Court is adhering to
original intent But the whole notioa of original intent is oftentimes an illusive concept
that is to a large degree subject to one’s own interpretation. The connection here is
altogether different; it is between the U.S. Supreme Court and a particular political
philosophy that many of the founding fathers accepted as part o f their own set of beliefs
and values. The respect and admiration for the rights o f the individual that classical
liberalism promotes remains central throughout the Court’s history, regardless of whether
or not original intent is at issue or not. If rights and liberties are involved (i.e., life,
liberty, and property^), then it is safe to assume that the individual is at the focal point of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s attention—that he is preeminent to all other considerations.
Ideally, the research and analysis conducted here is only the beginning. Further study is
strongly recommended to detenniae if such a relationship holds trae in other constitutioiml areas o f concsm. The brief allusion at the end to cruel and unusual punishineiits,
freedom o f speech, and eminent domain is certainly fodder for more in-depth research
and analysis. Moreover, while the analysis conducted here has been more qualitative in
nature, the demonstration of such a relationsMp between the U.S. Supreme Court and
American individualism is certainly open to quantitative (i.e., statistical) analysis. Indeed,
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some form of quantitative analysis is strongly rscoiBmeaded to further test the hypothesis
o f this researeh endeavor—

fijitber enhance and underscore its conclusions. The first

step into a relatively new area of judicial politics has been taken; it is now time for
further refiiiemeiit of that step and for further exploration into others.
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